/ 3
AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY COMMITMENT TO VIETNAM
This Paper, which the Government has had
prepared on the Australian involvement in
Vietnam, is tabled in accordance with the
Prime Minister's statement in the House of
Representatives on Tuesday, 13 May, 1905.
AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM
This paper has been prepared in accordance with a direction
from the Prime Minister of Australia that an objective appraisal should
be made of Australia' s military involvement in South Vietnam.
The decision in April 1965 to send a battalion for active
service in South Vietnam was the crucial issue in Australia's
commitment. However, that decision can only be interpreted in the
light of the development of Australian policy in the four preceding
years, and the significance of the decision only appears in the two
years following the decision when further forces were committed. This
paper is therefore presented in three parts:
Part 1 Australia Vietnam 1961-64
Part 2 Australia Vietnam 1965
Part 3 Australia Vietnam 1965-67
To reduce the records of seven years of government ( 1961-67)
to a few pages must inevitably result in over-simplification and the
degree of over-simplification must be the measure of any distortion
which results. In highlighting the main issues involved there are
certain generalisations which can be made which will stand under
detailed examination. These generalisations are based only on official
documents and are concerned primarily with Australian provision of aid
of a military nature to South Vietnam. No account is taken of
Australia's domestic political issues, of party pressures or of public
opinion, all of which played a large part in explaining the decisions
and the negotiations mentioned in this paper.
Despite the fact that the Government of South Vietnam on
29 April 1965 announced that the Australian battalion was sent in
, response to a request from South Vietnam, this is not borne out by the
evidence of the documents.
There were requests for aid of various sorts from South
Vietnam to assist in its effort against growing communist insurgency,
but the requests for military aid were largely generated by initiatives
from the United States. These initiatives were political and not
military in motive. The United States did not need the military aid
but it did desire the military presence of its friends and allies in
order to show to the world that the United States was not alone in
its efforts against communism in South East Asia, to show that it was
not replacing French colonialism in the area and in order to re-assure
Governments indigenous to the Area that members of SEATO were in fact
prepared to make a practical contribution to defence against communism.
In providing aid the Australian Government always insisted
that it should be acceptable to the South Vietnamese Government and
many assurances to that effect were received from Vietnam. However,
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in pursuing its paramount concern with the American alliance and
Australian forward defence interests the Australian Government over
a period of time showed in its actions and particularly in the process
of negotiations minimal consideration for Vietnamese wishes.
Nevertheless, the South Vietnamese attitude to the question
of military aid was somewhat equivocal. At first they believed that
they, the South Vietnamese, were capable of solving the problem of
insurgency and they were opposed to the possibility of Western forces
fighting on South Vietnamese soil and killing Vietnamese citizens
whether of the North or the South. However, with the growing success
of the insurgency and with the escalation of aid to the insurgents
from North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union, successive South
Vietnamese Governments came to accept the realities of their political
and military weaknesses and were prepared to accept Western military
aid. This acceptance was often in response to American pressure.
However, opposition remained; this opposition was due in part to a
fear of the capital which opposition forces both in North and South
Vietnam could make out of a Western presence, and in part to the
national and military pride of the South Vietnamese people and
particularly of the Generals. This produced an official state of mind
which although prepared to accept a Western military presence as an
undesirable necessity was still reluctant to ask directly for military
aid. Moreover, there was widespread resentment of the increasingly
insensitive actions of Western Governments in pressing aid upon them.
Offers of aid could be accepted but direct requests were very
reluctantly forthcoming and on occasion, only under pressure.
Australian military assistance to South Vietnam was not at
any time in response to a request for defence aid from South Vietnam
as a Protocol State to SEATO as a Treaty organisation. Although
successive Australian Governments sought publicly to justify their
actions as being " in the context of" or " flowing from" Australia's
membership of SEATO and the theory of the Protocol State or on the
ground that military assistance under SEATO could be on a bilateral
as well as a collective basis, the commitment was in fact made as a
projection of the forward defence policy to which they were committed.
Australian military aid to South Vietnam was in fact offered
and supplied in response to the known and frequently expressed wishes
of the United States for political support from its friends and allies,
even though the offer of a battalion rather than an agreement to meet
other specific requests from the United States was made to suit the
interests of the Australian defence development program.
The provision of military aid by Australia was decided upon
for political reasons and was in support of the fundamental aim of
Australian policy towards South Vietnam, which was to ensure the long
term defence interests of Australia. These were seen in terms of the
ANZUS and SEATO Treaties and the theory of forward defence against the
victory of communism in South East Asia, an area seen as vital to
Australia's future. This was a policy developed in Australia independently
of any outside pressure. The cornerstone of this policy was
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seen as a compelling necessity to commit the power of the United
States to the Asian area and thus to commit her to a
practical guarantee of active support to Australia through the ANZUS
and SEATO Treaties. Australia's concern over the stability of South Vietnam as
part of the general defence against communism in South East Asia grew
in intensity in proportion to the growing success of communist
insurgency in South Vietnam.
Despite Australia's concern over Indonesia and the possibility,
given Australian commitment in Malaysia, of over-committing Australia' s
limited defence forces, the Australian Government wished to react
positively to American hints for assistance. A growing bense of
urgency as a result of insurgent success produced an increasing
willingness at the political level to make further military commitments
to the defence of South Vietnam. By December 1964 through January
1965 this reached a peak where Australia's policy makers, being most
anxious about what appeared to them to be hesitancy and confusion in
America's policy, were eager to convince the United States of the need
for more resolute policy and more active measures.
The Australian Government' s four decisions 1965-67 to
increase combat forces in Vietnam were logical extensions of the
decision of April 1965. Negotiations concerning these extensions
illustrate once again the dominance in Australian official thinking
of the concept of forward defence, and the importance of the American
alliance. The negotiations also reveal once again constant United
States pressure at political, diplomatic and service levels. The
period is marked also by little concern with Vietnam' s wishes and
national sensitivities. There is one further problem which has been the subject of
public debate but about which it is difficult to come to an~ . fif
conclusion, that is the question as to when Australian forcesysecame
actively involved in combat situations. There is no doubt about the
official directives on this matter. When the first instructors were
sent to South Vietnam, the directive to their Commanding Officer
specifically precluded any activities other than those necessary to a
training role unless the prior consent of the Australian Government had
been obtained. Moreover, despite the wishes of the South Vietnamese
Government to concentrate the Australian instructors in a northern
province subject to insurgent activities, the instructors were located
in base training areas and not in any province likely to be over-run
by insurgents. However, the military authorities, recognising the
realities of the situation, suggested that the instructors would
probably be involved in combat situations produced by insurgent attacks.
Nevertheless, the official directive was given precluding any activity
other than the instructional role. When in May 1964 an additional
instructors were sent to South Vietnam it was then agreed that the
role of the AATTV should be extended to permit their employment in the
field at battalion and lower levels as advisers, and it was recognised
that, in the circumstances, casual~ ties were to be expected. So that
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the official record is clear, the decision to permit instructors to
move into the field where it was probable that they would be involved
in combat situations was not taken until May 1964. However, whether or
not before May 1964 individual Australian instructors working with
American units participated as advisers in the sort of active patrol
activity that would bring them into " combat situations" can only be
determined by a detailed examination of Australian and American unit
and command reports. Certainly, the Australian authorities knew on
23 May 1962 that the United States advisers were involved in combat
situations nor was this denied publicly, although it was somewhat
qualified in public announcements by the United States.
AUSTRALIA VIETNAM 1961-64
Early in October 1961 the Australian Government became
aware that the United States was so concerned at the situation in
South Vietnam that it was considering military intervention.
Australian intelligence sources took a similarly pessimistic view,
reporting during November 1961 that within six months Government
forces in South Vietnam might be incapable of mounting significant
offensive operations without massive assistance and that
intervention on the scale of at least two divisions would be
necessary if an adequate breathing space against Viet Cong attacks
were to be ensured. There were nevertheless doubts among some
Australian officials that such assistance would prove effective.
The Charge d'Affaires in Saigon admitted in November 1961 that he
had " serious doubts about the efficacy of introducing Western
ground troops", although he believed that President Diem and his
officials would welcome them; he suggested, however, that Western
naval and air forces could make an important contribution. The
Australian defence authorities considered that although foreign
intervention might contain and even eradicate Viet Cong control
( providing access through neighbouring borders could be sealed
off) it would not be capable of removing the Viet Cong influence
which had been felt by so many for so long.
on 17 November 1961 the Australian Ambassador in
Washington was officially informed that the United States was
considering increasing its assistance to the Republic of Vietnam,
although this assistance would be in the form of equipment,
transport, training and advisers rather than combat forces; an
indication of Australia' s views and willingness to assist was
requested. The Australian Prime Minister replied on 26 November
that he was examining the possibility of increasing Australian
assistance to the Republic of Vietnam and hoped to be able to make
a decision after the coming Federal election.
The first Australian initiative came, however, from~ the
Ambassador in Washington who reported on 5 December that
demonstrable Australian support for the Republic of Vietnam would
make a very favourable impression on the United States Administration
and suggested that Australia might supply counter-insurgency
training personnel, small arms and ammunition. These suggestions
were discussed by representatives of the Departments of External
Affairs, Defence, Navy, Army and Air on 14 December. It was
clear from this meeting that the motivation for providing
assistance was predominantly political and that the Services were
unwilling, for manpower reasons, to make more than a token
commitment to the Republic of Vietnam. Accordingly the Ambassador
in Washington was informed on 19 December that while Australia
could supply some small arms and ammunition it could make no more
thaA' a token contribution in training.
6-
Suggestions from the United States Administration that
Australia should give military aid to the Republic of Vietnam were
clearly initiated by the State Department rather than the Pentagon.
