FOPXRS SDHEPEA RTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
FOR THE PRESS CANBERRA
FELEA SED ONLY IN CANBERRA PR 131 gtQ
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Statement by the Prime Minister and Minister
for External Affairs.
The Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Menzies,
made the ftll1mwing statement on international affairs by leave in the
House of Representatives tnday
I do not propose in this statement to endeavour to deal with the
whole field of foreign affairs. Time would not pemit of such an oxercise.
But I think it might be useful to say something about certain of the key
points and to isolate, for purposes of discussion, some of the points of
danger. There is really not very much new to be said about the relations
between the Soviet Union and the Western World though I will take the
opp-ortunity of setting down something about the great problem of disarmamcnt.
I think that it has been the general view of Honourable M embers that some
good and perhaps much good might come of a Summit Meeting. As we know,
this failed to materialise in M4ay, since when there havo been allegations
and counter-allegations for the reascn of the failure. I remain optimistic
about the chances of securing a Summit Meeting. It will be remembered that
when I moved in that direction at the recent General kssembly, I was
supported by threo of the four nuclear powers United States, Great
Britain and France and not opposed the fourth the Soviet Union.
After these events, Mr. Khrushchev told me personally that he
favoured a Summit Meeting and indicated that he thought that first and
foremost disarmament and then other matters such as the Berlin problem,
the position of Germany, and nuclear tests could isefully be discussed.
Page 2.
Not one of us will suppose that a Siunmit Meeting could solve all
the outstanding problems; but we would hope that it could make a
start and in that way begin to melt the ice which clogs up
international relations so much.
Meanwhile, within the Communist world itself, there are
clear signs of strain between tho Soviet Union and Communist China.
It seems clear that they do not entirely agree on broad communist
policy. The Soviet Union has adopted the policy of peaceful coexistence,
meaning by this, to be perfectly plain about it, that it
does not desire to resort to war as the direct instrument for
forwarding the Communist cause, but that it prefers the weapons
of propaganda, tied economic aid, and internal subversion. It appears
that Communist China on the other hand is disposed to reject the
idea of pdaceful co-existence and to pursue the classical Communist
belief that in the struggle against capitalism, violence remains
the vital instrument.
Mr. Uren. Who said that?
Mr. Menzies. I said it just now. When I make a reference
to the Communists there are always one or two honourable members whom
I do not expect to agree with me. Most people will, however.
A Meeting of Communist Parties was recently held in Moscow
at which we assume, and indeed have reason to believe, that an
attempt was made to resolve these disagreements. Tho official
communique of course says nothind of disagrooeements, but such in( icA-ti', n:
as we have suggest that the Sino-Soviet differences may not have bacn
resolved. Having said this, I simply indicate that in thc course cf
my present statement I will say something about developments in Afric.;,
with particular reference to Nigeria, the Congo, and South Africa;
something about the two immediate trouble spots in South-East Asias
Laos and South Vietnam; and something about the position of West
Now Guinea where potentially dangerous incidents appear to be cithtr
threatened or actually occurring.
Page 3.
NEW AFRICAN~ COUNTRIES
There hasp in the course of this year, been a remarkable
development of new independent nations in Africa, most of whom have
already been admitted to the membership of the United Nations. We
genuinely welcome these new nations and look -forwarf. to devc-lop-ing
and maintaining with them happy and helpful relations. With many of
them, of course, we have had only the slightest of contact; hut our
knowledge of them will grow either through the United Nations or
ly
direct/ as the years go on. We have, of course, High Commissioners
in Ghana and Nigeria, the two Commonwealth countries. We have also
* veen represented at Independence Celebiations in such countries as
Qameroun, Togo, Somalia, the Congo Republic, Mauritania and Malagasy.
The newest Commonwealth country, Nigeria, seems to me to
afford a splendid examplo of how self-government should be achieved.
It is a large country, the most populous of the African nations.
