EMBARGO 7. 30 pm, Monday, 25 January 1971
THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE
Interview givenby the Prime Minister, Mr. . JP Gorton
for ABC Television on his return from the Singapore Conference januaryj191I
Interviewer. Robert Moore
Q. Prime Minister, it seems that most of the reports that have come out on,
the Conference have been gloomy rather than optimistic. People have suggested
that it was a waste of time, if not something worse. Do you feel, as you loo~ k
back on it, that the Commonwealth has come out stronger than it went into
the Conference?
PM No, I don't think anybody could say that. But I don't see how anybody
could say it was gloomy or the reports were gloomy if not worse. The
Commonwealth Conference broke up without anybody leaving the Conference,
and before the Conference was held it was thought that some countries might
do that under certain circumstances. So far, this has not happened. On the
other hand, the underlying questions have not really been resolved. But I
would say, it was much the same as it was before the Conference.
Q. Were you disappointed in any way at the conduct of the Conference, or
the items that were discussed or the manner in which they were discussedi
PM Yes, I was a bit disappointed at the manner in which a number of items
were discussed. That is to say, a formal sitting around a large table and the
reading of formal speeches, much on the United Nations model. I was a little
disappointed at that, and I wasn't alone in this. A number of other delegations
also said they thought it would be much better to get away from this formalised
kind of sitting around and reading of set speeches, and the handing out to the
press afterwards. And also I was a little I suppose " disappointed" is the
word at so much of the time of the Conference, a very great deal of the time,
being taken up discussing this one question of Britain and the provision of maritime
naval facilities and arms to South Africa. It finished up with nobody changing
their position. It did seem to me that people could have stated their position
once, or if necessary, twice, and then said, " Well, those are our positions"
and gone on to something else. But at least two -full days was spent in going
over and over that.
Q. Prime Minister, some reports have pictured you as a " loner", as the
tough. guy of the Conference. I think one of the Singapore papers called you
" Two-gun Gorton". What were your relations with the other leaders,
particularly the African leaders? Were you so toughf Did you stand on your
dignity so much? / 2
PM I don't think I stood on my dignity at all. But what I do believe one should
do at internation conferences or Commonwealth Conferences of this kind is to
say what one believes, is t~ o put one's point of view exactly as one sees it.
And indeed, other members of the Conference apparently had the same view.
I can see no point in using so much roundabout diplomatic verbiage that nobody
knows what you mean, and you can have a disagreement about what you meant
later. Maybe that was what they had in mind. But as far as relations with
the other individual members were concerned, I feel they were very good. I
like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and he did go to some trouble to come and
say goodbye especially before he left. Kaunda, in his last speech, suggested
it would be a good thing if people from Australia went through Lusaka and saw
more of his country, and if he and others could come and see more of us for
understanding. I don't think there was anything but good personal feeling
between us, although we had slightly different points of view.
Q. What was the role of Mr. Trudeau? Some people have suggested that he
was an honest broker, or mediator, or a smoother-over of troubled waters.
Did he play a big role, say, in the final draft on the Declaration?
PM Well, he played a role in it, but I don't think he played as great a role as
the Australians played, and by the Australians, I don't just mean myself I
mean myself and Mr. McMahon. There was a Declaration which was going to
be made and which all members were asked to subscribe to, and there-were
some things in that Declaration which we felt and we were not alone but we
-Ielt we couldn't subscribe to because we weren't in fact going to carry them out,
and therefore there should be changes in the original draft. Now, Mr. Trudeau
knew the African leaders ( he had had one of his aides over there speaking to
them beforehand), and he spoke to them and he got a suggested amendment and then I
put in a particular amendment saying that racialism, when we talked about it,
meant the practice of racialism within our own nation, each one withi its
own nation....
Q. Do you think it is fair to say that you pursued what one might call a hard
line at the Conference't
PM Yes, I think it is fair to say I pursued a hard line in two respects one
is that the Commonwealth Conference must operate in the way it has always
operated in the past, and that is by people expressing points of view to each
other and not trying to pass resolutions which purport to be binding, not trying
to take decisions by majority vote, not trying to reach conSen~ sus of opinion
which is expected to be accepted by those who don't have that opinion.