The United States military authorities in Saigon told the
Australian Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam in December 1961
that no Australian assistance was required in either training or
the supply of arms and ammunition. The United States Ambassador
to the Republic of Vietnam said, however, that he regarded an
early increase in the Australian contribution ( he appears to have
had in mind the use of military personnel at least for the protection
of civilian projects) as a matter of the highest importance. On
16 February 1962 the Australian Ambassador in Washington reported
that there had been considerable resistance in the Pentagon to the
use of non-American foreign military personnel in South Vietnam,
but that the Pentagon had now agreed to a State Department
proposal to ask Australia for counter-insurgency and jungle fighting
instructors. During March 1962 Australia received two approaches from
the Republic of Vietnam on the question of military assistance.
On 13 March the Australian Ambassador in Saigon reported that the
Republic of Vietnam . s Assistant Defence Minister had asked if
Australian military in-3tructors in Malaya could assist in the
training ( in Malaya) of the Vietnamest= Civil Guard. On 31 March
President Diem wrote to the Australian Prime Minister, setting out
the Republic of Vitnms case against the communists and noting
that the Republic " has been compelled to appeal for increased
military assistance and support from Free World countries to help
prevent it from being overwhelmed". The message concluded by
requesting that Australia. should condemn communist aggression.
Between February and May 1962 Australian policy moved
towards military assistance to South Vietnam. On 16 February the
Ambassador in Washington cabled a recommendation that any American
request should be considered favourably because the provision of
even a handful of instructors would help make Australia's mark
with the United States Administration. On receipt of this cable
the Minister for External Affairs asked the Minister for Defence
if the Australian Army could supply suitable officers for training
work in South Vietnam and the latter replied on 14 March that
while Australia could make no more than a token contribution in
training it would be possible to make available 10 officers and
some warrant and non-commissioned officers. At the ANZUS Council
meeting in Canberra on 9 May the Prime Minister told Admiral ! ILD. Felt,
Commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, that Australia was
willing to supply instructors and this decision was endorsed by
Ministers on 15 May, provided that a request was received from
the Republic of Vietnam. Although Felt admitted that Australian
military assistance was not at that time needed, he said that
America regarded our military presence in South Vietnam as most
important and suggested that we might also supply two radar patrol
ships, engineer units, a signals unit and one transport aircraft.
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These suggestions were made known to Ministers on 15 May and although
no specific decisions were made it was agreed that any early
disposition of Australian military forces in South East Asia should
be at the request of the Government involved and preferably carried
out as part of a SEATO operation, to avoid the appearance of a non-
Asian intervention. Two days later the defence authorities agreed
that Australia should offer up to 30 Army training personnel and
one Dakota transport aircraft, but Feltos suggestion of two radar
patrol vessels was not approved.
On 24 May 1962 the Minister for Defence announced
publicly that Australia. was providing military instructors "' at the
invitation of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam". The
correctness of this claim is, however, a matter of interpretation,
unless the Republic of Vietnam's appinaches in March are to be
considered a sufficient invitation. The Australian offer was
communicated to President Diem on 10 May by Admiral Felt, who had
flown straight to Saigon from the ANZUS meeting. Diem was
reported to have expressed great satisfaction. On 18 May the
Republic of Vietnam's Ambassador in Canberra informed the Department
of External Affairs that his Government accepted with pleasure
Australia's offer of instructors, but there appears to have been
no direct approach by Australia until 25 May, when the Ambassador
in Saigon handed a copy uf the Deftnce Minister's statement
( already made public in Australia) to Diem; the latter again
expressed great satisfa~ ction and asked for his appreciation to be
conveyed to the Australian Government
Military 6dvisers recognised that Australian instructors
would be liable to Viet Cong attack at any time and would probably
have to carry arms. The probability that they would become
involved in operations against the Viet Cong was not explicitly
stated in the Defence Minister s public announcementalthough it
could be argued that it was implied. However the official
directive to the Commander of the force forbade any activity other
than training. There remained only a. decision on how the Australian
instructors were to be employed. The Government of the Republic of
Vietnam at first wanted them to establish an independent jungle
training school in the northern province of Quang Ngai, an area in
which Diem feared a Viet Cong breakthrough. Diem's reasoning
appears to have bnen that commitment to such an area ( he likened
it to the Dardanelles) would encourage a deeper Australian
involvement and that any disaster there might lead to massive
third nation intervention. The future leader of the Australian
team visited Quang Ngai and reported that it would be a difficult
but challenging project within the capacity of the team, but it was
strongly opposed by both United States and Australian army
authorities, the latter arguing that it was an area of high Viet
Cong activity in which the team would be likely to become involved
in action outside the instructional field; there was, in any case,
no United States logistic support available and it was undesirable
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to have to depend on South Vietnamese forces. It was then
recommended that the team be divided and integrated with United
States staff, 4 instructors going to headquarters in Saigon, 22 to
three locations in the Hue area and 4 to Due My ( near Nha Trang).
The allocation of the instructors to training establishments was
announced by the Minister for Defence on 26 July 1962, approval of
the terms of the announcement having already been received from the
Republic of Vietnam. The Minister for External Affairs was
obviously disappointed that the political impact of the Australian
contribution should have been diminished by the team's dispersal
and integration with the United States instructors. Three months
later the Minister for External Affairs asked the Minister for
Defence if more instructors could be provided for South Vietnam,
but this suggestion was opposed by the Army because of the strain
it would place on manpower resources.
The next request for assistance came on 14 February 1963
when the Australian Ambassador in Saigon reported that the United
States might ask Australia for a small R. A. A. F. component. He
recommended sympathetic consideration of such a request on the
grounds that the Americans believed that they were winning the war
and that it was time for Australia to make a contribution and get
some share of the credit. The Ambassador was told that Australia
would prefer not to receive sbich a request and he communicated this
to the United States authorities in Saigon, but on 2 April Australia
nevertheless retceived a United SLates request for one Dakota
squadron and 16 additional pilots. The real difficulty posed by
this request was the need to explain a. change from a non-combatant
to a combatant role to the Au~ tralian public. The formal reason
for refusal, which was convcyed to Admiral Felt on 4 April 1963,
was that the possible re-equipment of R. A. A. FO transport with
Caribou aircraft made the supply of Dakotas impossible. The
following month the United States -again asked for 16 R. A. A. F.
Dakota pilots, the request being re-inforced by representations
from the Republic of Vietnam' s Ambassador in Canberra on 24 May
1963. Defence opposed the request because of manpower shortage
and although External Affairs saw some merit in accepting it was
decided that the Army training team was sufficient to demonstrate
Australian support for the United States.
At the April 1964 SEATO Council meeting in Manila it was
agreed that members should if necessary be prepared to take further
concrete steps to support the Republic of Vietnam. On 6 May 1964
the United States Embassy in Canberra delivered a note to the
Department of External Affairs which emphasised President Johnson0' s
desire for more free world countries to " show their flags" in
South Vietnam, listed existing non-American assistance and suggested
that Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom might between them
provide a range of army and air training personnel, pilots,
reconnaissance aircraft, forward air controllers, communications
engineers, shipyard advisers and medical and dental teams. A few
days later the United States Embassy in Canberra delivered a more
detailed list of items specifically requested from Australia. It
included:
a minimum of 6 three-man battalion adviser teams
an additional training cadre for corps centre
additional special forces personnel
a. helicopter unit
a fixed wing observation and liaison unit
a fixed wing transport unit
2 or 3 surgical teams.
Both the Australian Embassy in Washington and the
Department of External Affairs urged that the American request
should be considered sympathetically. The former cabled on 11 May
1964 that while it was appreciated that there were physical
limitations to what the Commonwealth could do it was recommended
that we should make as prompt and positive a response as possible.
South Vietnam was an area in which we could, without disproportionate
expenditure, pick up a lot of credit with the United States. Our
objective should be to achieve such an habitual closeness of relations
with the United States and sense of mutuail alliance that in our time
of need ( the possibility of a crisis in relations with Indonesia) the
United States would have little option but to respond as we would
want. In Canberra a Department of External Affairs memorandum
suggested that:, while the value of the Australian training team
should not be underestimated, our main object in providing
additional assistance wa~ s that of supporting the United States and
encouraging Thailand. The Minister for External Affairs appears to
have shared these vitw-, sending a cable to the Embassy in Washington
on 14 May which said " We should like the United States Government to
know that we are anxious to rEply promptly and sympathetically to
their suggestions" The United States prapoba16 were referred for consideration
to the relevant defence advisers who reported that South Vietnam was
a key strategic area and that if it. fell the West would be unlikely
to hold Laos, Cambodia and Thailand; this would in turn make the
future of Malaysia, Indonesia and the 7hilippines very uncertain. A
further argument in favour of increased assistance was that it would
influence the obligation -which the United States might feel to
Australia in an emergency. After examining the resources and
commitments of the types of personnel an d equipment requested they
recommended that Australia could offer:
an additional 30 N. C. O. s for the army training team
an army dental team
an army driving/ servicing instructional team together
with a light aid workshop detachment
a detachmenc of 6 Caribou transport aircraft
( by October 1964).
It was also recommended that the role of the army training team
should be extended to permit its employment in the field at battalion
and lower levels as advisers. These recommendations were accepted
10
by Ministers on 29 May. It was recognised that Australian casualties
must be expected if the army training team were to be employed in the
field. Details of the Australian decision were cabled immediately
to the Australian Ambassador in Saigon with instructions to inform
the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. The Vietnamese Ambassador
in Canberra was informed the same day and reminded of his earlier
discussions with the Department of External Affairs. The Ambassador
agreed that Australia could announce that the increased aid was being
made after consultation with the South Vietnamese and United States
Governments. The Australian Ambassador in Saigon later reported that
Acting Foreign Minister Mau had expressed warm appreciation of the
decision and agreed with the reference to prior consultations with
the South Vietnamese and United States Governments.