It has the advantage of being led by men of uncommon training and
distinction. It is noteworthy that already a Nigerian, the Economic
Minister, has been chosen as Chairman of the United Nations Reconciliation
Commission to go to the Congo. Nigeria has been moving by stages
towards complete self-government over a period of years and has therefore
developed an efficient administrative ma-chine. I believe that it
will serve as a groat stabilising influence in a continent which is
as yet unhappilyv7dxed ' by some internal conflict. I have in mind, of
course, the tragic events which have occurred in the Congo to which I
shall direct some specific attention a little later. But before doing
so I would like to offer one or two, perhaps trite, remarks about
most of the new African nations.
They have gained political independence which is a proud
and dignified state of life. But some of them at least are not yet
economically independent. This presents the world with a problem,, the
solution of which will call for wise and generous statesmanship.
Page 4.
True political independence must be built on sound economic
foundations; otherwise the nation may incur the risk of social discontent
and disorder and perhaps invite unwelcome and undesirable
intervention from outside. Such countries will need substantial
economic and technical help to develop their economies and to
strengthen their administrative system. lid of this kind should
be available " without strings". It would be offensive to these new
nations to treat them as pawns in an international contest or as
destined to pass into one orbit or another. Their independence must
be genuine and the judgments they form on international relations or
on association with other countries must be their own. So far the
Australian Government is making some contribution through the United
Nations Technical Assistance Programmes which are being substantially
increased, through other existing international programmes, and through
the International Dank. In addition, we have already offered a
number of fellowships and scholarships to African countries. A
special course of foreign service training has been in progress during
the past year in which young men from Ghana, Sierra Leone, Malaya
and the West Indies have taken part. Commonwealth Finance Ministers
decided in September to establish a specil Commonwealth schome for
help to Commonwealth countries. Naturally the details of this scheme
are not yct fully worked out.
Time will not pernit me to speculate about future develcpnorts
of nationhood in Africa though it is, of course, well known th'. t
political independence is not far off for Sierra Leone, Tanganyika,
Uganda and Kenya. I have learned today that the oon etitubicnal rcvio, 4
conference of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has just
opened in London under the chairmanship of Mr. Macmillan. This
conference will have the advantage of tho patient and far-reaching,
examination recently conducted by the Monckton Commission.
G. Page
I now turn to the Congo. The situation in the Congo is still
confused, difficult and dangerous. In his Annual Report to the United Nations,
the Secretary-General said that the United Nations had a duty by " preventive
diplomacy" that is his phrase to localise conflicts and to establish its
presence in areas where there was a " power vacuum" also his phrase and
where attempts by East or West to establish their influence would risk conflict.
By July such a situation arose in the Congo where the Belgian
transfer of power was fillowed by violent disorders. The Congolese Government
asked the United Nations to intervene to assure order, to supervise the
withdrawal of the Belgians and to give material aid.
The Security Council on July 14 called on the Government of
Belgium to withdraw its forces and gave a mandate to the Secretary-General
to provide the Congo with military assistance until the National Security
Forces might be able fully to meet their tasks. Later the Council unanimously
paid tribute to the work of the Secretary-General. On August 9, it confirmed
his authority while re-affirming that the United Nations force in the Congo
would not be a party to any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise.
In the result, the United Nations has in fact been acting as a
stabilising f& rco. As Honourable Mimbers will recall, this was
not to Ar Khrushchev's liking. By mid-September he habegun bitter
attacks -n United Nations operations in the Congo. In spite of this
a Special Session of the General Assembly by a vote of 70 to nil, with
only the Soviet Bloc abstaining, fully supported the mandate given by
the Security Council. ' In spite of this overwhelming vote, the Soviet
Union has continued to attack the Secretary-General and has refused to
pay its proper share of the cost cf the operations. The real reason for this
Soviet attitude is not that the Secretary-General has acted under Western
influence he has been notably independent but that the United
Nations has shown in the Congo that it can bring together an effective
force.
1' agea 6
By preventing chaos it has been a serious obstacle to Communist
ambitions. The United Nations is, of course., not the only means of
solving domestic disorder which a State itself cannot settle.
There may be occasions when a State may prefer to invoke the help
of its neighbours or look to more distant friends for help in
dealing with internal problems just as it is entitled to request
support in its exercise of its inherent right of self-defence.
But in the Congo, memories of colonial status are recent
and neighbouring countries find themselves called upon to devote
most of their resources to their own urgent development. If therefore
in the case of the Congo we are to avoid a contest between
opposing groups for influence through aid programmes, clearly all
aid should be channelled through the United Nations.
