MINISTERIAL STATEMENT INDO-CHINA. THE HON. E. G. WHITLAM,
PRIME MINISTER. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
8 APRIL 1975
Thirty years ago France attempted to re-establish
her fallen empire in Indo-China. A war for independence
became a war of massive foreign intervention. It engulfed
a region. It challenged the might and will of the greatest
powor on earth. It made a wilderness of somte of'the fairest
portions of the globe. Thu most tranquil city in Asia
Phnomn Penh has been made, in the wo.-rds of the Member for
Kooyonq, a mire of human misery. CuntL-es of old civilisations
have been madu cities of death. The war unleashe. d on a
peasant people the heaviest bombing in history and the greatest
fire power used in history. Not less than two million have
been killed. Countless more have been maimed. Yet the war
continues. It is ten years this month since Sir Robert Menzies
announced the commitment of the First Australian Battalion
to Vietnam. Since then it has been the duty of successive
Prime Ministers to report to Parliament and people on
-Australian activities, on Australian actions, including
activity by the armed services, in Indo-China. I am now
the fifth Australian Prime Minister to have to fulfil that
duty but with this difference: for the first time an
Australian Prime Minister need report only on our humanitarian
involvement, including the use of the armed services, and
our endeavours to end the war rather than escalate the
war. After all these years, after all the blunders
and bloodshed of thirty years, what tolerable or feasible
objective can any foreign government set for itself except
the ending of the war, except the ending of the killing
as soon as possible. We outsiders never had the right to intervene.
But even if there were such a right or even if it was right
to intervene, would anyone now suggest that any foreign
government should resume that intervention? If we have learnt
nothing else in the last thirty years we have surely learnt
this much, at a heavy cost to ourselves but at a terrible one
to the people we claimed to be helping.
For a generation and more, Australia shared with
her Pacific partners a great delusion about our rights,
our interests, our obligations. Those who acted for Australia
as a government mistook entirely the nature of Australia's
interests and obligations and her rights. They shared, and
encouraged the Australian people to accept, a delusion about
the nature of the conflict in Indo-China. All of us are still
paying the price for those mistakes in economic cost, in
loss of confidence in Western civilisation itself. We can
repair the losses, other than the lives destroyed. But to
do so it is necessary not to repeat the mistakes of the past
not just the mistakes in action but the mistakes of attitude.
It was a mistaken attitude after the revolution in China that
led step by step to the mistaken view of Australian interests
and American interests and mistaken actions in Indo-China.
Surely we have learnt our lesson at last.
-2-
Por twenty years there has been a kind of tragic
inevitability about the events now takingj place. The great
chance, the great opportunity for a political settlement,
L017uac thr-uujhouL Inido-China was Ov en . in 1954 by the
Geneva Agreements. The chance was lost, the opportunity was
thrown away. The Geneva Agreements provided the two basic
ingredients Eor a political settlement re-unification
after free elections. If such elections had been held, they
Would almost certainly have resulted in the power over a
un'i. ld Victnam under 11o Chi Minh. Rather th. in face this
prospect the regime in Saigon, urged on by thie then United
States Administration, refused to hold elections. The result
I been that an outcome whiich might have beutn achieved
by political means twenty years ago, an outcome certainly
foreseen by the parties to the Geneva Agreements, whether
they welcomed it or not, now seems likely to be achieved only
after these twenty more years of bloodshed.
The next great effort to achieve a political solution
resulted in the Paris Agreements of January, 1973. Once again
those Agreements envisaged a government of one Vietnam with
participation of all parties, not just the governments of
Saigon and Hanoi but the Provisional Revolutionary Government
the Vietcong so called. Neither the Geneva Agreements nor
the Paris Agreements ever allowed the idea that North and
South Vietnam were two separate countries. As Article
of the Paris Agreements states: " The military demarcation line
between the two zones at the seventeenth parallel is only
provisional and not a political or territorial boundary,
as provided for in Paragraph 6 of the final declaration of
the 1954 Geneva Conference." In other words, from 1954 to the
present day, from the fall of Dien Bien Phu 21 years ago to
the fall of Hue two weeks ago, the war in Vietnam has retained
its essential character. It is a civil war. The real
character of the war has never changed. What has changed
is the nature of the fighting and the level of violence.
That change, with all the additional suffering and killing it
has caused, is overwhelmingly due to one factor foreign
intervention. The real result of foreign intervention,
principally the United States on the side of Saigon and
Russia on the side of Hanoi, has been to raise the level of
violence, to raise the capacity for mutual destruction on
both sides. That is, if the two sides insisted on a solution
by military means, then foreign intervention made it certain
that the end whatever the outcome would be as bloody
as possible. What outsiders, including Australia, have done
is to create two of the world's largest armies. That is our
real legacy to Vietnam. That is almost the sole military
result of years of intervention. Let those who year after year
encouraged a military solution, those who decried as weakness
or even treason the calls for negotiations and the calls for
political settlement, now, and at last, recognise the real
consequences of their work. These strongmen, these realists,
the men on horse-back, insisted upon a military solution.