Q. Well, what is left then, Sir, if you....
PM What has always been there. This il~ ea that you-might adopt the practice
of the United Nations, of passing resolutions and things is completely new, as
far as Commonwealth Conferences are concerned. What is left is for people
sitting around a table, putting their point of view to each other, agreeing on
particular matters or agreeing to disagree on particular matters, and then going
on to things on which some constructive action can be taken. This has always / 3
been the concept of the Commonwealth, and if it is to turn into a United Nations
with a majority vote, it. wilL. I am sure, destroy itself.
Q. Would the kind of Commonwealth and the kind of Conference you have in mind
allow for criticism of the policies of varbus countries by other countries?
PM Oh, yes. But not for communiques and declarations issued by majority vote
criticising. It would allow for discussion and argument and criticism the way
Commonwealth Conferences in the past have always done.
Q. But only in private meetings?
PM Yes, that's right.
Q. Well, I wonder if we could turn now to the issue of the proposed sale of arms
by Britain to South Africa. Was this issue resolved in any way at all at the
Conference?
PM, No, I don't think it was. It was the African countries, for reasons which are
thoroughly understandable, who were very upset at the concept of the sale of
naval vessels to South Africa by Britain. And they argued their case very cogently
and they said this could lead to an upsurge of feeling against Britain, and the
African countries turning to Russia and China and so on. One of the good contributions
that was made in that field, I think, was made by Mr. Trudeau, who said, well,
he Could see that and that was fine, but supposing Britain didn't sell arms, sell
these maritime arms, France was presumably going to do it. Would that mak. e a
difference to the African countries as vis-a-vis European countries, would they
not be still as angry at Europeans coming in if perhaps Portguese or Germans
or some other country would sell arms, would that not still leave the problem
just as it was before? And he went further, and said, in any case, while South
Africa exists in the way in which it exists and is governed at the present moment,
won't there always be in the African countries, the focus for turning to Russia,
or turning to China..,. will the thing be really changed merely by Britain refraining
from fulfilling what she regards as her contractual obligations, and some other
country coming in and fulfilling them. I thought that was a good analysis of -LL.
Q. Do you feel that the British Government will wait for the result of the
investigation by the so-called study group before makb-tg a decision?
PM All I can say on that is that Mr. Heath made it abundantly clear, and perfectly
clear and on the record that he was not bound in any way to wait for any decision
by this study group.
Q. Well, what do you see as the status and function and value of the study group?
For instance, would Austra hia be bound by ny findings it might make about tile
threat of the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean? a 0 0 /' 6
PM No, no, no. Not at all. As a matter of fact, the wording of the study group
was " to examine I speak from memory " to examine the factors
Jeading to strategic threats to the sea routes of the world". It was pretty high, wide
and handsome terms o! reference. It was then confined to the South Atlantic and the
Indian Ocean. I think it may have been in the minds o! some of those who proposed
it that if this was accepted, then Britain would say, " Well we will wait until thlis
has been carried out" but Britain, in fact, did not accept that and made it quite
clear.
Q. Do you see this study group as having any real function at all? Or is it really
just widow-dressing?
PM Well, I would like to wait until the terms of reference are completely worked
out. I don't know that it will affect in one way or another Britain's decisions.
Q. Or Australia's?
PM Australia hasn't got any decisions to make.
Q. It must be very interested in...
PM We are not selling arms to South Africa. The whole question is should
Britain sell maritime arms to South Africa?
Q. I imagined the study group took in much wider territory of trying to mak'e
some judgment on the threat to maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean.
Australia would have an interest in that.
PM Oh, we would have an interest in it which I declared and made clear in the
Conference. But our interest is that there should be friendly ships if I can put
it that way able to lend assistance to the security o the trade router. on which
we so much depend. Those friendly ships can only operate if there are bases
from which they should operate. And we are interested in bases being available.
Now, it is up to Britain to decide whether, from military points of viewi, from1
financial points of view, she can best do this , in her own judgment, as a result a!
using the Simonstown base.
Q. Prime Minister, is it your impression that some African countries will leave
the Commonwealth if Britain does sell arms to South Africa?
PM Oh, I think we have to wait I wouldn't speculate on that.
Q. You were not able to get any insight into that?
PM I don't want to speculate on it.