The final arrangements were, however, delayed by doubts as
to whether all the assistance offered was actually needed. Mau told
the Australian Ambassador on 1 June that Australia could take it
that there was a requirement for all aid items proposed, but the
United States Charge d'Affaires and military authorities in Saigon
subsequently stated that there was no military requirement for the
army dental teams, the army driving/ servicing instructional team or
the light aid workshop det. chment. They suggested that Australia
should instead send an additional 2. army training personnel. In
consequence the public announcement of Australia's increased
commitment made by the Minister for Defence on 9 June omitted the
items not required by the United States authorities, but noted that
consultations were proceeding for the provision of some 20 army
instructors in addition to the 60 already definitely committed. The
text of the Minister's statement were forwarded to Saigon to allow a
parallel announcement there, but the Vietnamese were given no prior
warning of the changes in the Australian contribution. The Vietnamese
Foreign Minister was also given the text of the announcement and on
June he wrote to the Australian Ambassador expressing his " keen
satisfaction" at the imminent arrival of .30 new instructors and the
Caribou aircraft and at the prospect that 20 other technicians
might also be sent. On L7 June the Australian Ambassador reported
that the Embassy in Saigon had been mildly embarrassed by
successive instructions from Canberra to inform the Vietnamese of
Australia's decision to provide additional aid, to ask the
Vietnamese if these items were needed and then, having been assured
that they were needed, to inforn the Vietnamese chat some of them
would not be provided.
The United States military authorities' request for a
third group of Australian army advisers was supported by a senior
Australian officer who visited Saigon in June 1964 and the team was
increased in number from 60 to 83. The team suffered its first
combat casualty ( one soldier had been accidentally killed on 1 June
1963) on 6 June 1964 when Warrant Officer K. G. Conway was killed
during a Viet Cong attack on a special forces camp 35 miles west
of Da Nang.
11
During July 1964 the Prime Minister of the Republic of
Vietnam, General Khanh, addressed a written appeal for assistance to
the Heads of Government of 34 countries, including Australia. As
translated and published in Saigon on 25 July the letter expressed the
firm hope " that your government will kindly grant us all the support
you deem possible and opportune in order to help us successfully fight
the Communist aggression". In Australia's case this written approach
was followed up on 5 August by the Republic of Vietnam's Ambassador
in Canberra, who called on the Acting Secretary of the Department of
External Affairs to formally thank Australia for assistance already
given and to request " continuing help". There was no direct Australian
response to these requests, although the Minister for External Affairs
wrote to a number of countries commending General Khanh's appeal.
The Austra. lian Government. continued to view with concern
the deteriorating political and military situation in South Vietnam.
On 3 September 1964 the Minist. r for External Affairs sent a cable to
all Australian representatives abroad emphasising that our national
interests were to
help a government in South Vietnam which would
continue to fight the Viet Cong, oppose North
Vietnam and give some hope of eventually unifying
the : ountry
retain an ac. tivn Uni. t. ed Sta. es presence in
South Vietnam
Spreveat a failure in South Vietnam which would lead
to a collapse of the will to resist, in other countries.
Australia also sought to gain a clearer idea of how far the
Americans were prepared to compipr. them-e. lve. s in Vietnam, but it became
evident that the Ur. it,-d States would maintain only a holding
operation until after the November presidential Clectiono Once the
electioh was over the m. om. ntum of American policy, encouraged by the
ever= worsening situation i. n Vitn. rbam, began to increase. The
Australian Minist. er for External Affairs, who visited Washington in
late November, was tcl. d by D,. feo. ce. Secretary McNamata that if it
became necessary to apply i. ncr. etased pressure on North Vietnam by air
attack it. would be very helpful tc have. Australian aircraft ( ei. her
participating or standing by to protect Thailand, Laos and South
Vietnam. McNamara said that the United States would be looking
chiefly for a public demonstration of Australian support.. On 4
December 1964, White House Adviser William Bundy gave the Ambassador
in Washington a clearer indication of the directi. on of American policy.
This envisaged that, although the instability of the Government of
the Republic of Vietnam at present precluded a sharp new program, any
further dramatic activity by the Vi. et Cong would be opposed by air
strikes in North. Viet. nam and the stationing of surface-to-air missiles
and one division or two battalions of United States marines near the
border between Nort. h and South Vietnam. Bundy said Australia might.
contribute 200 extra combat advisers to such a force, but he did not
have in mind the use of Australian fighter aircraft.
On 10 December 1964 the Republic of Vietnam. Prime Minister
( Huong) made a strong direct request for increased Australian military
assistance to the Australian Minister for Air, who was then visiting
12
Saigon. Huong asked for more army instructors and air assistance
and argued that Australia's security depended on the survival of
South Vietnam; the Americans, he said, felt lonely and hesitant in
their present position and needed stiffening by the support of
nations like Australia. However, the Australian Ambassador
believed that this request was inspired by the United States.
No doubt prompted by the trend of events in Washington,
Defence already had increased Australian assistance under
consideration when Huong's appeal was received. On 11 December a
committee reported that Australia could supply:.
one infantry battalion
one squadron of the SAS Rngiment
logistic support elements
approximately 10 additional army instructors
HMAS ydney'and 2 frigates/ destroyers for
transporting the above.
Three days later, however, the Prime Minister received a message
from President Johnson which suggested that Australia provide:
200 additional combat advisers
minesweepers LSTS salvage and repair ships
hospital ships.
The list appears to have been drawn up without an adequate knowledge
of the equipment of the Australian armed services, which did not
possess any of the last three items. The recommendation from
Defence, reported on ' 16 December, was that Australia could supply
17 more instructors ( bringing the team in Vietnam up to a total of
100), but that commitments in Malaysian -waters would make it
undesirable and perhaps impracticable to offer any minesweepers.
The Prime Minister sent a personal message to President Johnson on
18 December informing him that Australia was unable to supply
either the ships requested or any significant number of army
instructors. Australia was however willing to send representatives
to discuss the possible positioning of United States, Australian and
New Zealand troops in the northern parts of South Vietnam. This was
followed by a cable from the Minister for External Affairs to the
Australian Ambassador in Washington on 22 December which emphasised
that while Australia was not qualifying her support for the American
effort in South Vietnam, it was important to know how far the
United States was prepared to go and what would be the outcome of
escalation and/ or negotiation.
13
AUSTRALIA-VIETNAM 1965
The Decision The fundamental reasons for Australia's providing
combatant ground forces in South Vietnam in 1965 are vividly
demonstrated in negotiations between the time in December 1964 when
Australia agreed to contingency staff talks concerning the possibility
of sending troops to South Vietnam, and the actual offer of the
battalion in April 1965.
Ihe basic concept behind the Australian action was that of
forward defence. This rested in turn on a belief in the fundamental
strategic importance in Australia's defence of the South East Asia
area, and on the necessity to prevent the spread of communism and
political instability in the area. Gliven Australia's military
weakness, this policy had to depend for success upon membership of
ANZUS and SEATO, and above all upon the presence of the United
States in the area. To this end it was Australia's aim to ensure
that the United States did not waver in its commitment to South East
Asia and to support the American presence politically, diplomatically
and if necessary militarily. It was believed that only by these
methods could real mEaning be given to the ANZUS Agreement and
Australia's defence bE assured. All these elements appear in the
following review of Austratia's diplomatic activity during the
period January to April ' 19b5.
On 7 January 1965 Australia's Ambassadors in Washington and
Saigon were informed that Ministers were gravely cuncerned at the
outlook in Vietna~ m and recognised the necess ity of taking whatever
steps were puossible-to advance Australia's vital interest in securing
success in So-uth Viet-ram. On .5 January Washington reported long
discussions with the United States officials as to their purpose and
aims, from which it became clear that military staff talks with
Australia must remain in suspense until the political situation in
Saigon was stabilibed. The Australian Ambassador supported the
United States idea uf applying progressive-pressure to North Vietnam
in order to bring Hanoi to nlegotiate. A further report received on
the 7th from Washington explained that United States policy was once
again in the doldrums, nor was it expected that mounting military
pressure upon North Vietnam would be decided upon even after the
American elections. Apparently the President preferred that the
United States should " muddle along" in South Vietnam trying to do
better with policies which had not succeeded in the past. Again on
13 January the Embassy in Washington reported that the political
situation in Saigon -was not suitable for the introduction of phase 2
of America's plans for escalating pressure. The United States was
not prepared to move. In1 Australia. on 13 January military
authorities made an assessment of the current military situation and
concluded that the prospects of victory had become more remote.
They were convinced that without strong and stable leadership or
without the introduction of a new factor such as counter action by
the United States or other nations the situation would deteriorate
Lfurther.
14
At departmental consultations in Canberra on 15 January, it
was decided that Australia should be forthcoming with the Americans
and that she should encourage the United States to plan for phase 2
( that is for air strikes between the 17th and 19th Parallels
directed against infiltration from the North). Australiaos
willingness to take part in military talks was once more expressed.
On 16 January in Saigon the Americans again raised the question of
Australian aid, saying that the greatest need was for combat
advisers. The next day the Australian Government decided to promise
full public and diplomatic support for the United States if that
country decided upon increased military activity. However on the
19th the Embassy in Washington reported that the United States was
still worried over Saigon's political instability but that military
staff talks with Australia would be relevant if the situation
improved. On 19 January lengthy Ministerial instructions were sent
from Canberra to Washington. Once again the Ambassador was informed
of Australia's grave concern at the outlook and instructed that he
should take advantage of any opportunity to bring certainty to
American policy and planning. He was to be tactful because of the
disproportion in power between Australia and the United States, but
he was to suggest that Australia would give full public and diplomatic
support if the United States were to initiate air strikes against
North Vietnam's infiltration sybtem. He was informed that the
Government did not belicvte that the Viet Cong threat was negotiable
at that stage, but the Government was also worried about the
Indonesian situation and would not support a call for a Geneva
Conference if air strikes resulted in buch a suggestion. When these
views were put to Bundy on 21 January his reply was that the
President would surely say that if we were so concerned then why
could we not contribute 50 more instructors? The necessities of
Australian defence expansion were again explained. Bundy a-gain
pointed out that there could * be no escalation inL Vietnam until the
Saigon Governmerit proved itself. The Ambassador made three points
to Bundy-he emphasised Australia's anxiety over the situation in
South Vietnam, chat it seemed to be that a coherent plan for
increasing pressure on North Vietnam was no longer in operation, and
that Australia was willing to give what help was possible. He
concluded his report by saying that Australia must keep up the
pressure. On 26 January the Ambassador reported that the Australian
Prime Minister visiting Washington shared the anxiety at the way
things were going and thought he might assure the President that we
would support him politically and militarily if pre-emptive landings
became necessary. On 28 January the Acting Prime Minister agreeing
with the Minister for External Affairs sent a message to the
Australian Prime Minister in London expressing the view that
Australia should be concerned to sustain the Americans in their
commitment to Vietnam while Australia. was doing its share in
Malaysia.
