VISIT TO THE U. S. AND U. K. 1971
WASHINGTON
PRESS CONFERENCE AT BLAIR HOUSE
GIVEN BY THE AUSTRALIAN4 PRIIIE MINISTER, W1ILLIAI4 McMAHON
2 NOVEBEP. 1971
( See separate text for questions on Cambodia)
PM Gentlemen, I think I can start of f by saying that yesterday
afternoon I saw the Secretary for Defence and he gave me a rundown
of the present position of the U. S. Forces in South Viet-Namn: And
as far as he could his appreciation of what is likely to happen in
the months to come. He painted a heartening picture of the situation
both in terms of military capability and of their development
programme and the kind of assistance that the United States was prepared
to give. Their military -prograrme is not of course, affected
by the decision of the Senate when it threw out the Civil Aid Bill.
So that they will be able to proviie not only the war equipment
but the other assistance that is needed to sustain a South Vietnamese
Army and the Civil Programme. Regrettably I can't go into the
details of withdrawals or transfers of equipment because the conversation
was off the record and I can only give you a general impression
of the discussions. At the same time the Secretary and Mr
Packard who was with me,. gave me an appreciation of the relevant
strengthe of the United States and of the Soviet. They pointed out
that the United States was sufficiently powerful and that the buildup
of the United States Forces was proceeding ra idly and would,
in their view, provide the kind of deterrent that was needed in the
interests o-f the free world. They also explained the position of
the Soviet Navy in the Indian Oc-ean and of the intention of the U. S.
to maintain forces there as a counter-balancing force to the Navy
of the USSR. In particular e~ ither one of them did Tp oint out to me
the need for countries on the littoral of the Indian Ocean to be
prepared to provide base facilities so that the fullest and most
effective use could be made of the United States Forces for the use
of the ' Naval Base at Cockburn. and the Air Force Base at Learmonth
and the extent to which the British/ United. States signal station
would . be put in the future. That's about the sum total of what was
discussed yesterday in outline. Today I saw the President and
again it was an of f the record conversation. I can assure you of
this one point the discussions were frank, they could not have
been put more frankly and in covt plete detail and I have no reservation
whatsoever in saying -that this is the kind of consultation
we like and I doubt whether it could have been better. FirstMr
Nixon, who was accompanied by : 4. r Kissinger, explained their policy
in relation to China that is the People's Republic of China
and their desire to bring the People's Republic of -China into the
comity of nations and to induce it to ado * pt policies that could
lead to an exnectation and a realisation of Doace. Mr Kissinger
took a very active part and explained in copsiderable detail the
kin4 9f conversations that had taken place in Pegiftg orh botfl odcasions.
* He lso explained the necessity for secrecy. The second
point the President mentioned was the mission ' ha wculd pay to M4oscow
and explained that the fact that he was prepared to visit both
capitals clearly indicatoed that they were not trying to play one
country of f against the other, but were attempting to explain
overall Amo. rican policy and its desire for a deten-te and a reduction
of tensions. And the position in the Mediterranean was explained
2.
in much the same way as it was explained in the discussions with Mr
Laird and the President went over much the same ground as MR Laird
had gone over as to American intentions in South Viet-Nam. Pretty
full details were given to me of what their intentions were,
but for reasons I have given you I am unable to go any further than
I have gone at the moment. One point I can mention to you because I
think that this is of great importance to Australians ,, as that he did
agree with me that the phrase could be used that the United States
Government, from the President down, recognised, or were prepared to
confirm the unqualified and unconditional assurances that had been
given to us in the ANZUS Treaty were as relevant and valid today as
they were at the time the Treaty was negotiated.
We discussed in particular the problems of Japan against the
background of the decision in the United Nations and the proposed
visits to Poking and Moscow and also the difficulties associated with
the realignment of currencies and the import surcharge. Mr Connally
will bo de~ aling , with these matters in Tokyo shortly. But it was
emphasised to me that the difficulties were not associated peculiarly
with the United States and the Japanese alone, but with other countries
and particularly the French. It was a very frank and useful discussion
on the monetary probL , ms.