Q. It seems to many observers, I suppose, that one of the problems facing tile
Commonwealth now I think this was shown at the Corlerence is that there is
probably an irreconcilable conflict of priorities in the minds of the variou's
members. I would like to quote very very briefly to you something from President
Nyerere's background paper which seems to me to put that so-called African point
of view very succinctly. In his paper, President Nyerere says the Africans do
not expect all Commonwealth countries to have the samne order of foreign policy
priorities. And now here I quote " But we do expect that they will have South
African racialism on their list of priorities even if it is not at the top. Now is
South African racialism on the list of our foreign policy priorities?
PM In the sense of taking action against the South African Government, no, it
isn't. And this is one of the reasons why we couldn't go along with the Zambian
Declaration. The original Zambian Declaration suggested that all countries should
seek every means of combating racialism every means and deny all regimes
which practise it any assistance which could consolidate or strengthen them.
Now this means, or could be interpreted to mean undoubtedly, that you would break
off trade relations with any such country, and -you wuld break off diplomatic
relations, and indeed, if you take it seriously that you would use every mean-s
you could be required to go to war against them. Now, we are just not going
to do this.
Q. To come back to President Nyerere's point of view.... South African racialism
is not a foreign policy priority for us?
PM it is some thing which we deplore publicly and say we don't agree with. We
don't agree with the way it is applied but it is not something which we propose to
take international actio-n to combat.
Q. The African countries seem to want you to say, or the Commonwealth to
say not just that racialism is bad but that it is the worst thing in international
relations or human relations.
PM Yes, I think that the African countries, when they speak of racialism, don't
completely have in their minds racialism as practised in countries all over the world.
I think to them racialism means South African domination. I don't think'.* they are
at all concerned with disagreements, racial practices such as an African nation
agaist Asian citizens or perhaps the problems that we have seen in England or
in America or in other countries. -That comes into it partly, but basically I
believe whether they know it or not when they speak of racialism they really
mean South African and Rhodesian domination.
Q. Is there really any hope of countries which disagree so violently and
emotionally on their priorities in foreign policy, any hope that these countries
can live together as a Commonwealth for much longer? / 6
PM I would think that there was and there ought to be because while oin may
disagree as to priorities, nevertheless there should be and there is, within
a numube r of foreign policy objectives, or economic policy objectives, thinirgs or.
which these countries can and do agree. Now that ought to bind, and people ought
to be able to say, " Well, these other things, we don't quite agree, but let's
go on to the ones we do agree about".
Q. In the weeks leading up to the conference, our p osition on the sale of British
arms to South Africa wras often described as being neutral. Now, in whtat sense
was it neutral? What could we have against it?
PM What could we have....
Q. Against the sale of arms to South Africa to make us neutral?
PM Well, we had to consider two things : One, the feelings of other people i the
Commonwealth to some extent; secondly, that this was, ba: 3ically, a British
Government's decisioin. We did not we, as I said before, we want to see that
the Indian Ocean trade routes are protected, particularly since there is now a
growing Russian interest in the area. There have to be bases from which these
ships can operate. I have a belief that if Simonstown were in Tanzania, if it
were not in South Africa, that everybody would say, " Yes, of course, this is the
place for a base and this is where these things can best be done".
Q. Could I put it to you, then,, if the same security arrangements could be rra de
in another way, would you prefer arms not to be sold to South Africa?
PM I am afraid that wie have taken the view, and I think1c that it is the correct one,
that we are interested in the protection of the Indian Ocean trade routes. If
Britain in her judgment feels that any action she takes contributes to thle protection
of the Indian trade routes, that is her decisioin, and the results of that, as far
as the Indian trade routes are concerned, would be iii Australia's interest. But
we don't urge or condemn.
Q. Well, put it in another way, then. Is a strong South African essen-tial to our
security in the Indian Ocean?
PM I wouldn't want to comment on that. After all, we are talking simply about
whether the base which Britain occupies, which she monitors, under which there
is an agreement, should be continued to be used by her for the protection of
naval routes trade routes. I can only repeat that we think it is her decision
on this, and we don't propose to condemn her for mal-zing any decision she makes
or protest against any decision she makes, or urge her into making any
decision.
Q. But you wouldn't rather have the security if another base could be f. Lound and
not have the arms sold to South Africa? Wouldn't that be a kind of compromiie.... o. / 7
PM I would like to leave this to Britain's dec tsion.
Q. What precisely is the degree of threat now, of the Russian Navy hi the hidian
Ocean?