The political and constitutional situation within the
Congo is still most unsettled. I will just mention one or two
striking aspects of it.
First, there is the position of Mr. Lumuinba who was
Prime Minister when the Congo received its independence, but was
subsequently dismissed by President Kasavubu. As Honourable Members
are aware, the position of Mr. Kasavubu has been recognised by the
seating of his delegation in the General Assembly by 53 votes,
including our own, to 24. The persunaj. fate of Mr. Lumumba, who is
now under arrest, appears to be at present a matter of great uncertainty
techrnicallY at rmy ratethough
he is still a Deputy in the Congolese Parliament.
Second, the rmy Chief of Staff, Colonel Mobutu) proclaimed
that is his wcrd
the temporary " neutralisation" pf the Congolese Parliament and its
political leaders and the establishment by him of a College of
Commissioners to administer the country pending the restoration of
more normal government.
Third, there is the position of Mr. Tshombe, Prime Minister
of Kabanga Province, who does not accept -the authority of Leopoldville
but who, we hope, would co-operate in a United Congo, which badly
needs the economic strength and resources of 1ataaga if it is to become
self supporting. There have been similar tendencies in Kasai
Pare 7.
also
province which i' a relatively rich area.
There are hopes that the position may begin to clear.
The General Assembly has appealed to the Congo to seek a speedy
solution. A Reconciliation Commission has been established,
consisting of a majority of the African and Asian members of the
Secretary-General's Advisory Committee. In addition to this,
President Kasavubu himself has said that he envisages a " roundtable
conference" of Congolese political leaders.
The economic and administrative aspects of the problem
are, of course, tremendously important. The United Nations military
forces and technical task force have been hampered by the absence
either of a suitable ministry or of the elements of a proper system
of administration. The General Assembly has appealed for voluntary contributions
to a fund for the Congo for these purposes. Australia has great
sympathy for this troubled country. We have already made a modest
response to calls for specific practical help through medical teams
and otherwise. We shall be prepared to meet our share of the cost
of maintatihneiyn ga rtehe United Nations forces which are in the Congo;
at present/ of the order of 20,000 drawn from 14 different countries.
The costs of this force will be hirh. We have decided to mako 2
contribution of 750,000 dollars to tho United Nations Conilc Fund.
The great canger still is that this territory may become
the centre of international rivalries. The Soviet Union and other
moddlers have in their own hands the means of avoiding such a
disaster.
lage 8.
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS I turn now to Commonwealth 4ffairs
There have been important developments affecting the
Commonwealth. Nigeria is now a Commonwealth country and we have appointed
a High Commissioner to Lagos.
Cyrpus has become an independent republic and may ask to
become a member of the Commonwealth.
South Africa, at the recent referendum, decided to adopt a
republican constitution. This has given rise to discussion about the
effect of this step on South Africa ' s continuing membership of the
Commonwealth. In the past, the fact that a Commonwealth country has
become a republic has not led to its exclusion from the Commonwealth.
But feelings in many places run high about South Africa and it is
therefore desirable that the relationship between a Republic of
South Africa and the Commonwealth should be considered quietly and
carefully. Our own view is that it should be the subject of joint
deliberation among the Governments of the Commonwealth before
individual government decisions are publicly stated. There will be
a favourable opportunity for such consultation at the next Prime
Ministers' Conference. No doubt the position of Cyprus might be
considered at the same time.
The whole question of the future constitution of the
Commonwealth is clearly important and not without difficulty since
we may expect over a relatively short period of years to have more
British countries, now colonies, achieving independence and seeking
admission to the Commonwealth. The questions involved received
some attention at the last Prime Ministers' Conference when an
official committee was set up to study them. We will no doubt have
further thought given to the matter in March.
tage 9,.
IOS I turn now to Lacs.
The preservation of Laotian independence is important
both for its own -4ake and because the loss of Laos to communism
would expose other South-East Asian countries to serious threat.
With a population of probably not more than 2-million and with
long and -ulnerable frontiers, Laos has struged to maintain its
integrity against constant pressures from Communist China and
Communist North Vietnam and against internal Pathet Lao insurgency.
