SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER. THE RT. HON. R. G. MENZIES
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
THURSDAY, 7TH SEPTEMBER, 1961
BERLIN
I have already laid on the table of the House a
chronology of events since the end of the ' Jar and a collection
of documents relating to the period from May, 1959, to the
present time. Copies of a comprehensive collation of papers
prepared for the United States Senate and covering the period
before May 1959 have been available to Honorable Members in the
Library. How the Berlin Situation came about
History of estern ights
The two collections are not confined simply t-Berlin
but relate to the larger question of a post-war settlement in
Germany, of which the problem of Berlin forms part.
How did the Berlin situation come about? It is a
product of the unconditional surrender of Germany and of the
arrangements made in the closing stages of the Second Jorld War
for the future occupation of Germany by the four principal
victorious belligerent powers. These arrangements were intenae
to be temporar, and to govern the administration of Germany
pending the negotiation of a German peace treaty.
Perhaps we might begin by looking at the situation in
early 1945, when the Allied Armies were advancing into Germany.
At that time, for military reasons which need not detain us now,
the Western strategy was not to race for Berlin, but rather to
concentrate on objectives which were judged to be of more
importance for the early destruction of the German armies. Sir
Winston Churchill, in his war memoirs, tells how he questioned
this strategy, because of the political importance of Berlin.
But it was adopted; and in consequence, the Western armies were
halted along the general line of the Elbe, West of Berlin, and
it was there that the mooeeting with Soviet forces advncing from
the East took place. In some cases, Western troops were in fact
withdrawn to this general line.
In the agreements worked out in the European Control
Commission which gave each of the chiaf belligerents a zone of
occupation in Germany, the zonal boundaries were so drawn as to
leave Berlin as a special area within the Soviet zone of
occupation, by which it was surrounded. For Berlin itself,
arrangements were made for a special regime of joint four-power
control. For administrative purposes, the area of Greater
Berlin was divided into four sectors, each allotted to one of
the four occupying Powers; but Berlin itself was to be
administered as a unit by a Four-Power Kommandatura of the
United Kingdom, United States, French and Soviet Military
Commands. These early agreements were made in the period from
before the surrender of Germany until a time immediately after
it. As I have said, they were intended to lay down the general
lines of the arrangements that would obtain pending the
conclusion of a peace settlement.
In addition to the rights of the Four Major Powers,
those agreements also defined certain rights of the other
belligerents against Germany. As one of these belligerents
Australia was enabled to establish a Military Mission in Berlin,
which it still maintains.
The rights of the victors include the right to
maintain garrisons in Berlin and the right to free access to the
city for this purpose. Such a right is essential to the Western
position in Berlin. Without it Western forces cannot be
maintained there, and without these forces there would be little
physical obstacle to the extension of Communist control over
Jest Berlin. The manner in which the Western powers and the Soviet
Union exercise their rights ( notably for the Western Powers this
right of access) forms the subject of the various agreements
among the four powers. But it is important to stress that the
rights themselves, being originally derived from the unconditionlsurrender
of Germany, do not depend for their validity upon the
continued acquiescence of any one of the four. Accordingly, the
rights of the Western powers in Berlin cannot be lawfully
cancelled or reduced by the Soviet Union.
Events leading up to the current crisis
The divisions which after the War opened up between the
wartime allies have prevented the effective negotiation of a
German peace treaty. However, having consolidated its physical
hold on the zone of occupation in Eastern Germany which fell to
it on the surrender of Germany, and having installed Communist
officials in key positions, the Soviet Government sot up in 19:-9
a Communist regime there, the so-called German Democratic
Republic. Since then it has worked to place its special sector
of occupation in Berlin formally under the control of that
regime. These developments were accompanied by measures to
restrict freedom of movenent from East to West Gornany. These
measures were and are in breach of various four-power agreements,
and most strikingly of the Paris Agreement of 1949, which ended
the Blockade of 1948-49. It is understandable that in these
circumstances the existence of a free West Berlin, enjoying the
protection of the Western powers, and with living st: andards so
superior to those of East Berlin, has been an increasing
embarrassment to the Russians. They showed early signs of
wishing to put an end to this state of affairs, in the imposition
of the Berlin blockade in 1948. This attempt was defeated by
Allied resolution and the Air Lift and for some years there was
little trouble. But towards the end of 1958 Mr. Khrushchev faced the
Western powers with an ultimatum calling for the conclusion of a
separate peace treaty with East Germany ( which would formally
legitimate the Communist regime there and perpetuate the division
of Germany) and for the establishment of lest Berlin as a socalled
" free city".