On 29 January the Minister for Defence raised with the
Americans in Saigon the possibility of stepping up the campaign. On
2 February the'Ambassador in Washington reported that we needed to
do all in our power to strengthen the American resolve, to follow a
firm line based on a credible threat against North Vietnam. It was
suggested also that an attempt should be made to clarify the extent
of the United States commitment to ANZUS. With this last point the
Minister for External Affairs disagreed, preferring to concentrate
on the essential purpose which he supposed was to remove any
hesitation on the part of the Americans and with Australia's
limited resources to go with them but not rush out in front. On
4 February Forrestal in Canberra explained that support for
America from other countries and Australia was needed because it
was important politically. In reply Forrestal was informed that it
was feasible for Australia to make a combat battalion available for
service in South East Asia if the Australian Government so decided.
On 7 February Washington reported South Vietnamese and
United States air strikes against targets in North Vietnam in
retaliation for Viet Cong attacks on United States bases and
barracks. Australian Ministers supported the action. On 9 February
the Australian Minister fur Defence told Governor Harriman in
Washington that Australia. was still ready to enter into military
staff talks concerning phase 2 operation6 just as the Prime Minister
had told President J l~~~ the previouz, D _ cember. On 10 February
the Minister for Defence reported frrr Washington that the United
States was at the edge of entering phase 2 and again pointed out,
this time to Bundy, that Australia Wa ready to enter military
staff talks. He refe-rred to Australia's own need for i, 000
instructors, wThich explained our inability to meet United States
requests of this type. When the Minister raised the possibility of
a SEATO operation in Vietnam, Bundy pointed out that for SEATO to
operate South Vietnam would h-, V tLoO dppeal for-help and he doubted
that this was wise fur fear of tt-fusai1 by some members. The same
day the Australian Amrba! ssddur coImm-ented on the new spirit of urgency
and robustness in the United S~ aLLe6 Administration, and believed
the ' beginning of phase 2 wao close. However the stage was not yet
reached w~ herLe staff Lalki could begin. The Minister for External.
Affairs repeated that the Australian aim should be to remove any
hesitation on the part of the Americans and within our limited
resources to give what aid we could. On 18 February the Mini ' ster
repeated to Washington his strong support for all the Americans had
done and his hope that in the imakediate situation the only
determinant of American action would be the effect such action
would have in checking aggres~ ion and strengthening morale in
Saigon. On 20 T'ebruary came the news that the United States was
prepared to inaugurate the staff talks and believed that it would be
necessary to put in substantial1 ground forces but not in the style
of pre-emptive landings as in the phase 2 plans. This was
reinforced by a report that the United States was not at present
considering any initiatives which might lead to peace talks. On
24 February Australia. officially agreed to participate in the
talks but emphasised that this was not an agreement to contribute
16
ground forces, and that further information as to the planned use of
forces was required. Full departmental consideration followed in
Canberra. Emphasis was again laid on the strategic importance of
South Vietnam and the necessity to give public and diplomatic
support to the American program of increased pressure on North
Vietnam. More information on United States thinking was requested.
On 29 Match the Government informed its Ambassador in Washington
that their firm support for America's present action was based on
the belief that in the present circumstances it would check
aggression, restore confidence in South Vietnam and lead towards
an acceptable settlement.
On 4 April the report on the staff talks in Honolulu was
received in Canberra. The conclusion was that the United States
wished to have a contribution of Australian forces in South Vietnam.
If approved, it was assumed that a request from the South Vietnamese
Government would follow. The Australian representative at the talks
believed that Australia should offer a battalion to the defence of
such a strategically important area. On 6 April Australian military
authorities confirmed the recommendation, believing that it was vital
to Australiaos strategic interests to have a strong United States
military presence in South East Asia., and that it was essential to
show a readinei3s to a. ssist the United States to achieve her aims in
South Vietnam. Australia should therefore offer a battalion. On
7 April the Government agreed to the recommendation and on 8 April
received a me5sage from Saigon that the United States was pleased with'
the Honolulu thslks und that their officials had once more stressed the
value in South Vietnam of " Third Country" flags. It was also
reported that the Premier of the Republic of Vietnam, Dr Quat,
appreciated the military tequiremEnt. b ut had to move cautiously in
view of possible opposition from nationalist elements.
On 9 April the Government decision was explained to the
Australian Ambassador in Washington. The Government had agreed tc
accede to what amounted to a request even though the United States
had stopped short of making a formal request. The Government
believed that the Australian battalion would be important in itself
and of great importance in present and future Australian-American
defence relationships. It ws decided also that when informing the
United States Government of the decision to offer a battalion it
should be pointed out that this would disperse Australian forces
further and would thus limit the Government's military capacity
elsewhere in South East Asia and New Guinea.. Therefore Australia
must look for support from both the United States and British
Governments in dealing with difficulties elsewhere.
However, it was nut until 13 April that the Ambassador
reported that he had made the offer of a. battalion. The delay is
explained by the e fft~ ct of President Johnson' s address at Johns
Hopkins University: it was thought that this address indicated that
the United States was again considering the possibility of
negotiation, in which case the offer of a battalion would have been
inappropriate. The offer was made to the Secretary of State on
13 April and the Secretary responded that the President would be
1.7=
most appreciative and that in his own opinion the sooner the battalion
was provided the better. The Ambassador also reported that the
Secretary had taken the point that the further dispersal of Australian
forces might require Australia to look for support from the United
States and that the President was fully aware of the United States
commitment pursuant to the ANZUS Treaty.
The Matter of the Request
In the first instance, therefore, the offer of troops by
Australia was trade to the Unitcd States and not to South Vietnam.
Article IV paragraph 3 of the SEATO Treaty stipulates that
" 1no action on the territory of any state designated under paragraph 1
of this Article or in any territory so designated shall be taken
except at the invitation or with the consent of the government
concerned". As the Australian Government used the " umbrella" of the
Treaty publicly to justify its policies in South Vietnam, the
question of invitation or consent on the part of the South Vietnamese
Government requires consideration.
The Australian Government was aware of and participated
with the United States in attempts to elicit the necessary formal
request. These efforts took place between 9 and 29 April. The
negotiations revteal the methods used and the degree of spontaneity
behind the Vietnamese request.
On 9 Aprii the Australian Ambassador in Washington
reported that the requebt would have to come as a matter of form
from the South Vietnamese Government. He added that the State
Department had given instructions that Quat should be specifically
asked to request Australia to supply the battalion.
Despite earlier reports that South Vietnam had been
informed of Australia's willingness to contribute if requested, on
12 April the Australian Ambassador in Washington reported that he
had been advised that General Taylor, the United States Ambassador
in Saigon, had not yet raised the question of the Australian battalion
with the South Vietnamese Government. On the previous day the
Australian Ambassador in Saigon had reported that, given South
Vietnamese nationalist sensitivity and the fragility of the political
front, he saw advantages in having prior consultations with the
South Vietnamese rather than simply having them informed by the
Americans that Australia would respond to a request. Otherwise,
Australian action would be seen as implying that the Australian offer
was prompted exclusively by American advice and the relationship
with the United States, and Lhat Australia was indifferent or
insensitive to Vietnamese needs, taking their eventual request for
granted and not considering them genuinely independent. On 13 April
the Australian Ambassador in Saigon reported that in Taylor's opinion
it would be better if he, together with the Australian Ambassador,
called upon Quat when the time came to inform him of the Australian
18
Government's readiness to supply a battalion if requested. However
in Washington the American view seemed to be that expressed by
Rusk, also on 13 April, that it would be better for Taylor, by
himself, to sound out Quat before Australia's offer was made.
After discussion among Ministers in Canberra as to
whether or not they should work only through the Americans, it was
agreed on 21 April that the American and Australian Ambassadors
should together see Quat in order to obtain agreement from the
Vietnamese. However in Washington Bundy~ s reaction to this
suggestion was that it would be better for Taylor to see Quat first
to make the point that Australia was ready to contribute if
requested, and only then should the Australian Ambassador approach
the South Vietnamese. The Australian Ambassador again pressed for
a joint approach, to which Bundy now agreed. However in Saigon on
24 April Taylor in fact followed the course outlined by Bundy and
raised the matter with Quat by himself. As a result, the Australian
Ambassador in Saigon on 24 April sought and on 27 April obtained
Canberra's approval to see Quat alone but he was unable to do so
until 28 April. Meanwhile on 26 April the Australian Ambassador had
reported from Washington that Quat had not yet given his agreement
and that no one knew when he would do so. It was felt that Taylor
would have to speak to Quat again if he did not reply very soon.