So a military solution it is now to be. / 3
-3-
It should also be emphasised that both the Geneva
Aqre Iflcnts and~ the Paris Agjreements onvisa ' jed that all
conte. nding parties would share political responsibility in
a re-united Vietnam. The Geneva Agreements envisaged free
elections. The Paris Agreements provided for a National
Reconciliation Council, to arranye for general elections
in South Vietnam. Article 12 stated:
" Itmmediately after the cease-fire, the South Vietnamese
parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national
reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual
non-elimination to set up a national council of national
reconciliation and concord of three equal segments.
After the National Council of National Reconciliation and
Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese
parties will consult about the formation of councils at
lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign
an Agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon
as possible and do their ' utmost to accomplish this within
ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect."
This was the crucial political article of the Paris
Agreements. The Saigon Government has refused to act to implement
this central provision. It has not been prepared to join
with the Provisional Revolutionary Government. This breach is
the key to the justification for military retaliation claimed
by the opponents of the Saigon Government.
Because the political opportunities have been for
a second time lost, a military solution became inevitable
in the broader sense. This does not mean, however, that the
actual and specific events of the past three weeks were
themselves inevitable. The over-running of so much of
South Vietnam is by no means a classic example of a blitzkreig.
In very large measure the North Vietnamese forces have been
moving into a military vacuum. The United States' Defence
Secretary, Mr Schlesinger, said on 31 March that it was Saigon's
withdrawal rather than a communist general offensive which
was the primary cause of the Government of Vietnam's present
difficulties. President Ford said on 3 April: " A unilateral
decision to withdraw created the chaotic situation that exists
now. It was a unilateral decision by President Thieu."
To state these facts is not to condone breaches of the
Paris Agreements by North Vietnam. There have been gross
breaches repeatedly by both sides. It is just a plain
statement of fact that the immediate chaotic situation north
of Saigon is due to the unilateral decision by President Thieu.
In the words of the Australian Journalist Denis Warner
close as he is to military councils in Saigon " The shattering
loss of central Vietnam, which has swung the balance of forces
entirely in Hanoi's favour, was not caused by enemy action but
by hideous blunders in Saigon." The decision to withdraw and,
perhaps even more importantly, the way it was made, with no
explanation, no consultation, no communication, had two immediate
res ults. It destroyed the morale of the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam and it spread panic to the population. / 4
-4-
It is in this situation of unparalleled chaoc and
unexpectud rapidity of events unexpected in lhanoi itself
tliat t AutLrian Government has tried Lo apply its
resources to save lives, to relieve sufferinig.
It must be emphasi. sed that the suddonness of the
collipse in South Vietnam ] imited the scuie ind effectiveness
ol tliy aid given by the Au.; t. ra] in GovenmL( J!. ur by any other
. government. Members of the Opposil. ion have clo:;( n to belittle
our efforts. For example, the Leader of the Opposition
particularised our participation in the attempted evacuation
01. Danang as a " futile and pathetic gesture too little,
too late." The truth is that the Australian Government met,
as soon as it was received through the American Embassy,
a reqLuest from the Government of South Vietricm flor assistance.
The decision wa* taken to make available seven lercules transport
aircraft together with other aircraft currently based at
B utterworth in Malaysia. On 2 April I received the following
message: " Please accept my warm appreciation and deep
admiration for your help to evacuate the
many desperate refugees from Danang. Australia
can take great pride in the rapid decision to
meet an absolutely essential humanitarian
requirement. Warmest respect. ( Signed)
Admiral Noel Gayler, United States Commander
in Chief Pacific."
The Australian Government last year contributed
$ 1.15million to international organisations to be spent in
Indo-China on both sides during the current financial
year. On 28 March the Australian Government announced a
further contribution of $ 200,000 to the Indo-China Operations
Group of the International Red Cross, which operates throughout
Indo-China. On 2 April I announced a further contribution
of $ 1 million to the U. N. -High Commissioner for Refugees'
relief work among refugees in all parts of Indo-China, on both
sides of the lines of military control. On 3 April I opened
a public appeal for a $ 5 million refugee aid fund, to be
co-ordinated by the Disaster Emergency Committee of the
Australian Council for Overseas Aid.
Yesterday the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced
a further grant of $ 1 million to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. This brings the total Australian
Government aid to international humanitarian organisations
operating in Indo-China to $ 3.4 million.