There followed a Foreign Ministers' Conference held in
Geneva in the European summer of 1959. At this Conference, the
Western Powers made constructive proposals designed to ensure
free elections for the whole of Germany and at the sane time to
safeguard both iestern and Soviet security. Mr. Khrushchev
refused to agree, and though he temporarily withdrew his
ultimatum there wore indications that he would again raise the
subject when he judged the time was ripe.
The present crisis was set in train by a Soviet
momorandun delivered to United States officials in Vienna at the
time of President Kennedy's meeting there with Mr. Khrushchev on
3rd and 4th June, 1961. The text of this memorandum is set out
in the paper I have tabled; I shall describe its contents in a
moment. The Attitude of the Two Sides
The Soviet View
Essentially, the Soviet Union wishes to perpetuate the
division of Germany because it knows that a freely elected all
German Governnent would certainly not choose the Communist
social, economic and political institutions which the Soviet
Union has imposed on the people of East Germany.
The aim of its policy is to strengthen and stabilise
the Communist regime in East Germany, to obtain international
recognition of it, to dim the beacon light which West Berlin
shines into the darkness of East Germany, and to close off the
escape route which it offers to the oppressed population of the
Eastern zones. Each year since the war some 200,000 refugees from
Communist rule have fled by way of West Berlin. The flight of
these refugees has naturally disturbed the rules of Eastern
Germany, because of the consequences both for the ocoionmy of the
Eastern Zone and also for the prestige of the Communist regime
which the Soviet Union supports there. According to official
figures, some 2.7 million people have fled from the Eastoen z'ne
of Germany since 1949. Some estimates place the total number who
have fled since 1946 at nearer four million. Out of a total
population of 17 million, either of these is a formidable figure.
It shows, more dramatically than anything else could, the misery
and oppression which rule in the Eastern zone, in striking
contrast to the freedom and prosperity of West Berlin and of
JWestern Germany. It is small wonder that the Corm-unists regard
West Berlin as a " cancer" in Mr. Khrushchev's teom, and that they
wish to seal off the means of escape which it offers.
The " Free City" Proposal
The thome of the Soviet omeorandum of Juno this year
and of subsequent speeches by Mr. Khrushchev is that there is an
urgent need for a Peace Treaty to be signed with " both German
states" ( that is the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Cormunist regir. e in East Germany) by all the powers at war with
Germany; that, if the Western powers refuse to sign, the
Communist powers will conclude by the end of this year a
separate peace treaty with East Germany; and that this treaty
will terminate the present basis of Western rights in East
Germany and in Berlin and will define the status of West Berlin
as a " free city". The Western powers would then be obliged to
work out with the East German regime new arrangements for their
right of access to Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev has stated that any
attempt to raintain Western rights by force would be mot by
force. But he has also suggested that, after the signature of
the peace treaty Western rights of access to Berlin would not
necessarily suffer interference. The Warsaw Pact powers have
issued a declaration stating that a denilitarised " free city" of
West Berlin would itself enjoy free comr. unications. But nothing
was promised in this declaration about access for Western troops
and clearly, if the Soviet view were accepted this would be a
matter for the East German Government to determine.
No gotiations The Russians have not suggested negotiations except on
their own terms. Any conciliatory signs fron then have been
balanced by stateents of their willingness to resort to force
if necessary to defend the so-called sovereignty of the German
Democratic Republic.
The Western View
The Western attitude towards the Berlin problem has
always been that it is, essentially, part of the wider problem of
a German settlement and indeed of a European postwar
settlement. They have long considered, as the Soviet Union
claims to believe, that a peace settlement in Germany which would
make it possible to end the occupation regirme in Berlin is
overdue. In a series of unsuccessful negotiations with the
Soviet Union extending over many years, they have endeavoured to
reach agreement on arrangements which while meeting legitimate
Soviet fears about its own security ( fears which, in the light
of modern history can be understood3 would ensure a stable and
peaceful Germany in future.
Together with the Soviet Union the Western powers are
committed, by signature of the United Nations Charter, as well
as by agreements specifically relating to Germany, to respect
the principle of self-determination.