The Australian Government on 27 April indicated that it was
anxious that a request should be obtained as early as possible, but
on the same day Sai'gon again advised Canberra that because of
Vietnamese sensitivities it would seem desirable in any public
announcement to include references both to the Vietnamese request
and to prior consultations among the Vietnamese, the United
States and Australian Governments. On 28 April the Australian
Ambassador in Saigon expressed a. hcpe that the Vietnamese could be
given prior guidance on the content cf the Prime Minister's planned
statement as consultation with them on the present proposal had
been minimal. He also reported that Quat had on 27 April welcomed
the Australian Government's offer and agreed to an announcement by
the Australian Prime Minister of the decision to provide a
battalion in response to a Vietnamese request. Later, on 29 April,
the Ambassador reported that Quat had not handed him a forffel
written request but had agreed verbally. In an endeavour to
formalise matters the Ambassador planned to hand a note to the
Vietnamese Secretary of State, Bui Diem, confirming the Australian
offer, the Vietnamese acceptance of it and their expression of a
request for the despatch of the force. Also on 29 April, Bui Diem
agreed to send a letter acknowledging the Ambassador's letter and
confirming the Vietnamese Government's request. Later the same day
Quat's letter, which the Australian Government accepted as a r~ quest,
was despatched. This letter stated that the Ambassador's letter
confirming Australia's offer had been received, that the Republic of
Vietnam confirmed its acceptance of that offer and requested the
despatch of the battalion on the basis discussed. Also on 29 April
the Australian Government announced that, being in receipt of a
19
request from the Government of South Vietnam and after close
consultation with the United States, it had been decided to provide
an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam. The terms of
this announcement had been communicated to Washington before receipt
of the letter from Dr Quat of 29 April. ' The Vietnamese Government's
off icial communique issued on the subject and dated 29 April began
" Upon the request of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam the
Government of Australia today approved the despatch to Vietnam of an
infantry battalion Despite this communique, it would then appear that, the
offer of the battalion having been made by Australia first to the
United States, the two Governments together ( with the United States
predominating) subsequently arranged for the formal request from
South Vietnam. In terms of Article IV paragraph 3 of the SEATO Treaty,
however, the further question as to -whether Australian military aid
was acceptable to South Vietnam and whether Australian combat
forces were in that country with the consent of its Government needs
to be examined. Prior to April 19,65 there had been other requests from the
Government of South Vietnam and frequent expressions of appreciation
of aid supplied. The request made in general terms by President Diem
in March 1962, the request for pilots made by Ambassador Tran Van Lam
in May 1963, General Khanh's widc and general appeal in July 1964
and the appeal by Prime Minister Huong in December 1964 have been
placed in their context in the chronological survey of Australian-
Vietnamese Relations 1961-64. There is no Evidcnce in Australian
documents to show that the requests by President Diem, by Ambassador
Tran Van Lam and General Khanh were prompted by external pressure,
although it is notable that the Ambassador's request for pilots was
received while Australia. was considering a similar request from the
United States. However, in the ca-se of the strong direct request
from Prime Minister Huong, and of the request from Dr Quat, there is
evidence of such pressure. ' The conclusion suggests itself that
although the South ViEtnamese authorities were initially reluctant
to request external military forces as distinct from general
support of a military nature and continued to display this reluctance
in varying degrees, they were brought to accept the necessity of
such forces by persuasion and by the weakness of their own position,
and they did on various occasions indicate that the forces were
appreciated and welcome. Consequently, the Australian military
presence in South Vietnam can clearly be said tu have received their
consent.
20
The Relevance of SEATO
The documents show quite clearly that Australian troops
were not sent to South Vietnam as part of or in response to
SEATO Council Planning, nor were they sent in response to an
appeal to SEATO as a collective organisation from South Vietnam
as a Protocol State of SEATO. In the following paragraphs the
mass of evidence in the documents to support this conclusion is
condensed to a brief summary.
As early as 15 May 1962 the Australian Government decided
publicly to justify non-combatant, and later combatant
military aid to Vietnam as being in accord with or in the context
of SEATO. This decision taken by Ministers seems to have been
taken without any departmental advice. It was not until August
1964 that any serious analysis by officials of the relevance of
SEATO appears on the files. This analysis began by admitting
frankly that Australian assistance was in fact given in response
to the wishes of the United States that Australia should provide
some military assistance to Vietnam in the form of a services
" fpresence". The analysis then went on to argue that it was unwise
to endeavour to justify Australian aid as being covered by
a public treaty such as SEATO or in terms of Article IV of paragraph
1 of the SEATO Agreement. This was because the Government of
South Vietnam had not formally invoked SEATO, because of the
non-combatant role of our forces, as well as the very small response
they represented. It was pointed out that Article II
would be a more appropriate justification as it provided for
self help and mutual aid to counter and prevent subversive
activities directed from outside a given state. However, under
the terms of the Protocol, Article II did not apply to Protocol
States. However, it was suggested that paragraph 2 of Article IV
would provide a " useful umbrella" to justify Australian action.
This Article provided that " If in the opinion of any of the
parties the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or
the sovereignty or the political independence of any party in
the Treaty area or of any other state or territory to which the
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply
is threatened in any way other than by armed attack, or is
affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger
the peace of the area, the parties shall consult
immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be
taken for the common defence".
Because the South Vietnam Government never invoked
SEATO as a Treaty Organisation and because of the difficulties
of interpretation involved in any attempt under these circumstances
to use the Treaty provisions as a justification for
Australian action, the Government preferred not to specify any
particular provision of the Treaty, but to argue in general
terms that Australian action was in accordance with Australia's
21
obligations under the Treaty. More specifically while using
the-Treaty as a " useful umbrella", justification was based upon
three arguments. The first was that South Vietnam was in the
Treaty area and was for the purposes of Articles IV and III
designated a Protocol State. The second argument accepted past
interpretations made of the Treaty by the United States and
argued that the Treaty obligation was individual as well as
collective and that therefore obligations could be fulfilled
by bilateral agreements as well as by collective action. Thirdly,
it was argued that a collective SEATO policy had been in existence
and maintained over a period of time. In support of this,
reference was made to three Resolutions of the SEATO Council:
that of 29 March 1961 which noted with concern the efforts of
an armed minority with external aid acting in violation of the
Geneva Accord to destroy the Government of Vietnam, and declared
its firm resolve not to acquiesce in any such take-over; that
of 1963 in which the Council expressed the hope that Vietnam
with external support could maintain its advance towards
economic stability and international security; and that of
1964 when the Council gave special attention to the deteriorating
situati on in Vietnam, the official communique stating ( with
France abstaining) that the Council agreed that member states
should remain prepared if necessary to take concrete steps
within their respective capabilities in fulfilment of their obligations
under the Treaty.
Immediately before the Honolulu staff talks Departments
gave some consideration to '' the credibility of maintaining the
view that what we had i~ n South Vietnam flows from our SEATO obligations".
As a result it was clearly realised that the arguments
represented above were exceedingly weak in view of the conspicuous
absence of any collective SEATO activity. Moreover it is notable
that, when the Australian Government came to explain to the United
Kingdom the crucial military staff talks which took place in
Honolulu in March 1965 between Australia and the United States
concerning the provision of military aid to Vietnam, Australia
represented to the United Kingdom that these were informal talks
arising out of ANZUS affairs. No suggestion was made that these
crucial talks as a result of which Australian combat troops were
committed to Vietnam, were in any way part of a SEATO operation.
Again, the status of Australian forces in Vietnam was
not governed by any authority deriving from SEATO but was based
upon an exchange of letters with the President of Vietnam giving
Australian troops in that country diplomatic status on the model
of the Pentilateral Agreement on Mutual Defence Assistance in
Indo-China concluded in 1950 between the United States, Vietnam
and other Governments. No matter what the theoretical arguments which could
be raised concerning the relevance of SEATO to Australian
22
action, in practical terms the facts are clear.
Although the Government of South Vietnam at different
times appealed to the Heads of Government of over thirty
countries, it did not at any time appeal to SEATO as a collective
treaty organisation. Because there was no request of this type,
the SEATO plans devised by SEATO military advisers specifically
to assist a Protocol State and to counter communist insurgency
in South Vietnam were not used, nor could the Treaty Organisation
operate. There is certainly nothing in the documents to suggest
that the sending of Australian troops was the subject of a SEATO
Council decision. Not only did South Vietnam not appeal to SEATO but the
United States Government was for a variety of reasons specifically
opposed to the use of SEATO as the machinery by which increased
military aid could be introduced into South Vietnam. As a result,
several Australian suggestions to the United States that any
Australian aid should be related to SEATO received no support.
In its early thinking before the commitment of United
States combat forces, the United States occasionally suggested
that the situation in South Vietnam might require SEATO operations
and very occasionally hinted that SEATO provided a justification
for its presence. But the real justification was
always based upon the fact of a bilateral agreement and not
upon the SEATO argument. Moreover, the fact is plain that
American military plans for aid to Vietnam were not of direct
relevance to SEATO and i~ n fact on occasion were in conflict with
SEATO military planning. This was known and understood by
Australian military planning authorities, and was specifically
mentioned in the Honolulu talks. Because of these facts
neither the United States nor Australia, when reporting its
action in Vietnam to the Security Council, did so in terms of
SEATO. In the light of the above evidence and no matter what
the theoretical possibilities of arguing as to whether or not
Australian action could possibly be justified in terms of the
SEATO Treaty, the fact is apparent that Australian troops were
not sent to Vietnam as part of a SEATO operation or as a result
of consultations among the SEATO powers as a treaty organisation.
23
AUSTRALIA VIETNAM 1965-67
The four decisions made by Australian Governments to increase
troop levels in Vietnam ( announced on 18 August 1965, 8 March 1966,
December 1966 and 17 October 1967 respectively) were all essentially
a logical extension of the 1965 decision to send combat forces to
Vietnam, and a measure of the importance placed on the American
alliance. General support for United States policies in Vietnam did
not necessarily mean unqualified approval of policies of escalation,
nor was it conceded that Australia should increase her forces in
Vietnam progressively as the United States increased its own troop
levels there. Successive Governments retained control of the Liming,
extent and nature of Australia's added commitments in Vietnam, and
each decision was taken. in accordance with assessments of changes in
the political and strategic circumstances of the region and with due
regard for the Government's total defence program and its domestic
commitments. But the option of refusing to increase troop levels was
never considered. The dominant influence throughout the period was pressure
from Americans at political, diplomatic and service levels for
Australia to increase her commitment in Vietna. Australia's contribution
was, of course, too small to be very significant militarily:
the chief United States motive was the need to prove that her Vietnam
policies had the support of other countries, and the more U~ nited States
policies were called into question, the more she required her allies
publicly to proclaim support. AL the end of the period under review
here the pressure which she exerted was described as " extremely strong".