The action which has attracted most attention is of
course the bringing of children to Australia. In this matter,
the sole role of the Australian Government was to bring eligible
children to suitable adoptive families as promptly and as
safely as possible. Nobody has been helped by unfounded claims
that vast numbers of orphans were waiting for evacuation from
Saigon.
At all times, the Australian Govenments has been
bound to require two conditions: that orphans would be approved
for exit from Saigon by the South VietnameseGovernment
for adoption in Australia, and that the States would guarantee
that normal adoption procedures would be observed.
As soon as the Australian Governunent received advice
that t hu uJrst JL: equi. umtinL 1,1d b . i melt, ad II i at on thu sec: old,
the States had approved 246 adopting families, arrangements
were made to bring the orphans by Hercules transport to Bangkok
and by chartered Qantas jet to Sydney. Austriilian Government
authorities found that many of the children evacuated from
Saigon were the subject of uncompleted off shore adoption
procedures in South Vietnam by Australian nationals. Faced
with this fact, my Government determined that it could do
nothing in the matter of allocating children to families as
this was clearly a State responsibility and therefore if
there was to be any disagreement between adoptive families
about the children then it was a matter for the States to
determine. The Government had arranged for an aircraft to
depart Sydney yesterday afternoon for Bangkok to evacuate
a second group of orphans. That aircraft did not take off,
following advice from our Ambassador in Saigon that the South
Vietnamese authorities decided not to release any more
chi ldren as they wished to reconsider their policy on adoption
by foreign nationals. Our Ambassador has been unable to
confirm reports that this decision has since been reversed.
I should point out, however, that the decision
i elf amply demonstrates that there is no large pool
of' orphans awaiting urgent evacuation and, further, that
the Saigon Government has properly insisted on the performance
of its own policies and procedures. / 6
The actions of the Government in the immediate
emergency are part of the lonqstandinq program and policy
we have adopted since achieving office. our immediate
objective has been to do what we can to stop the fighting,
to bring the war to an end. our long-term objective has
been to help rebuild a devastated Vietnam and help
rehabilitate its peop: le. We hiave cons is itc~) ly pursued
both objectives since December 1972. The most important
step open to Australia to reduce the level of violence was
always to stop contributing militarily to that violence.
Within a week of taking office we ordered the end of
Australia's military involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia.
The second contribution open to Australia was to
use diplomatic influcnce to end the fighting. In particular
tho Australian Government has tried to promtote adherence
to the Paris Agreements. We have lost no opportunity to
encourage the. Vietnamese parties to implement the Agreements
to the full, and to deplore the breaches of the Agreements
by both sides. And, of course, we have been able to do
this only because we are diplomatically represented in
both Saigon and Hanoi.
These attitudes have consistently been expressed
over the past 15 months by me and by the Foreign Minister
at the highest level, and by personal contact between
Vietnamese ministers and officials and some of my colleagues,
including the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for
Defence. As recently as 13 March I wrote to both President
Thieu and the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister stressing
Australia's support for the implementation of the Agreements,
our concern at the continued lack of progress, the continued
fighting and the continuing breaches of the Agreements by
both sides. The fact is that the Australian Government has
been foremost among nations in seeking to end the war and
relieve the suffering it has caused. In this immediate
emergency, no government has been more active, more
concerned and, reflecting the wishes of the Australian
people, more generous. And it is worth noting the real
reason why the Australian people expect their Government
so to act. Why does Vietnam invoke a very special kind
of emotion and concern and compassion in Australia? It's
not just the scale and extent of the suffering, which is
not, unhappily, unique, not even unusual in this troubled
world. The refugee, the homeless, the starving, the
innocent victims of war number millions upon millions
across three continents. But Vietnam has a power over the
Australian conscience for one particular reason. The
Australian people have accepted the truth, the bitter
truth, that the intervention into which they were led was
disastrously wrong, that it only increased and lengthened
the agony of Vietnam. The Australian people have acknowledged
the truth in the same way that the American people and the
American Congress have acknowledged it. But is the truth
of the disaster acknowledged by its authors and their
abettors?