Other matters were discusscd of our bilateral trading
relationships particularly the export from Australia of meat and the
possibilities due to the dock strike of a carry over of supplies and
matters of a similar kind. All in all I can give you this assurance
that I could not have wished for greater concentration that occurred
on this occasion. I Think I should mention to you too in this context
that suJ-saqan to the second visit of MR Kissinger to Peking the
President did, through the Australian Ambassador, communicate with me
on several occasions. Those communications were, I believe, not only
productive of the greatest goodwill but indicated a desire that we
should understand the American point of view, and why they had taken
the various initiatives they had taken. Later on I saw the Secretary
of State and he too reaffirmed the assurances relating to the ANZUS
Treaty and also went over the ground relating to South Viet-Nam and
American military aid progvammes there. It was a very interesting
discussion and showed, I believe, the very high regard the-U~ iitd
State holds for the Australian people and for the policies of the
Australian Government. To me it has been a most valuable me : ting and
one I think which is of benefit to us because of the concrete and unqualified
assurances that have been given.
Q Prime Minister, on the Indian Oc can a question about the
use of bases in Western Australia. Did the Pkesident ARM yOU if thig
was possible or was it taken as a matter of course
PM It Whs More in the area of Mr Laird that the questions relating
to bases were mentioned. But they would be only too happy to
use the Naval Bases and they will, of course, want some sort of access
in case they need repair facilities. It wad ! AR Laird who was more
interested in this question.
Q You Uave him this assurance that American Forces would be
able to use these Bases.
PM We had, of course, given that already. And they had also
assured us that they would, when necessary, appreciate the opportunity
to use the Bases.
( See separate text for questions on Cambodia)
Q On the broader area, Sir, you raised just on Cambodia,
is there anything said to you which has caused you any surprise in
your discussions with the Americans porhaps or if not surprise
whether or not they may have adopted perhaps a different tone from
what you expected.
PM -It depended which area you local~ ise it to.
Q I thought I would just leave it up to you because obviously
you have a fair idea on this occasion of the thinking of the American
people on most issues. I was just wondering in your discussioms with
Mr Laird and ! Nr Nixon, were you surprised that they placed emphasis
on any particular areas and were there any new answers which you found
unusual given the Playback you have had in Canberra
PM No but this might be wise after the event because so much
was said that I thought was logical and wise but I didn't expect them
to say and didnot think that their thinking had gone as far as it
obviously had gone. To that extCent I was surprised, Yes.
Q Was this on China?
PM Well, on several issues there their thinking was we had
given a lot of thought to it, we did not know how profound their
thought was or how far they had gone and it was on these that the
profoundness and the lengths to which they had gone that were a little
surprising.
Q It jU8V Odu~ od to me that you said it was several issu(: es,
one of them was China if that's any indication. Is that right
PM Yes.
Q Sir, there has always been a certain ambiguity about the obligation
of ANZUS for the presence of Australian troops in Singapore
and Malaysia. Could that be clarified in any way
P11 No I didn't Dursue that. Whiat I wanted was an affirmation,
-a strong affirmation that I received from both the President and
Secretary of State of. unqualified support for ANZUS, and the view
was expressed to unqualified support not only from the Administration
and the Congress but from the Amcerican people as well. THey wanted
to display complete goodwill towards Australia and this was just as
important, perhaps more important to me, than the actual words of the
Treaty itself.
Q Why did you demand such a strong affirmation Sir
PM Because I think there is a lot of discussion going on in
Australia today by people and not necessarily well informed, that
ANZUS is starting to re Dcede into the limbo of forgotten things. That
is I didn' t think it was true but naturally enough I want to get the
strongest affirmation I can get in order to refute these suggestions. .4.
Q Sir on this question, if T could just add one further point
on this, the speech that was made by 11, r Bowen in New York. It
caused or was a matter of some controversy in Australia. You yourself
in Parliament defended this speech as being suloported by the Government.
Did you raise the terms of that speech privately with Mr Nixon?
PM No
Q -Well, * put it this way, was it raised in any fashion or did
you raise it that a change in Governmant in Australia would have in-
-volved any change in the existing relationshin between Australia and
America.
PM No
Q Did you discuss with Nixon or did you gat any assurance
from JAR Nixon about trade with the United Sta tes, any suggestion
that wool might get special treatment in import surcharges or tariffs?
PM You're in an area flow that I am not able to discuss in any
detail. I did talke about our trade relations with him and mentioned
meat and wool.
Q Could I I would like to ask just one more thing Sir. Did
you ask M~ r Nixcr_. to come to Australia?