We believe that any government of Laos which desires to retain
genuine independence has two tasks.
The first is that, while maintaining a determination not
to submit to Commuiism, Laos should avoid givig its powerful
Communist neighbours even the flimsiest excuse for interference.
This is why neutrality as distinct from military alliances has
seemed the only practical course for the country.
The second task is that of settling the internal troubles.
Some fighting between the forces of the government and of General
Phoumi have already taken place. While the Government of Souvanna
Phouma controls the administrative capital, Vientiane, anti-government
but non-communist supporters of General Phoumi control the Royal
capital of Luang Prabang. This is a tragic situation. The
Communists alone, working through the i'athct Lao profit from the
division and fighting between the non-communists.
The imperative need inside Laos is for unity among, non-
Communists so that the real onomies of Laos and Laotian neutrality
the Communists can be isolated and resisted.
We have a deep interest in these matters. The . minton-anc
of Laotian independence will be a symbol of a nation's resistance t;.
Communism in Asia. And aggressive communism in Asia and pressinL
out to the borders of the asian continent reoresents a mcnaco to us.
Nobody would doubt that the result in Laos will be important to the
security of countries like Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, whose
safety is one of the aims of the South-East Asian Treaty.
Page
VIETNAM There are many current criticisms of the policy of the
government of South Vietnam on the ground that it is too authoritarian,
too highly centralised, and that it is not undertaking necessary
reforms. But I point out that reftorms aire not easy to introduce in
the face of heavy Communist pressure.
President Diem is beyond question a man of courage and
resource. His Government is not only subject constantly to hostile
propaganda from Hanoi but is also faced by greatly increased communist
insurgency throughout the countryside.
Recently the President survived an armed revolt from a
small group from within the army. It is, I think, important that
we should have a sympathetic and intelligent interest in the
difficulties which this country has struggled with since 1954. In
order to maintain resistance and development, the Republic has been
obliged to maintain large armed forces. its policy, to an externt which
has been criticised,~ 0li it necessary to curtail the political
liberties enjoyed in more fortunate countries. It has had,-to battle
against rebels who are masters of guerilla warfare. It has had to
do all these things in a difficult terrain with large areas of swamp
and jungle and with long and exposed frontiers.
I am sure that the resolution which the Vietnamese people
have shown in these lost six years, the increasing political experience
of their leaders and continued Western aid and encouragement can carry
the Republic through its present difficulties.
. ge 1
WEST NEW GUINEA The House has previously debated the Australian attitude
towards the future of West New Guinea. The policy of the Government
is well known and needs no re-statement. There are, however, two
recent developments which should be recorded.
The first is that the P~ rime Minister of Malaya; in a series
of conversations in various countries, has been putting forward
proposals with respect to the future of West New Guinea. He was good
enough to convey to me the kind of thing he had in mind and I promptly
conveyed to him the attitude of the Australian Government. Since the
Prime Minister has not, so far as I know, published his proposals I
am not at liberty to disclose them. But I can say, and I should say,
that I have made it clear that we adhere strongly to the principle that
the future of the Territory should be one satisfying its ihhabitants
and determined in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.
This principle is, of course, the basis of our own policy
in lcapua and New Guinea. Clearly it is also the basis of the Nether-lands
Government's declared policy in its territory and of recent constitutional
developments in both countries. In addition, I have made it clear
that whatever discussions might in future occur between the Netherlands
and Indonesia these should not be influenced by threats of force.
It is interesting to note that while abroad, the Prime
Minister of Malaya had discussions at the Hague with Dr. de Q~ uay,
the Prime Minister of the Netherlands. They issued a communique in
" Talks were of an exploratory nature and were held in a very
friendly atmosphere. The Netherlands Government greatly
appreciates the activities and constructive interest in this
matter on the part of Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Prime Minister
of the Federation of Malaya noted with satisfaction that the
Netherlands Government are willing to subject their policies
in Netherlands New Guinea to the scrutiny and judgment of the
United Nations. It w~ as agreed that the Prime Minister of the
Page ' 12.