In contrast to the Americans, the Vietnamese only intermittently
exerted pressure on Australia to increase her military aid to
their country. However, before Australia's biggest troop increases
( the commitment of the second and third battalions) discussions took
place between the Australian and Vietnamese Governments. These discussions
did not, according to official spokesmen, result in specific
Vietnamese requests for more troops. Despite Australia's concern that
her increased assistance be justified in terms of Vietnamese requests,
in three of the four cases of increased Australian assistance it was
considered unnecessary to ask the South Vietnamese Government for a
formal request for aid. The Sout~ h Vietnamese Government was merely
informed of the decision either shortly before or after the announcement
by the Australian Government. Twice the Vietnamese Government and the
Australian public were informed that the increase was in pursuance of
earlier requests and once that it was as a result of continuing consultations
between the two Governments.
The First Increase The first increase in the numbers of Australian combat troops
in Vietnam was prompted by a request from President L. B. Johnson to the
-24
Primc Minister on 26 Ju,; ly 1965, ju.: 7t he Unitccd St. ates was about to
increase her own forccs t~ o L*-4 b-At:. ticn--and to (' ndor the " Search
and destroy" strategy. Similar requt-sr--wcre : cnt to other countries:
the United State. s wanted a " clear : inal LO the world and perhaps
especially to Hanoi of the -_ olid-rity cf inr. crnatio1-3l support for
resistance to aggre. ior in Vi_-tnarn and fo-r a pc'accful settlement in
Vietnam" In a covering nc. c, t'; hc United Stati-i Ch-irge d'Affaires in
Canberra said that he had been, a.,: kcd to _ stc that thc. United States
fully recognised Lt difficuttic:-that-_ would be. inv~ olved in any
additional Austra1laxn co. Lribution ir. Virtnarr during 1965, but it
hoped that when the full _--ope of U'nitcd St-& t. c-dc.: tlcns became known,
the Australian Go--crnmr; nt-mriiht L. 7k r"~ dto~ i build-up measures
that would permit. an car]. icr bti. n tbct pr-nt. t il1itary plans
would allow. The Prime M. Lni.:: Cr apkvd for i-, rnkiEiatc a4; 1_ ri on the request,
as when United Statos' p~ an-wero puabli: Jv -) ncuncktd it might be
necessary for the Au.-trali. n Gc.;.' rnnrt-te 27cmo P-: blic indication
of its own position about . addiricnal IT. C L.
When tLhc rcqu -r w~ i fr, r . r. Ji derci in thE: D:-partro. Ent of
ExternaL Affair:. it-wa& :--t7t~ id thit tls inrnd.-Jte f-uturc. it is
clear that We Lanl only lcek. for rr. rgin,, d *: cntriL-uion,-', of which
" the most att--cti.-n in pclit-iLa3I -r i thc; idc-.-c. 1 building up the
battalion L~ O baILle( zreup". Dep-47[ t-m e. r~ u~ L di doubted that.
Australia zhouIld Plan fcor-, :. Wo-L-aL--t1cn Efort Socuth Victrum
early in 1966, or th, r, -11 pr ap'c-1 the United
State!; T-hould bc info'rrrcd c f themr. C,!-; cti the . r~~ in~ c in
Indonesia, Malay-vi;. and NE~ w G-i.. nL-3, r. o dc : iLion ! 3hniild be taken
without " a zareful ex. An~ r,. tion Lrn thv 1i~ of cont. irning Jnited States
and Britih policie., in SrA-1r. h. : ifld rhi*;, not been done.
AL a n el~ tin2, 2q J, Av 196",, S. v. Dcpairtmentvil
adviB~ sr-. con.-i dcrcd wh-it -c-uttl hr dc~ rEf withi. r; A. 3' pre. 3cnt
capabilit. i. C-r. An -ldtonl2Grc~ n cild d(_: p-rchcd, but if there
were any int~ intion of rir. ru~-cr : 1rtli'l the. Army needed to
have an irnradiatc Jcui.-ior. In ordc. r Lc pi c-fr dr~ pa tch in February
or March 1966. Threc criLeria wCI. _:: Uggi.: tEd for r. ak~ ng ' a recommendation
to the Govrrrr-cnt whar. wi-nt: c * e-r-cfyo r the wmILtary effort in
Vietnam, wha. wa,-nuzf-. ry to cif. L] T'. Jf-17o r-Jr,-Amcrican support in
the area, and whatr would :, di--. VA1p; uli.: opinion and on all
three count,,, It EcrLm.. d unneCLe-C7 _ i1^ t. c0 zc'nr[ u-i n cxtra3 b attalion. In
the following month, thcr, forf*, Lht:. Mi m rcfr Dcftr. n. c recommended
to his collec~ guc_-that. A-u-7t. ria. t ~ huld:
buil~ d thc. Inf; intcry Bat tllvir. ant-c linGru
by the addition of arl. iltdry -1 T. ppOrti1ng units;
retain the National Scr-ii.,-A int: 1kc thc i-xi. iting
figure of 8,400 pcr -inrnu, N~ re~ Vi ' W~ l a.-it hE
end of 1966;
25
authorise the Army to plan and prepare on the
assumption that a second battalion might be
committed in March 1966;
restrict on a need-to-know basis knowledge
of the planned build-up and its objective;
inform the Americans that we were unable to
contribute more than the forces indicated in
and explain why.
Departmental advice to the Minister for External Affairs,
tendered on 16 August 1965, stressed the impossibility of forecasting
future events in the Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia area, and urged
again that for this reason no formal indication should be given to the
United States " that we are planning to make a second battalion available
for service in Vietnam in 1966", though she should be told of
the planned increase in the National Service intake, and that
Australia's capacity would be reviewed in 1966. The Department also
thought that Australia should avoid any commitment to " progression"
i. e. that as the Americans increased their forces so Australia should
do more. When Ministers considered the question they endorsed
recommendation& and but directed that no planninz or preparation
whatever should be made on the assumption that an additional
battalion or any other additional forces would be committed to Vietnamr.
The Australian Embas~ sies i~ n Washington and Saigon, and the
High Commissions in London and Wellington were informed of the Government's
decision on 17 August, and asked to inform the Governmentsto
which they were accredited. The Washington Embassy was told that " we
would like you to present it in a way that will make the greatest
favourable impact on the Americans"
There i~ s no evidence in official documents that the South
Vietnamese Government had made any request for further Australian
military aid at this time. Nor is there any firm evidence to suggest
that the Vietnamese were consulted on the question before 18 August,
the day the Australian Government announced its decision. The view was
expres * sed in Australia that it would be necessary to confirm with the
Government of South Vietnam that the further contribution of forces
remains acceptable, but the message actually sent to the Australian
Embassy in Saigon was simply to " inform" the South Vietnamese Government
of the decision, " in context of a step in pursuance of their earlier
request". There were delays in decyphering in Saigon, but the message
was conveyed to the Acting Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam on
18 August, some hours before the official announcement, in Canberra
( which took place at 8 p. m. in the House of Representatives). The
Chairman of the National Leadership Committee, Major General Nguyen Van
Thieu, expressed pleasure that the Australian force was being built up.
26
He asked what the possibilities were if, at some time in the future,
the Vietnamese Government were to make a request for additional forces.
The following day the Vietnamese Ambassador to Australia called on the
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs to convey his Government's
" thanks and appreciation" for the increased Australian military
aid. The Second Increase
The background to the second decision to increase Australian
troop levels in Vietnam ( announced on 8 March 1966) was very different
from that to the first in so far as no formal request was received
from the United States or, until the last minute, from South Vietnam.
In fact, Australian Ministers and officials went to considerable
trouble to ensure that no such request should be made until the Australian
Government was ready to give serious consideration to the matter.
There was nonetheless very intensive lobbying arnd hinting by the United
States for over four months before the announcement. In Washington,
Saigon and Canberra, United States diplomatic and service officials
made it abundantly clear that the United States hoped that Australia
would increase her Vietnam force, while Australian Ministers, whenever
questioned publicly, stated that no formal request for increased aid
had been received. Towards the end of 1965, United States officials took a
gloomy view of the Vietnam situation. In Saigon, United States Defence
Secretary McNamara in an informal talk with the Australian Ambassador*
said that the United States had been surprised by the strength and
violence of the enemy reaction to the American introduction of ground
forces. The choice for the United States as he saw it was between
putting in still more rcops Vietnamese, American and others or
accepting eventual defeat, and the United States would not accept
defeat. McNamara thought that there would be a long and costly military
effort and that neither the military situation nor the preparations
made by the Vietnamese were far enough forward for pacification to be
undertaken on any significant scale. He agreed that negotiations would
carry many dangers as things stood at present. In asking for the
Ambassador' s assessment of the situation McNamara also asked him,
whether action against North Vietnam should be intensified and whether
Australia could send a second infantry battalion to Vietnam. The
Ambassador said the second question was for the Australian Government
to decide, but he was certain that any request would receive prompt and
serious consideration. During December 1965, there were reports of discussions on
many occasions: the Minister for External Affairs during his visit to
Saigon in December 1965 said that both the Americans and the South
Vietnamese raised the question of additional assistance; the Ambassador
* United States Ambassador Lodge, Generals Wheeler, Sharpe and
Westmoreland were also present.
27
in Washington reported talks with Bundy and with Harriman ( who passed
on President Johnson's thoughts as " background for our decision");
and the United States Ambassador in Canberra spoke to the Prime
Minister. There were also talks in Canberra between United States
Embassy and Departmental officials, and in Washington between the Head
of the Australian Joint Services Staff and Pentagon officials.