The Western attitude has also been based on the
conviction that a divided Germany would prove a source of
constant tension in Europe and that the only really pe:. manent
solution lies in the reunification of the country by moans or
free all-German elections followed by the conclusion of a peace
treaty with a single German governrlent. Such a Treaty could be
combined with various measures constituting a European security
system to guard against any revival of German militarism. For
the same reason, the Western powers have been opposed to the
recognition of a separate puppet state in the Eastern zone of
Germany, which would inply acceptance of the permanent
division of Germany. They have withheld formal recognition of
the Oder-Neisse line as the Eastern frontier of a future Germany
on the ground that the determination of Gernany's frontiers is
properly a matter for an all-Gernan peace treaty.
The Western powers have, however, made it clear in the
past that they are prepared to enter into negotiations and they
have on various occasions in the past made constructive proposals.
At the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva in 1959 they
proposed an advance in three phases towards the conclusion of a
peace settlement with an All-German Governmont: first, free
elections throughout Berlin to establish a united city there;
second, a mixed German comnittee ( from Westrbnd-, rany) to draft
an electoral law and submit it to plebiscite; third,
elections for an all-German assembly and the formation of an all-
German Government to conclude a peace treaty. They proposed
that, concurrently with stages two and throe, there should be
certain reductions in military strength in central Europe.
These proposals wore not accepted by the Soviet Union.
The Western Powers will no doubt be prepared to enter
into further negotiations. In such negotiations, they would
undoubtedly continue to defend and secure the freedio of the
inhabitants of West Berlin, the rights of the Western forces to
be there, and the rights of access of these forces.
The Inmportance of Berlin
In the years since the unconditional surrender of
Germany a democratic state has been established in iWestern
Germany with a Government deriving from the freely exercised
vote of the population. Under the able leadership of Chancellor
Adenauer the Federal Republic of Germany, though not a nember of
the United Nations, has developed into a loyal member of the
free world, to the strength of which its economic vitality
contributes. Similarly, the zone of Western occupation in Berlin,
West Berlin, has prospered as the result of its inhabitants'
efforts and under the protection of the rights that the Western
powers enjoy there.
Two and a quarter million people now live in West
Berlin. They have steadfastly resisted Communist pressure and
the Western Powers have a responsibility for their future, to
see that they are not abandoned to Comr: unist oppression. They
cannot be allowed to share the fate of the other German millions
in the Eastern zone, the nature of which is so eloquently
attested by the refu~ goe figures I quoted just now.
The existence of free Berlin is of importance not only
to Germans, but to all the peoples of Eastern Europe and
indeed, to people everywhere in the world. To hand the
Bcrliners over to Communism would not only be wrong in itself
and a denial of every principle of justice; it would also be a
fatal blow to the hopes and confidence of people everywhere in
the determination of the Western powers to defend their frooecnm
What happens in Berlin will affect the balance of power and
reputation between the Communists and the Wust in areas
geographically much closer to us than Berlin itself.
Future Prospects What may we expect to see in the next few weeks and
months? It is likely that there will be a series of measures
and counter-measures over Berlin by the Co. mmunists and the allied
powers. The sealing off of West Berlin by the East German
authorities on 13th August, and their subsequent action to draw
the ring round Berlin tighter is an example of the action open to
the Communists; as is their apparent threat to air col. u-i. cations
with Berlin in their latest note to the -estorn Powers. ' J. is
note, it may be observed, has boon speedily and firmly rebuffed..
Against this background of tension there may well be a
neow series of negotiations. I will not venture any prediction
about their exact timing, location or outcome.
It is possible that at some stage there will be a
recourse to the United Nations. Article 107 of the Charter
envisages that action in relation to former enemies may be taken
" by the Governments having responsibility for such action." It
will be recalled however that the problem of Berlin was placed
before the United Nations at the time of the Soviet Blockede of
Berlin in 1948. A Security Council resolution was vetoed by the
Soviet Union, and an appeol by the President of the General
Assembly and Secretary-General produced no perceptible result.
The lifting of the blockade was the result primarily of the
steadfastness of the Western Powers and of their patient.
negotiations with the Soviet Union. But the United Nations
interest may have helped to bring to bear on the U. S. S. R. the
force of world opinion, and it was the Soviet United Nations
representative through whom the U. S. S. R. announced its
willingness to lift restrictions as soon as a date had been set
for a meeting of Foreign Ministers. The possibility of the
United Nations playing a useful role in the present crisis can
therefore not be excluded.