Federation of Malaya, who has already held similar talks
on this issue with other Governments as well as with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, would in the
light of the outcome of these various talks consider
whether at a later stage further talks might be useful.
In such an event, he will inform the Netherlands
Government accordingly." These wer, th. terms of the ccimmuniquc,
It is not to be taken from this communique that the
Netherlands Government is offering to submit the question of
sovereignty to the United Nations. It has made it quite clear that
it is not doing so. Honourable Members will recall that the
Indonesian claim to sovereignty of West New Guinea has not been based
primarily upon legal considerations. For this reason Indonesia has
consistently declined to submit its claim to the International Court.
some
The second development is the recent landing of/ Indonesians
in West New Guinea.
On 21st November the Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs
announced that a small armed group of Indonesians landed on the
South-west coast of Dutch New Guinea in mid November and some were
apprehended. On 29th November the sa. me Ministry announccd that the
Dutch Navy had interccpted and apprehcnded in waters aro. nd Dutch ' nv
Guinea an Indonesian vessel which wis intended be supply an earlier
Cgrcup of infiltrators. There have been several r,_-orts of Indonesian public
statements on these infiltrations, the mcst recent of which was by
few
an official spokesman of the Indonesian Navy who on 2nd Docembur/ said:
" so far as I know the Indonesian armed forces have never ; cnductod
infiltrations into" Netherlands New Guinea.
iage 13.
At the same time there have been several references by
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Subandrio whom many honourable
members will recall as a distinguished visitor to Australia last year
to the possibility of an armed clash with the Netherlands in the. future
over West New Guinea. I have, of course, studied what Dr. Subandria
said. I hope that his remarks do not repudiate previous assurances
given by both i1resident Sukarno and Dr. Subandric regarding the intentions
of the Indonesian Government not to use force to obtain a solution of
the dispute over West New Guinea. Indeed, Sir, I think I am right in
saying that since I wrote those words earlier in the week there has been
word confirming that he repeats that attitude.
On 4th December, in discussing these and related matters with
the Australian Ambassador, Lr. Subandrio said that his comments to the
Ambassador on recent events did not mean any change in the Indonesian
policy of pursuing their claim by peaceful means.
There have been, of course, Sir, various Indonesian suggestions
that the Dutch, by making some small reinforcement of their defences in
West New Guinea, have acted provocatively. One has only to point out
that the forces available to the Netherlands in West New Guinea are a
tiny fraction of those actually under arms in Indonesia to show how
unreal these allegations are.
We certainly have no evidence in fact or any reason to support
the strange notion that the Netherlands propose to launch an attack on
Indonesia. Suggestions so fanciful do not help the understanding of the
real nature of the problem.
Finally, Sir, I turn to the problem of disarmament. Australians
share the almost universal concern at the continued increase in armaments,
including nuclear armaments. There is a sort of psychological control
present when nuclear weapons are, as at present, confined to four nations.
But there will no doubt be a constant pressure so long as the threat of
war exists to have such weapons made available to other nations.
We believe that if the number of countries possessing such
weapons were substantially increased or if they fell into irresponsible
hands, the world would live in a state of great dred.*
iPage 14.
The throat to use them could indeed become a weapon of blackmail
in pursuit of territorial or other gains* As I have frequently sai. d,
myself, armaments are much more the result than the cause of international
tension. I should like to remind Honourable Members that one of the
groat causes of tension in the Western World is the continued
enslavement of the once free powers of Middle Europe by the Soviet
Union. It would, I think, be idle to suppose that the making of
some agreement, leading even to a substantial reduction in armaments,
can bring genuine peace to Europe or reconcile the enslaved nations
to their slavery. Disarmament is therefore a matter to be approached not as an
exercise in rhetoric or as a piece of detached idealism but as a hard
practical matter. We have ourselves emphasised that disarmament in the
nuclear field alone would not and the threat of war but might very well
increase it since the Communist Powers have such predominance in
conventional weapons and forces. Disarmament must occur in all fields
and as it proceeds be accompanied at all stages by full inspection and
control. It is, of course, impossible to discevcr what is the real aim.
of a dictatorship since it is subject to no probing or questions of
public opinion and does not havo to engage in democratic debate.* We ar
therefore without the means of answering confidently any question about
what is in Khruschev's mind. It is pernmissible to believe that his
stated desire for disarmament may be to a point genuine. He is eng. a0CC
in some raising of the standard of living of his own people; in certain
branches of science and technology his country has made great strides.