The Australian Government was in no doubt, therefore, about
the desire of the United States Government to see an increased Australian
contribution. Ministers, however, saw no need to rush into a
decision: if an extra battalion were committed it could not be done
before March or April 1966; the defence group did not favour further
piecemeal contributions; and a decision should await the outcome of
ministerial discussions with the United Kingdom in the latter part of
January 1966. In the New Year defence planners began a detailed examination
of what increases could be made to the forces in Vietnam, and finalised
their report on 10 February, after the completion of the British
defence review, and after the Prime Minister had defended the United
States' resumption of bombing North Vietnam. The planners outlined
possibilities rather than making recommendations but, as the Departmental
representative explained to the Minister for External Affairs,
the balance of opinion was that Australia should contribute enough
land forces to make up a task force.
Consideration by Ministers was further deferred pending the
visit of United States Vice-President Humphrey, although at a press
conference with Humphrey the Prime Minister wa. quoted as saying that
Australia had been considering for some time what more could usefully
be done in Vietnam. He denied American pressure on Australia and said
that the United States had made no request.
Thus it was not until 3 March 1966 that Ministers finally
decided to replace the force of scme 1,400 men with a -ubstantially
enlarged contribution of forces in the form of a self-contained
Australian task force of s: ome 4,500 personnel under Australian command.
When he told President Johnson of the decision the Prime Minister
commented that his military advisers considered that the provision
of a force of this size represented the upper limit of Army capacity,
having regard to existing military commitments in Malaysia. Furthermore,
while they advised that. the force could be sustained, they had
made it clear that short of a major emergency it would not be practicable
to enlarge it. The Government had believed that the task force
would be the most militarily effective contribution Australia could
make to the allied effort in South Vietnam and it judged that it should
go so far at that time, in consequence of the high importance of the
issues at stake in South Vietnam and to make a clear demonstration of
Australian support for the massive efforts of the United States.
During the months preceding this decision, the Australian
Government was no more anxious to receive a formal request for more
military assistance from South Vietnam than it was to receive one from
S28
the United States. In an interview with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister
in December 1965, the Minister for External Affairs made it clear that
" the position was that when we were ready to receive a request we would
let him know and he would make one". The Vietnamese subsequently
restricted their efforts to making the Australians " informally aware"
that Vietnam would welcome increased aid. In December 1965 Air Vice
Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, " made what was almost a request" to the Australian
Minister for External Affairs for army and air force assistance,
and Ky repeated this request to an ABC interviewer. Foreign Minister
Tran Van Do, while agreeing not to make a formal request, added that
the Vietnamese Government would, of course, welcome any reinforcement
of the Australian force in Vietnam even if the. se reinforcements were
relatively small.
In the following months there seems to have been no further
communication between the Australian and Vietnamese Governments on this
question, until on 19 February the Australian Prime Minister was quoted
as saying: " we hope to announce soon what Australia can do to supplement
our present forces in Vietnam'. The Australian Ambassador to the
Republic of Vietnam quickly suggested that any such announcement should
be preceded by " adequate prior consultation with the Vietnamese", in
order that it would appear that the Australian decision was taken in
response to a Viettnamese rather than an American request. He al. o
suggested, as had a member of the Department of External Affairs, that
a formal request for aid hould bf: sought from the Vietnamese Gcvernment.
Air Vice Marshal. Ky showed i. nmediate interest in the Princ:
Minister's reported statement, and the Australian Ambassador assured him
" that no decision had yet been taken but that we would omrr. unicate with
the Vietnamese Govzrnment as coon as possible after any such deciiocn
was reached". The Ambassador also informed the Australian Government
that Ky was repcrted to have :-aid previously that existing arrangemrE. nts
would not cover any further military forces that Australia might wish
to send to Vietnam: " there would have t-o be a specific request from
the Government of Vietnam".
On 4 March the Australian Government notified its Ambassador
in Saigon that it had decided upon the ocommitment of the second battalion,
and instructed him to advise Ky of this fact and work out with
him the terms of a letter of request. The letter was to indicate that
it constituted the final formal step following a. series of consultat. icn.-
and should be available for publication. It should be a re( qu st in
general terms only.
The letter was duly obtained from Ky and its contents cabled
to Australia on 7 March 1966, It concluded: " The Governmcnt of the
Republic of Vietnam wishes to request the Australian Government for any
increased military contribution which it might be able tc make in the
present situation". The following day the Victnam-. ne and Australian
Governments announced the decision -inultaneously at 8.45 p. m. ( AEST).
The Australian Ambassador in Saigon reported that Major
General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Vice Marshal Ky expressed appreciation
29
of the Australian Government's decision to replace the battalion with
a Task Force and of the continued moral support which this implied.
The Third Increase Towards the end of 1966 United States administrative,
diplomatic and Service officials again indicated that, as United
States presidential adviser William Bundy put it, a possible extra
Australian contribution was " a subject on our minds". But perhaps
because of recognition of Australia's determination to avoid receiving
a formal request during the previous year and appreciation of the
internal difficulties an election posed for the Australian Government,
there seemsto have been greatly reduced pressure from the United States.
The impetus for the third increase in Australia's contribution
came clearly from the Prime Min-ster after he increased his majority
in the November 1966 election, and the speed at which he desired to
move surprised officials and the Minister for External Affairs.
Immediately after the election he told the Secretary of his
Department that he wanted very early Cabinet consideration of sending
an extra battalion to Vietnam, and that he did not want to wait to
consider the question in the light of a review of needs and capabilities
early in the New Year, He asked for a study of all possibilities including
particularly sending an additional battalion from Australia;
and re-deploying the bat. talion at present in Malaysia.
The Minister for External Affairs then asked the Australian
Ambassador in Washington for a personal report of any indications of
further thinking in the United States. The Ambassador replied that
the Embassy had continued to receive hints from contacts in the
White House, the State Department and the Pentagon that an additional
military contribution from Australia would be greatly appreciated by
the Administration and that American hopes of further support from
the United States' allies stemmed as much, and perhaps more, from international
and internal political considerations as from military
necessity. The Ambassador referred to Johnson's need to seek Congressional
approval for a large ircrease his budget the following
January and to the conflicting pressures on one side from the
liberals to " accept negotiations and dangerous concessions to the
Communists" and on the other from those who wanted to escalate the
war with a view to getting it over quickly. The Ambassador believed
that Australia's ability to influence the President's response to
these conflicting pressures would be related to the scale of her
military contribution and the readiness with which it was made. He
suggested that if the fact of an additional contribution would be
at least as important as the nature of such a contribution, this might
provide more flexibility in the Government's consideration of the
' problem. When Service and Departmental advisers presented their
report on 13 December they opened it. with a survey of the state of the
war. They thought that the military situation in Vietnam had improved
over the previous twelve months, but that given the allied forces t. hen
30
available, defeat of the military aggression from North Vietnam and of
the Viet Cong was unlikely to be achieved for some considerable time.
Concurrently they saw a need for progress to be made in pacification
and civil reconstruction, but this could only be achieved at the expense
of the availability of forces for military operations. Thus the rate of
progress in defeating aggression from North Vietnam and of pacification
was directly related to the size of allied forces available, The report
canvassed several options open to the Government in regard to all three
Services and thought that while the most effective addition to the
Army Task Force would be a third infantry battalion, early deployment
would pose considerable problems. ( Because of these the Army had
recommended against the provision of a third battalion before August
1967.) There were, however, increases ( totalling approximately q00
troops) which were needed to overcome known deficiencies in the existing
forces, some of them specifically recommanded by the Commander of
the Task Force. Anxiety was expressed about making changes in the
Australian contribution to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve given
the situation in the Malaysia-Indonesia region, and it was agreed that
any such variations should be discussed with the United Kingdom before
any decision was made. As a general observation, the advisers stated
that it was fundamental to Australian defence policy that we should
make a contribution to the security of South East Asia which was
consistent with our national resources and with our vital interests in
the securing of area against communist encroachment. On these
broad strategic, grounds they had previously r-c. ommerded ard the Government
had approvecd a_ substanti. al Australiar forc. e contribution in the
present conflict in Victnam. There were elements in the present situation
including the state of the war, the continuing build-up of
United St. ates forces and the apparent expe( ctat. i. on in the United States
Administration that Australia and other allies would increase their
commitments, which suggested that a further increase in the Australian
contribution would be appropriate. The nat. ure and timing of any increase
were mattc. rs for d. termination by the Government.
The Coverr. TFnt accept. ed their advice against di. patching a
third battalion and irter. fering with arrangements regardlrg the
battalion then in Malaysia, t. decid: d to increase the total number
of personnel serving with the Australian Forces in Vietnam by more
than one-third to a total of 6,300, with increased numbers coming
from all three Services. The Army component was to be raised from
4,370 to 5,200. The Australian Ambassador in Washington was told of
the decision on 16 December, and asked to check points of detail and
acceptabil. ity with the United States Administration so that the
Australian Government could make the earliest possible announcement.
He reported back to Canberra on the same day that United States Defence
Secretary McNamara had expressed particular gratification that
Australia was increasing the level of her ground forces. United
States approval of details was reported on 19 December.
There is no documentary evidence that. the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam was consult. ed about or given prior notification of
this third increase in Australia's forces in Vietnam. The Department
of External Affairs advised in a memorandum of 19 December 1966 that it
did not seem necessary or desirable to seek a specific request from the
31
South Vietnamese on this occasion. The memorandum added, however, that
there had been a continuing emphasis on consultations with South Vietnam
and with the other allies ( illustrated, for example, by the Prime
Minister's visit to Saigon in April and Washington in June-July and the
recent Manila Conference*). In any event, the broad terms of Ky's
letter of 7 March, together with the continuing consultations at
various levels seemed to provide a satisfactory basis for maintaining
that the additional forces were provided at South Vietnam's request.
It was suggested that, after the proposed aid increase had been made
public, a South Vietnamese announcement of the increase could be useful
if it emphasised the continuing consultations between our two Governments
and with the other allies and drew attention to the increasing
North Vietnamese aggression.