Onie of the miost depressing aspects of this whole
tragic episode has been the lamentable performance of
the Opposition in the past two weeks. I've listened
with increasing dismay and contempt to the statements by
spokesmen for the Opposition. I pass over the humbug
mnd hypocrisy par for thc course 7 huit the truly depressing
thlinig ha s been the mounit ing ev i denice thim with the
Oppos it ion nothing has chanjed Ten yeatus of destruct ionl
have changed nothing. The present Leader of the Opposition
has even revived the doimino theory, smai-tly dismnissed by
the Pr ime Mini ster OF Singapore as " old hash". T1he onec
great constant in the attitudeI Of the Ipar1ties OJpoSite to
the war in Vietnam, throughout the period of Australia' s
involvement, was thei~ r determnination to squeeze every drop of
po1 itical advantage out ol it., Anid eveni iii the Final. thr-oes,
they're at it again. One could hear all the echoes from the
past, right from that unforgettable night ten years ago,
28 April 1965, when from this side of the House they bayed
and brayed with a delight they didn't bother to conceal as
Sir Robert Menzies announced the first instalment of Australia's
military cohimitmient. It was their finest hour. They laughed
as they lied their way into this war. But throughout the
subsequent years, in any debate which had to deal with any
American initiatives to disengage or dc-escalate * the war,
they were notable for their sullen silence. The only occasion
their spirits revived was when, five years ago
President Nixon unleashed the South Vietnamese Army upon
Cambodia, escalating the war to its most ferocious level and
transforming a haven of fragile peace into a war-ravaged
wilderness. In the orchestrated outpourings of the past week there
has been just one new note muted as yet, but clearly designed
to become a grand new theme, and that is that the United States
is an untrustworthy ally. The irony of it! We are witnessing
the beginning of a new effort to sow the seeds of fear and
suspicion and division in Australia. What else is the purpose
of this attemnpt to blame the United States Congress and the
American people for the debacle in which the Government of
South Vietnam now finds itself. There could be only one other
motive to shame the United States back into Indo-China.
Is this the wish of the Opposition? Is this their proposal
for either the United States or Australia to get back into
the war? to prolong it for yet another decade? If that
is not their proposal, then what criticisin of substance can
they have against my Government's attitudes or actions with
regard to Indo-China, now or at any time in the past two
years and four months?
In the heady days when Vietnam was a popular war,
when it was a political goldmine, before the people of
Australia came to see its implications and consequences
for Indo-China, for Australia, for the United States,
the constant challenge imade in this House, not least
from the present Leader of the Opposition, was, " stand
up and be counted". Indeed, the first time this challenge
was raised in this House was against me by the then
Minister for External Affairs, now Lord Casey 21 years
ago. It was in 1954 that in this House I first warned
against Australian or American military involvement in
Indo-China. Let the Members of the Opposition now stand
up and be counted and say that they believe it was wrong
that we should have got completely out of the war or
believe that the United States or Australia should go
back inito the war.
As to the United States, she has fulfilled any
obligations she assumed to the Government of Saigon.
Neither-thle honour nior thc initerests of a great people
can bec confided to any particular foreigni regime. But
the United States' honour and interests do lie in helping
rebuild a unified Vietnam, the unification of which
misguided policies, mistaken policies of the past so long
delayed; the United States' honour and interest lie in
helping to rebuild an Indo-China to the devastation of
which those policies so greatly contributed. That is
the way for the United States to regain her real place
of leadership in our region. To helping in such a task,
the Australian Government is already committed, indeed,
already contributing. And in that task Australia, as
far as this Government is concerned, will be a good
partner with the United States.
We will have no truck with those who put out
the line that the United States should resume her
intervention in the war. We will have no truck with
any suggestion that America's honour or reputation
requires resumed intervention. We will have no truck
with those who seek to build a new philosophy of fear
upon the unwarranted assertion of American dishonour
in refusing to intervene with force on behalf of the
Saigon Government. While the security of Australia has never rested
solely upon the American alliance, that alliance remains
a key element in it. And whatever the outcome of the
events now unfolding in Vietnam, the basic elements
of Australia's security remain untouched.
Who rules in Saigon is not, and never has been, an
inqredient in Australia's security. Our strength, our
cutr it. y reit on factoru aind crlationsh i p ultimately
unchlanqud by these events. The really important factors
. tnd rcolations are those, which have been davweloped by the
Australt. ian Covernment. . ince oocumber 19;! our relations
with our closest and largest neighbour Inidonesia, our
rel. ations with our greatest trading partner Japan, our
relations with China, our active support for development
of co-operation between ASEAN members, our efforts to ensure
that the Indian Ocean does not become the next area of
confrontation between the super-powers as Indo-China
became, in a sense, the first. Above all, Australia's
security, as with the peace ot the world, rents ultimately
upon mnaking the detete lhetwufln the Unite: d SI-ates and the
Soviet Union a success and with associatingc China in a
widor detente. ' Thlse re t he .) reat rolIn ion:; hips and the
ijireat fLictor which dut cinif. no Hli t' ec. u ity of Australia.
' Phis GovernmentI ha: s beun unr-umi ttinq i iLs efforts to
strenqthen those relationships. Those ettorts have been
rewarded with remarkable success.
It is not possible that the nightmare of Vietnam
will ever pass from the memory or the conscience of any
man or woman of our time. Nor should it. But the work
we are now doing to build good, constructive relations
with peoples and nations throughout the world will outlive
even that bitter memory, will outlast even the bad and
destructive things inflicted on the people of Vietnam
during the past thirty years.