The more these results are achieved, the more criticism will begin tc
evolve inside the Soviet Union and the more resentment there may be at
the vast size of the burden of armaments and the enormous concentrati , n
of what, after all, must be limited scientific resources on war-like
affairs.
Page
On the other hand, Khruschev can see great advantages
for his own country in its struggle for power if he can divide his
opponents, persuade their people that ' the Soviet Union genuinely
desires disarmament and so create in them an unwillingness to
all very confusing.
sustain the necessary burdens. I't is, sir, to put it quite shortly,!
One reason I have for believing that there is more
propaganda than substanco in the Soviet view is that at the last
Assembly, Khruschev himself, having previously ordered his
representatives out from the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee in
June, came along to the General Assembly to advocate that there
should be a negotiation on disarmament in the General Assembly.
This, I think, threu a murky light on his tactics. Nobody with a
genuine desire for concrete negotiations on disarmament could think
the General Assembly with its 100 delegations ( mann not less thrcn
1000 delegates and alternates) an appropriate meeting ground for
genuine negotiation. This great problem requires deliberation,
reflection, honest exchange., It can be negotiated only in a
body of limited numbers.
That what I will call the Western Powers desire disarmament
quite
is/ clear. The whole Western social, political and economic system
depends for its success on peace. Its free institutions and the
free spirit of its people are not well suited to having a sustained
" Cold war".* Yet we cannot disarm unilaterally, nor can we be directly
or indirectly parties to any disarmament agreement unless we know
that it contains sufficiently strong meansof inspection and control
as to. make us not entirely dependent on Soviet good faith. The
Western Powers will insist that while they are disarming they must
be able to see that others are also doing so. This means not only
being able to see how many weapons are being destroyed but also how
many remain behind. Because of the secrecy surrounding Communist
military capacity and intentions, and because of the Lack of
confidence now existing, the West has always insisted on proper
supervision to be ready to operate when disarmament begins and to
apply as it proceeds.
Page 16.
This, Sir, is " disarmament with controls" not, as the Communist profcsrcs
to believe, " controls without disarmament".
Attempts tc negotiate disarmament agreements have now been
in progress for over a decade in the United Nations. Recently they
have been conducted in a 10-Powor Committee whose composition was
agreed upon to meet Russian demands. The Communist delegates, as I
have said, walked out at the very time when they knew Western proposals
of a positive kind were about to be submitted. We think that the
Committee of ten should resume its activities; for what is wanted if
there is to be any measure of disarmament is not speeches at a large
public meeting but honest negotiations at close quarters.
The Western proposals are based on the following fundamental
principles: I state them quite briefly
1. Disarmament should be carried out in stages during which
nuclear and conventional disarmament should be so balanced
that no country or group of countries obtain at any stage a
significant military advantage.
2. Compliance with disarmament obligations will be effectively
verified both as to quantities, destroyed and quantities remaining.
3. ircvisions for such insp. ction, vorification : 2nd control must
form an integral part cf any aOrrecr:: nt on disrmancnt,
4. Transition from stage to stage shall bc dependent Cn assuranco
that the measures in the precoding sta. ge have boon satisfactorily
implemented. The Wast in Juno presented a detailed plan based on the abov,
principles. With the concurrence of honourable members, I incorporate tlij2r
informative document in " Hansard"-I have taken this subject last in
chronological order, but it is, of course, of obvious and overwholming
importance to the world. The plan is as follows
I-Age 17.
" The ultimate goal is a secure and peaceful world of
free and open societies in which there shall be general
and complete disarmament under effective international
control and agreed procedures for the settlement of
disputes in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter.
General and complete disarmament in a secure, free
and peaceful world requires
1. The disbanding, through progressive stages, of all
armed forces of all States and the prohibition of
their re-establishment in any form whatsoeveic,
except for thlose contingents of agreed size required
for the purpose of maintaining internal order and
ensuring the personal security of citizens and for
agreed contin-. ents for the international peace force.