PM I informed him that he would be a welcome guest but at the
same time I indicated that I would un~ derstand it if he found it
difficult to come in an election year. He laughed when I said it
and said well thank Heavens that you recognise the difficul. ties, it
would be ex4-remely difficult.
Q Speaking a-bout requesting an assurance of their support for
ANZUS, Mr Prime Minister, did you explain ' this feeling in Australia,
that it was receding into a limbo of forgotten things and who held
that view
PM Could I make a correction. I did say that there was a feeling,
some feeling, but not necessarily one that was widespread that ANZUS
-was receding into the linbo of forgotten things. I did not ask for a
positive assurance relating to it, it was given then without any
-further prompting. But by this time, his feelings towards Australia,
and towards the Australian people, and the high regard that he had
for us as not only friendly, but willing allies and one who could be
relied upon and trusted and relied upon, had become obvious.
Q Today, Sir, Mir Rogers had a press conference, the one that
the press sat in on and during the course of which he remarked that
the President was concernod for the Foreign Aid cut, that the decision
of the Senate would affect the foreign policy posture of the
United States and the rest of the world. Did the President expatiate
on this with you because M~ r Rogers referred specifically to Viet-Nam
while he was in the context talking about obligations created in Asia
and that this posed a threat in fact to the Nixon doctrine, in fact
he used that expression, to refer to that part of the world if I may
settle this for you ( INAUDIBLE). He also said in the public / 5
statemnnt that there could be a collapse of the South VietntmeeeJ
economy arising from this fact and there does seem to me to be a
conflict in what he said earlier about it being able to carry on
and that they also will be reconciled... ( INAUDIBLE).
PM First of all turning to what Mr Walsh said, this question
of aid, of civil aid programmes was only touched on perfunctorily
by the President and he did express the view that there would be a
reinstatement or partial reinst'. tement of the aid programmes. He
did not go any further.
Secretary of State Rogers dealt with it in greater detail
but felt that not too much. should be said about it. He was very
sorry for the vote but particularly the large numx. er of absentees
and the fact that it was taken at the time when Mayoral and other
elections were taking place but there is not much more I can add
to what you already know. He also is hopeful that the Congress
will take action to make additional appropriations but he did not
want to be too forthcoming about it. As to what you said, MR Reid.
about there seems tg be an inconsistency, it has to be looked at in
two ways. So far/ me bulk of assistance to South Viet-Nam is
concerned it is under the military funding programme and that won't
be affected. As to the balance, it will be civil aid and I don't
know to what extent civil aid is involved.
Q What is your view?
What do you think of it MR Prime Minister
PM Which
Q Not the Foreign Aid cut, the decision by Senate
PM When I'm in another country I don't like to make any critical
statements relating to what that country has done. It is its
business and I don't like interfering in its own domestic affairs
other than to say this. I thought i t was regrettable, I thought
a mistake was made but I have a feeling that to a large extent the
vote will be, in one way or another, will be reinstated by Congress.
I can go no further than that.
Q Don't you beltve Prime ilinister, that it does affect us
simply because the withdrawal of aid from the Asia Pacific region,
would certainly cause us to rethink changes in Foreign Policy.
-PM I don't th-ink it will be any change to us. We will go
ahead with our aid programmes
Until I know exactly what the United States Government
or Congress intends to do on Foreign Aid, I refrain from
any comment other than what I have already made.
Q Is there any suggestion, Mr Prime Minister, that Australia
may be called upon to put forward more aid to South Viet-Nam
PM Tere might be but I doubt whether it would be practicable.
Q In what circumstances might these be now requested
PM I don't know Ivan. That is hypothetical and I'm not getting
involved into a world of hypothesis.
Q Sir, M! r Kissinger was in China for the first time at the time
of the Labour Party delegation. Did he talk about that at all and the
effects..., of the visit.
PM No, he didn't, he merely explained the kind of conversation
they had, what it was about and the significance of it and its short
and long term significance.
Q Did you get the feeling Sir that the United States was moving
-quicker towards diplomatU,. recognition of the PRC than we ourselves
are.
P11 No.
Q Did Mir Kissingczr sit in throughout the entire interview Sir
PM Yes, And par-ticipatei to a considerable extent.
Q Did they discuss the United Nations vote and the implications
that it has for the United States relations with not so much China
but the rest of the world
PM They did not do so but Secret.-ary of State Roqers did.