PM I don't think it is great I don't think it is great at all. It is comparatively
you Imow, ships deployed are comparatively small. But there is a new element
that has been introduced. Russian ships in the past have come into the Indian
Ocean and gone away againi. But there is clearly a much greater degree of
interest, a much greater period of time during which Ohips df the Russian Navy
are in the Indian Ocean, a clear greater Interest and greater act ion to sustati
that interest. And this is comparatively new.
Q. You allow that the Russians do have some kind of legitimate interest in the
Indian Ocean
PM I suppose that all countries really have an interest in tKl oceans, but I agree
with Briain that when there is a new element introduced 4r:: o a situation, the.-, you
have to take cognisance of that new dement.
Q. Is the threat really to the trade routes or is it so. i-iing else?
PM didn't say there was a threat, you know. I just L., d there was a new
element that had been introduced and that this, therefore, had to be taken care
of. And I don't suppose that we would have been acti2ng as we are, to provide
naval facilities in Western Australia, if we didn't fee. t
Q. Why is the study group then looking at the security of maritime trade routes
in the Indian Ocean if there isn't some kind of hypothetical, I suppose, threat
from somebody?
PM I think that this was something that was put up by somebody at the Conference
I think I told you this before perhaps in the expectation that if it were put up
and adopted then it would delay Britain making a decision. But Britain made it
quite clear that this was not so.
Q. Well, can I put it this way. If Russia were to be a threat in the Li-dian Ocean,
would it be through its effect on our trade routes or would it be somethi-ng else?
I mean, what could it do about the trade routes?
PM Well, I don't think that in talking about the Commonwealth Conference and
what occupied the Commonwealth Conference, I want to go into kind of Defence
Papers on what the effects of a new presence in the Indian Ocean might, from
a defence point of view, be, other than to say as I have said before, we are
interested in maintaining a trade route. Britain is particularly interested in
maintaining her trade routes; there is a n. w element introduced; Britain and
ourselves feel that we need to take more interest in it ourselves. T" hat's all. / 0
8.
Q. Now, Prime Minister, we will leave that there. Could I turn now to another
subject which arose not at the Conference but while you were i nSingapore.,
our immigration policy. In your speech to the Australian Alumni Association,-you
were quoted as saying, of Australia, that " it may provide the first truly multiracial
society, with no tensions of any kind possible between any of the races
within it. At any rate, this is our ideal". Now, did you see that as a major
statement of new policy?
PM No, I didn't.
Q. What did you mean by multi-racial then, a multi-racial society?
P.) M I meant a society in which there are people with different coloured skins, of
different racial extraction, such as in fact we have in Australia at the momenit.
We have Australians, we have aboriginals, we have Australians of Chinese
extraction, of Japanese extraction, of a variety of races. You see, Sinñ gapore
I was speaking in Singapore and speaking to the Singapore Alumni people
Singapore says, " We are a multi-racial society" and so they are. They are
Chinese, Malays, Indians, Europeans, Eurasians, but they are also a homogeneous
society. I don't know the percentage, but I would thinkL'-90 per cent at least are
Chinese. They are homogeneous, but there are many races. And there are
also tensions there between the races from time to time. And as far as Australia
is concerned, I believe we must remain homogeneous. I believe in the present
application of our immigration policy, but under our present immigration
rolicy, people of other races can come in and be assimilated. I feel there is
little or no racial feeling in Australia towards such people. And this being
continued could lead to a multi-racial society in the sense that there wiere a
number of different races, without racial tensions which exist in almost every
other country of the world. But can I perhaps make it more clear by reading
some sentences of what I said.... because one of the speakers had spoken about
our immigration policy. I said,
" As far as the application of an immigration policy is concerned, I
have no hesitatio-n in saying what I am now going to say, and I propose
to make no apology for saying it. Looking around the world, I see
social problems between Negro and Asian in some parts of Africa,
I see tensions between Negro and European in England. I see grave
danger to normal liing in the split between the races in the United
States, and I read not long ago of riots between races not far av ay from
Where I am standing now,, riots which could have easily spread to
Singapore. I am not going to allow that kind of da:ñ-ger to occur in
Australia.
Q. Prime Minister, if I could just come back to that, you also did mention
that Australia might become the first truly multi-racial society in another part.