2. The cessation of the production of all kinds of
armaments, including all means for delivering
weapons of mass destruction, and their complete
elimination from national arsenals, through
progressive stages, except for those armaments agreed
upon for use by an international peace force and
agreed remaining national contingents.
3. Strict and effective international control, from
beginning to end, of the carrying out of all
disarmament measures, to ensure that there are no
violations. The establishmnent of effective means for enforcement
of international agreements and for the maintenance
of peace.
Controlling principles:
1. Disarmament under effective international control
shall be carried out in such a manner that at no time
shall any State, whether or not a party to a Treaty,
obtain military advantage over other States as a
result of the progress of disarmament.
2. General and complete disarmament shall proceed through
three stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded
measures with each measure being carried out
in an agreed and strictly defined period of time,
under the supervision of an International
Disarmament Control Organization, within the framework
of the United Nations.
3. Each measure within each stage shall be initiated
simultaneously by all participa ting States upon
completion of the necessary preparatory studies
and upon establishmeint of the arrangements and
procedures necessary for the International Disarmament
Control Organization to verify the measures on
an initial and continuing basis.
Page 18.
0 4. Transition from one stage to the next shall be
initiated when the Security Council of the United
Nations agrees that all measures in the preceding
stage have been fully implemented and effective
verification is continuing, and that any additional
verification arrangements and procedures required for
measures in the next stage have been established and
are ready to operate effectively.
The Treaties shall remain in force indefinitely subject
to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and
be relieved of obligations thereunder if the
provisions of the Treaty, including those providing
for the timely installation and effective operation of
the control system, are not being fulfilled and
observed.
6. The International Disarmament Control Organization
shall comprise all participating States whose
representatives shall meet as a conference periodically
as required. There shall in addition be a control
commission and a Director General. The specific
responsibility and authority of the conference,
control commission and the Director General, the
staffing arrangements and criteria, the responsibilities
of participating States to the Organization, and
provisions for any necessary preparatory or interim
group to aid in the establishment of the Organization
shall be specified in the Treaty.
7. The specific arrangements, procedures and means
required for effective initial and continuing
verification of satisfactory performance of each
measure by the International Disarmament Control
Organization shall be specified in the Treaties.
These shall provide for all necessary means required
for effective verification of compliance with each
step of each measure. Verification of each agreed
disarmament measure shall be accomplished in such a
manner as to be capable of disclosing, to the
satisfaction of all participating States, any evasion
of the agreement. Specifically, from the initiation
of implementation of each agreed disarmament measure,
there shall be effective verification by the
International Disarmament Control Organization;
verification shall be in no way dependent upon
declarations by States for its effectiveness;
verification shall include the capability to ascertain
that not only do reductions of armed forces and
armaments in agreed amounts take place, but also that
retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed
agreed levels at . ny stage.
TASK OF THE TEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
The task of the Ton Nation Committee on Disarmament
is to work out a Treaty for general and complete
disarmament under effective international control governed
by the foregoing controlling principles as follows
1. Negotiate and agree upon a Treaty, to be acceded to
in the first instance by the States represented on the
Ten Nation Disarmament Committee, embodying the first
stage of the programme. This stage shall consist of
those initial and controllable measures which can and
shall be undertaken without delay by the States
participating in the Committee to preclude the
expansion of their armed forces; to bring to a halt
the growth of their weapons stockpiles; to reduce
the levels of their armed forces and armaments to the
S 0
Ta I-.
extant possible wiithouat jeopardy to their security;
and to provide measurs for protection against
surprise attack.
2. In the course of no~ otiatin such a Treaty, arrangfor
and conduct the necessary technical studies to
work out effective control arrangements for 1iasuros
to be carried out in the prograrm. Thcse studies
shall provide an agreed basis for proceeding with
impleme. iontation of the measure studied in the
appropriate Stage. Among the narly studies shall be
a technical examination of the measures necessary to
verify control ov-r, reduction and elimination of
agreed categories of nuclea-r delivery system" is,
including m issil.. z aircraft, surface ships,
suoiarincs , and eartillary.