It was in fact some hours after the Australian Prime Minister
had announced the increased assistance in general terms on 20 December
that the Australian Ambassador in Saigon was instructed to inform Air
Vice Marshal Ky of the decision. The information was conveyed through
Foreign Minister Do, who agreed to say that a letter of request was not
necessary because the two Governments had been in continuous consultation
for some time, that Australia was fully aware of Vietnam's
requirements, and that in making further forces available Australia
was acting in the spirit of the Manila Conference.
The Fourth Increase
Expression of American interest in increased Australian aid to
Vietnam during the first half of 1967 followed much the same pattern as
the previous year: the United States made no formal request to Australia
for an additional commitment in Vietnam, but United States military
sources in Saigon and Washington made American wishes quite clear to
Australian officials.
From Washington on 18 April 1967 the Australian Minister for
External Affairs reported a meeting with United States Defence Secretary
McNamara on the progress of the wa-. McNamara had no doubt that America
could no longer lose the war, but they still had the problem of winning
and that could be long and hard and there was no easy way which could
point directly to victorv. After considerable discussion of United
States operation? and the slow progress of negotiations, McNamara asked
The Manila Summit Conference, attended by the political leaders and
foreign ministers; of Australia, The Republic of Korea, New Zealand,
the Philippine.;, Thailand, the United States and the Republic of
Vietnam, was held in the Philippines on October 24-25 1966, " to
consider the conflict in South Vietnam and to review their wider
purposes in Asia and the Pacific". In the Joint Communique released
after the Conference, the participating nations declared their purpose
to be peace in South Vietnam and throughout the Asian and
Pacific area. However they were also determined " that the South
Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and
shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and
their own form of government. We shall continue our military and all
other efforts as firrnl. y and as long as ~ wy be necessary in close
consultation among ourselves until the aggression is ended."
32
the Minister's views about the present level of forces and said that
more troops could do more tasks but they brought with them political,
economic and psychological problems. McNamara then illustrated the
value of more troops by pointing to the specific task in Phuoc Tuy
province being carried out by the Australians with two battalions and
commenting that clearly we could do the same task more quickly with
three. If the Defence Secretary also elaborated on the problems, the
Minister did not report it, nor did he report any comment of his own
on the specific issue of the troop increase.
But if United States probings of Australian intentions were
not particularly insistent during the first half of the year, the
rising level of public controversy in America over policies of escalation
in Vietnam soon made the United States Administration more anxious
to demonstrate that United States policies had the moral and practical
support of her allies. Thus, President L. B. Johnson on 13 July brought
the whole question of increases in troop levels into the public arena
when, together with Defence Secretary McNamara and Generals Wheeler and
Westmoreland, he indicated in a press statement that the United States
would discuss increased contributions with her allies. A week later
the White House announced the visit of presidential advisers Maxwell D.
Taylor and Clark M. Clifford to Asia, Australia and New Zealand. Meanwhile
on 15 July President Johnson wrote to the Prime Miaister pointing
to the need for additional effort, but net making a specific request.
The political situation in the United States was analy. j d by
the Australian Charge in Washington on 25 July. He reported a fluid
situation comprising many conflicting trends in opinion, increasing
public scepticism about the war, and although he did not think the
basic American ccmmitment tc Vietnam was being called into question he
feared tha. t if, following the United Kingdom's announced intentions to
withdraw from South East Asia, America's allies gave a negative response
to proposals for more troops it would have a disproportionately adverse
effect on United States opinion. Under these circumstances Australiacs
response, as the most significant Western ally, was of particular
importance. The Clifford-Taylor talks held at the very end of July were
broad-ranging rather than narrowly fc. cussed cn the question of troop
levels. A number of papers, including a summary of main talking point?,
were prepared in the Departments of External Affairs and Defence for
the use of Ministers. These cover political prospects in South Vietnam,
the pacification program, prospects for ncgotiations, communist use of
Laos and Cambodia, United States plans in regard to bombing as wll as
the issue of troops. Amongst other things the summary noted that the
relatively optimistic picture of the military situation giv n by the
President in his message to the Prime Minister contrasted with our own
military assessment; and with some private United States assessments.
It noted also that the Revolutionary Development program had been making
very slow progress and the South Vietnamese Army was not yet giving it
adequate support. On the question of troops, military advisers expressed
the view that in considering any future contributions of forces to
South Vietnam a tank squadron and additional helicopter support should
S33
be given first priority. ( A request for the tank squadron had been
received from the Australian Commander in Vietnam and defence advisers
supported the request.) They suspected that a contribution on these
lines would probably fall short of what the United States would have
liked from us, i. e. more ground forces, but sgugested that Taylor and
Clifford might not be fully aware of the important implications of the
British White Paper for future Australian defence arrangements.
At the talks themselves the Australian attitude was not to
deny the substance of the United States view that there was a need for
publicly declared allied solidarity and greater effort, but to bring
into the equation the very considerable stretch already in Australia's
military and economic effort, not only in Vietnam but elsewhere, and
the new pcssibility in the light of recent British decisions that wider
responsibilities would fall on us. For Australia, " effort" was not to
be measured simply in terms of the Vietnam commitment.
The Clifford-Taylor talks thus provided a forum for a mutual
exchange of views; they led to no immediate decision on the part of the
Australian Government.
Defence and departmental officials continued tc consider the
details of possible further commitmints with no great enthusiasm, By
18 August 1967 they had reached agreement that c-ommitment of a third
battalion would pose many difficulties; instead they favoured making
available the additions to the Task Force which had been requested by
the Commander in Vietnam. There was, however, a division of opinion
over whether a positive recommendation against providing a third
battalion should be made. There could be an embarrassing situation, it
was suggested, if the Government were subsequently asked if it had acted
upon the views of its official advisers. Although this suggestion met
with some opposition, the weight of opinion was that the requests for
additional forces received from the Ccmmander of the Tack Force should
be recommended on military grounds; cther possible contributions should
be listed for Government consideration, and the dicadvantages of providing
a. third battalion should be enumerated.
Ministers on 6 September decided in principle to commit the
third battalion to Vietnam, but did not set the date for the announcement.
Thus when the Prime Minister spoke with the United State6
Ambassador to Australia on 7 September, he told him only that he should
let the President know that " we were not going to sleep", but that
there were some important difficulties and complexities in the situation
for the Government, such as the implications of British withdrawal planour
budgetary situation, the local political scene in terms of the
Senate election and the Capricornia by-election due shortly, and uncertainties
still surrounding some aspects of the Vietnamese elections.
There was nevertheless a will to assist.
Just as the Prime Minister had given the impetus to an early
decision on troop levels at the end of 1966, so now he would seem to
have provided the initiative in determining that Australia should offer
more than, by implication, its defence advisers had recommended. When
the Australian Treasurer was in Washington in early October ( and under
instructions not to inform the President that Australia would provide a
third battalion), he referred to the Prime Minister's leadership in
making clear to Ministers " what the issues involved in Vietnam were
and the critical importance of our association with the United States".
In reporting thi:: meeting with the President, the Treasurer
stated that the pressure put upon him to have our decision indicated
quickly to Johnson was " extremely strong", and that the Australian
Ambassador, who was also present, could not remember stronger pressure
being brought to bear.
In response, the Treasurer explained to the President
Australia's various commitments. The following day ( 3 October 1967)
he suggested to the Prime Minister that the President should be told
personally and confidentially what Australia proposed to do, and on 6
October the Prime Minister did so in a message sent. to the Australian
Ambassador in Washington for transmission to the White House.
He told the President of Australia's plans in regard to the
Malaysia-Singapore region where, he said, what happened in the longer
term would be determined in large part by the outcome of Vietnam and
by the extent of co-operation by the countries in the region in maintaining
their own security. He suggested that Aust. ralia'= continued
military prese; nce would depend on reaching . ome understanding with the
United States in the event of serious trouble developing in the
Malaysia-Singapore region. He thought it desirable to discuss the
United State:;' interest in the security and stLability of South East Asia
generally, the bearing of this on the cecurity of the Malaysia-Singapore
region and the part in this security which Australia and New Zaeland
could play. In Vietnam, he said, Australias fcrce. would be incr: ased by
some 1,700 men tc brine the rnmbers to over 8,000, and thi-, he: a: s ured
the President, put Australia at the f-ll. stretch of present and planned
military capacity. He added that to attempt to go beyond this would
involve the Government in military, . conomic and political deci. ions
which he and hi:; colleagues would regard as publicly unacceptable in the.
existing climate of opinion apart from other considerations cf national
policy. As in the case of the decision in March 1966 to commit the
second battalion, there was consultation between the Australian and
Vietnamese Governments before the third battalion was committed. During
a visit to Saigon in late July 1967, the Minister for the Army discussed
the Aistralian force in Vietnam with both Vietnamese and American officials.
He declared, however, that neither the Vietnam. se nor the
Americans had made a specific request for more Australian troops.
There further, indirect evidence that some month, s later
the Republic of Vietnam's Ambassador to Australia conveyed to the
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs " an indication of a
wish on their / the Vietnamese/ part to have whatever additional, support
35
we can provide". There followed a suggestion on 10 October 1967 from a senior
member of the Department of External Affairs. Although he no longer
thought it necessary to seek a specific formal request from the Vietnamese
Government for additional Australian forces he thought it important
that the Vietnamese should be informed of our intention well in advance
of the announcement on 17 October. On 14 October the Australian
Ambassador in Saigon was asked to notify the Vietnamese Government of
the decision, which was described as having been taken in the light of
previous requests by the Vietnamese Government for such military assistance
as the Australian Government was able to provide, a request which
the Vietnamese Ambassador in Canberra had confirmed that month. The
Australian Government saw this decision as being in fulfilment of the
undertaking made by the Manila Conference Powers to continue military
aid to South Vietnam as long as aggression continued there.
The Ambassador informed the Vietnamese Foreign Minister of the
decision to increase military aid on 16 October, and the latter
" expressed appreciation". After the Australian announcement of the
decision on 17 October, Directory Chairman Thieu publicly welcomed the
troop increases and praised both the military and civil activities of
Australian and New Zealand troops in Vietnam.