Conclusion The Berlin situation is both difficult and dangerous
and much patience, firmness and good sense will be needed to avoid
its manifest dangers.
These dangers will be rocogn. sed by both sides. In
particular, I believe that the Cormunists would do well to
realise that, though the Western nations will never be the
aggressors, they will if necessary defend their rights.
As to Australia, we shall of course continue to support
the Western position in Berlin and the right of Berliners to
freedom which we have maintained in the past. I night recall our
contribution in 1948 to the Western airlift, in which R. A. A. F.
aircrew helped to nan the aircraft which beat the blockade.
We are in close touch with other Governnents '. ad with
our own missions including those in Bonn and in Berlin itself
about the developing situation; and I shall inform the House
fron tine to tine of events as they occur.
indeed, since this statement was first drafted, a new
move has been nade by the Soviet Union. It has in substance
abandoned the negotiations for a cessation of nuclear weapons
tests, first by the dramatic statement that the Soviet would te. t
another bomb; and then, within a matter of hours, the actual
carrying out of that and further tests.
In order that this entirely cynical and dangerous
action may be fully understood, I should remind the House that on
August 28th 1959, the Soviet Government made the following
announcement " The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union have
decided not to resur. e nuclear explosions in the Soviet Uhion
if the Western Powers do not resume the testing of atomic
and hydrogen weapons. Only in the event of the resumpti. on
by them of the testing of nuclear weapons will the SF~ v. l1t
Union be freed from this self-imposed undertaking."
The Soviet Union has professed to believe, as th-
Western world certainly does, and as the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers publicly declared earlier this year, that the cussation
of further nuclear testing would be a step in the direction of
disarmament, would serve to reduce tension, and would offer to
the people of the world some hope of a reduction in international
tension. Honorable Members will be wll aware that the Soviet
Union has by every instrument of propaganda, including statomcn:-ts
made by Mr. Khrushchev to me in New York at the end of last yc. ar,
professed a desire for complete disarmament to be arrived at b
organised stagos.
Thefirst stage clearly would be to hold up the
development of now and even nore terrible weapons of destruction.
The Soviet Union has now, by its action, exhibited its contempt
for such an idea. We will no doubt be t-cld that the decision to
explode these further bombs is due to the tension resulting from
the Berlin crisis. But, as I have pointed out earlier in this
statonent, this is a crisis manufactured by the Soviet itself,
The immediate effect of this last action by the Soviet
Union might well have been to produce an imediate resumption of
testing by the Western Powers and an abandonment of hope that so
sensible a measure could ever be achieved.
It is therefore of significance that on Sunday last,
President Kennedy and Mr. Macnillan made the following staterent-
" The President of the United States and the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom propose to Chairman Khrushchev
that their three Governnents agree, effective iim-ediately,
nnt to conduct nuclear tests which take place in the
atmosphere and produce radio-active fallout. Their ain in
this proposal is to protect mankind from the increasing
hazards fron atmospheric pollution and to contribute to the
reduction of international tensions.
They urge Chairman Khrushchev to cable his irmediate
acceptance of this offer and his cessation of further
atmospheric tests.
They further urge that their representatives at
Geneva meet not later than September 9th to record this
agreement and report it to the United Nations. Thry
sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will accept this offer,
which remains open for the period indicated.
They point out that, with regard to atmospheric
testing, the United States and the United Kingdom are
prepared to rely upon existing means of Jotection, which
they believe to be adequate, and are not suggesting
additional controls. But they reaffirm their serious desi-e
to conclude a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, applicable to other
forms of testing as , ell, and regret that the Soviet
Government has blocked such an agreement."
The reply which will presumably be made to this
statement will be a complete test of the good faith and pacific
intentions of the Communists.
On Tuesday, 5th September, on the day that the third
Soviet nuclear explosion was announced, President Kennedy, after
careful thought and a thorough review of all the factors invol) ved,
issued a statement ordering " the resumption of nuclear teo-, in
the laboratory and underground, with no fall-out". It
emphasised that this announcement did not qualify in any :/ the
Western offer to make an agreement. Nevertheless, in the.
circumstances, which clearly show that the Soviet has cm-: ' ed on
a series of tests which, it must be presumed, will materially
increase Soviet nuclear weapons capability, the steps taken by
President Kennedy are, in his own words, those " which prudent
men find essential". I will reserve further comments on this subject till
next week when a further statement to the House may be
appropriate.