I doin't want to bandy words with you. Now what you are saying there is that to
the extent we become a multi-racial society, it won't be so much through
deliberate policy as through accident or stealth 0 / 9
PM '/ eli, I think it will be through deliberate policy in that we are not propos,: ing
to change an immigration policy in order to allow large numbers of other races to
come in, because that would create racial tens ion. Can I quote the words that
you are quotin~ g?
Q. Yes.
PM/ " I think that the course which we are followtog" that is our present
immigration policy " holds great chances of achieving real racial tolerance.
I think it holds better chances than if we were to risk the kind of racial confl-icts
t hat other countries which I believe we would risk, if we abandoned
our present policy. " I think if we build up gradually inside Australia a proportion
of people without white skins, then there will be a complete lack of conscious-ness
that it is being built up" and that we will arrive-at a state where we vi 11
have a multi-racial country without racial tensions and perhaps the f" irst in
the world. The key to that is that we do maintain our present policy.
Q. wouldI fy tohue rper ewfeerre an osto cteientsyi ownhs ich nwo arsanc'ita hl otmenosgioennse ou[ i sba umt uwlhtii-crha cinia fl acsto cdiiedt yh ave
great diversity of race, of language, religion...
PM You are asking me a question that if there were no racial tensions, and
wherever I look in the world, I can see no instance where there aren't racial
tensions
Q. Whiat I am really asking is is a homogeneous society a preferable ideal to
a very diverse society?! It seemed to me you were hinting....
PM If you look at ideals as distinct from realities, of course an ideal is something
that one must ultimately strive towards, but it is not something which can be
applied in a world of reality.
Q. Well, if Australia goes on. being so relatively free from racial tellsions,
given the limited amount of non-European immigration, would you like to see,
or would you expect to see a gradual increase in the number of non-European"-
migrating to Australia?
PM I would want to see Australia remaining homogeneous, overwhelminigly
homogeneous, as I think that is the only way one can avoid racial tensions. There
are racial tensions and I am quoting aghin " There are racial tensioins, and
whether there, ought to be or not, doesn't matter. We live in a world of reality.
We don't live in a world which mo uld be different if we could shatter it to bits
and remould it. And living in a world of reality, I believe that if we were to
abandon our restricted immigration policy, that we would get tensions that wie won't
get if wie continue with the liberalised policy we have now got. *.* 0/ l13
Q. Of course, it is often suggested, and I am sure you have heard this, that
our policy is a racist policy people of other countries sometimes say this,
often not looking at their own policies, I agree. But one of the things, of
course, that they do beat us with now is the fact that we don't grant assisted
passages to non-European migrants not so much the number, but we distinguish
on that ground. Do you feel that it would be worth removing that charge?
PM No. No, I dont.
Q. Why?
PM Because I believe that what we apply, and what almost every other country
I can think of applies, is a racist immigration policy. If it were not, then ai-,,; body
from anywhere could come in equal numbers and this simply doesn't apply.
But what I believe is that the racial implications of abandoning our present
policy would. lead to the kind of trouble that we have seen in other natio-ns, and
not only European natiorB.
Q. Prime Minister, now when we look ahead after the Conference, where do
you see the Commonwealth in our overall foreign policy? How big a part does
it, or will it, play?
PM It is a very hard question to answer. You say " in our overall foreign
policy". I don't quite know how to fit one concept into another. I would say,
-for example, quite clearly Indonesia, in relation to our foreign policy, is far
more important to us than many countries in the Commonwealth are far more
impoitant. So I don't think the Commonwealth impi:-nges on that area of foreign-r
policy at all. But perhaps where it impinges is that one can, or one hopes in
the future, meet around the table, a group of people from different countries
in the Commonwealth and explain to each one of them one' s own fo reign-policyt
and perhaps reach things on which one can agree and which one can ao-operate,
Q. , Prime Minister, I suppose tIe worst cynics suggest there won't be another
Commonwealth Conference. Will there be?
PM I can't tell you. I would be surprised if there were not. The Commonwealth
is not going to aisappear because if the worst came to the worst, and some
nations in it decided not to be in the Commonwealth.... it would depend on hoyl
many nations still wished for there to be a Commonwealth, how many nations
wanted to go to a Commonwealth Conference. And I think there would be quite
a number. Prime Minister, thank you very much for talking to us.