3. After reaching areeent on a ' fraty on the first
stage of the programne, prepare for submission to a
world disarm-, ament confornce aLn agreed draft Treaty
on the second and third stages of the programme-. io as
set forth below, in accordance with the foregoing
controlling principles.
4. Thereupon, arrange for a wiorld-wide conference of all
States, to be held at thie earliest possible tine, for
thc following purposes:
Accession to the Treaty covering stage one by
Status which have not already done so;
Accession to the iTraty covering stages two and
three by all States
S TAGE ONE:
1. An International Disarm.-iament Control Organization
shall be established within the framework of the
United Nations, and expanded as required by the
pr o rssjv ie; l ir of eannde raclom : pletedisamaiient.
2. Thu placing into orbit or 3tationing in outer space
of veh icle) s Lcarryin ; l-n. pons expble of mass
destruction shall b, -oroiibited.
3. To 1yve~ r~ te ), rotctior noa inst surprise attack,
prier notification to the; Intenational
Disarvilaient Control Organization of all proposed
launchings of spacc vehicles ard r. iissiles and their
planned track s; the s ; ablishmnt of a zone of
aerial and ground inspection in a. 3r3eed -areas including
the and US. SR.; exchange of observers on a
ru-procal basis at -grr; d rilitary b ses, domstic
zad foreign.
4. Dclra.) tion of and insti1tution of on-site inspection
at umuta-lly agreecd operLtional air bas. s, iiissile
launchin*' Y pads, submsarine and naval bases in orde. r te
. stablish ai basis for controls ovcri nuclear delivcry
systms in subsquent sta. ses.
Initial -force level coilins shall be established a. s
follows-2.5 million for the U. S. and the . S. S. R.
and ag-reed appropriate force levels for certain othKej:
Sta tos. Aftjir t!-e accession to the Traty of other
Limilitarily si;, nifi cant Sttes , ifter these initical
force lcvels ha~ z bean vrified, force levels of 2.1
illion shall be established for th and L. S. B.
c d ag. r cod Opropriate; force 1erelcs shall be
c t Il A ,1 , r t i Cca I-Ste
Page
6. Agreed types and quantities of armaments in agreed
relation to the established force levels shall be
placed in storage depots by participating States
within their own territories, under supervision by
the International Disarmament Control Organization
pending their final destruction or conversion to
peaceful uses.
7. The production of fissionable materials for use in
weapons shall be stopped upon installation and
effective operation of the control system found
necessary to verify this step by prior technical
study and agreed quantities of fissionable materials
from past production shall be transferred to nonweapons
uses, including stockpiling for peaceful
purposes, conditioned upon satisfactory progress in
the field of conventional disarmament.
8. The submission by the various States to the
International Disarmament Control Organization of
data relating to: the operation of their financial
system as it affects military expenditures, the
amount of their military expenditures, and the
percentage of their gross national produot earmarked
for military expenditures. The data to be submitted
will be dram up in accordance with predetermined and
mutually agreed criteria.
STAGE TJO:
1. Force levels shall be further reduced to 1,7
million for the U. S. and U. S. S. R. and to agreed
appropriate levels for other States.
2. Quantities of all kinds of armaments of each State,
including nuclear, chemical, biological and other
weapons of mass destruction in existence and all
means for their delivery, shall be reduced to agreed
levels and the resulting excesses shall be
destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Agreed
categories of missiles, aircraft, surface ships,
submarines and artillery designed to deliver nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction shall be
included in this measure.
3. Expenditures for military purposes shall be reduced
in amounts bearing a relation to the agreed
reductions in armed forces and armaments.
4. An international peace force, within the United
Nations, shall be progressively established and
maintained with agreed personnel strength and
armaments sufficient to preserve world peace when
general and complete disarmament is achieved.
STAGE THREE:
1. Forces and military establishments of all States
shall be finally reduced to those levels required
for the purpose of maintaining internal order and
ensuring the personal security of citizens and of
providing agreed contingents of forces to the
international peace force.
2. The international peace force and remaining agreed
contingents of national armed forces shall be
armed only with agreed types and quantities of
armaments. All other remaining armaments, including
weapons of mass destruction and vehicles for their
delivery and conventional armamonts shall be
destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.