Q And what did VMr Rogers say I have seen his public statement
on the matter. They referred~ more to what they call the atmosphere
in which it was taken than to the actual vote itself.
PM I can't go any further than I have gone because as I said I
am limited to what I can say to what I have already given you. If
there is anything more I think got to go from the Secretary of
State Rogers and not through me.
Q Mir Prime Minister you made the point that... you specifically
made the point of saying that prior to MR Kissinger's visit to Peking
( I am sorry) prior to the announcement of Mr Kissinger's visit to
Peking and the announcement of the pending visit of Nixon that the
White House did communicate withyou on several occasions. Are you
saying Sir that they told you beforehand
PM THis is the second visit
O No, the first visit.
PM I didn't say so, I am., sorry, I was referring to the second.
0-Sir, on this currency thing arising from the conversations
today, were you able to fix mentally upon a timetable yourself, final
decisions on currency
PM No, I can't and they can't either.
Q Did the President seem concerned about the way in which Mr
Sato's position, in jeopardy in politicq would be affected by the decisions
taken in both the economic and political level in America
at the moment. This is the subject of considerable speculation
throug'hout the world. I think I've heard you express some concern
about this yourself.
PM I can but repeat what I said before. that the President and
the Secretary of State did refer to the importance of Japan in the
world, scene and not only because of its industrial and political
position but because of the problems that were faced on currency realignments
and trade as well. I can't go any further than that.
Q How about yourself Did you raise the question of MR Sato's
position as distinct from that of Japan as a whole
PM Yes.
Q Could you tell us what your feelings were on this?-
PMq No I'm sorry.
T-M!' r Prime Minister, obviously attitudes to defence in our
region was obviously quite a big part in your talk with the President
today. Could . you tell us something about that
Py, It was a big part of our talks. And it was emphasised that
the United States had no intention whatsoever of withdrawing from the
Asian region. Wh~ at it was doing was matching its commitment to its
capabilities and above all they pointed out that the haNZUS Treaty was
for them part of the supreme law of the land and they gave clear and
unqualified assurances that the ANZUS Treaty was just as valid today
in the minds of the Administration, the Congress and the people of
the United States as it was when the Treat' was first signed. That's
the answer.
Q Mir Prime Minister. one of the significant discussions you had
with the President today related to the American Naval buildup as
planned in the Indian Ocean. Iow significant is this and what part
will Australia play
PZ1 I think you have gone a little bit too far in saying the
significant American Naval buildup in the Indian Oce: an. WKhat they
intend to do is to have some kind of parity with the Soviet Union's
Naval Forces that are now or might go into the Indian Ocean and I do
hope that they will be able tc have access to Australian base facilities
when their Navy, or elcments of their fleet, are there.
0 Does that mean an expansion of the facilities there are planned?
PH No, not so far as I know. That was not discussed.
Q MR Prime iinister, what do you believeyou and Australia have
gained by today's talks with MR Nixon
PM They were very frank and honest discussions and they did show
the wish of the United States Government to have consultations with
the Australian Government on matters of mutual interest and importance
to both of us. That was the first important effect. The second one
without any doubt was the interest it has created in Australia abouzt
the viability and the permanence of the ANZUS Treaty. There is a
tendency back home for some Australians to say well it doesn't matter
very much and it is dying from lack of use and people do not care
about it very much more neither do the people in the United States.
Those two statements are wrong. It is a cruciall. y important Treaty
from our point of view. Secondly, so far as the Americans are concerned
that is the United States, from the Government, Congress and the people
of the United States, there is no doubt about it that they regard the
assurances given in that Treaty as of crucial importance to them and
assurances that they will respect. In their minds the terms of the
Treaty will be maintained by the United States Congress and Government.
8.
one other short question. Did you disagree with anything which
Mr Nixon had to say
PMI Not so far as I can raedmer. I would have to go over everything
that was said in m~ uch greater detail before I could give a complete
answer. But most of what he said and fEor that matter what Mr
Kissinger and Mr Laird, not Mr Laird, and to a greater extent what was
said by Secretary of State Rogers coincided with what we in Australia
are thinking. I would like particularly to compliment the President
for the frankness with which he expressed his vi'* ews and the detail
with1 which he went into the various problems that arose and the informat~
lon conveyed to us.
And I think too if I can say this his liking for Australia
is very great and for that reason I did express the hope that he might
be able to come to Australia next year although I doubt whether it will
be practicable.