PRIME MINISTER:
Well ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to welcome you to this news conference. At the conclusion of the conference I'll make available to you a copy of the unclassified version of the Flood Report, and it is being simultaneously released in Canberra together with a covering statement.
I would like to start by thanking Mr Philip Flood for the very good job that he's done. He was given terms of reference in line with the recommendations of the Jull committee and he has carried out a very thorough and professional and comprehensive elevation of our intelligence services.
His principal finding is that the Australian intelligence community is serving the nation very well and is a potent force for the Government, though his major finding is a very positive one about the role and the performance of our intelligence agencies. His report contains an extensive list of recommendations and I can announce this afternoon that with the exception of one recommendation, which I will come to in a moment, the Government proposes to accept all of Mr Flood's recommendations. The only recommendation the Government will not accept is a recommendation for changing the name of ONA. So all of the recommendations of substance have been accepted by the Government and this acceptance includes an increase in the annual budget for ONA from $13.1 million to $25 million. In addition there will be a reallocation from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of a sum of $2.5 million and this will all effectively mean that ONA's size will double from 74 to 145.
On the issue of Iraq, Mr Flood found that both ONA and DIO assessments, and I quote, "reflected reasonably the available evidence and used intelligence sources with appropriate caution." He also found that our intelligence agencies did not automatically rely on all of the assessments made by their British and American colleagues, although it is a matter of record that the great bulk of the intelligence available was from British and American sources.
He also came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had reflected more cautiously the material that was before them and that their findings thus far on the facts as have emerged have proved to be closer to the mark. He did note that the intelligence on Iraq's WMD was thin, ambiguous and incomplete, but he also noted that Australian assessments and key judgements were relatively cautious.
Very importantly, and I think quite significantly, he said that the observe conclusion, namely that Iraq did not have WMD aspirations and capability, "would have been a much more a difficult conclusion to substantiate". What he said importantly therefore was that on the available evidence it was a harder proposition to establish that Iraq did not have the aspiration and the capability than to establish and substantiate the proposition that Iraq did have the aspiration and the capability. I regard that as a very significant finding. He also made the observation that at the time these crucial assessments were made the only government in the world that was arguing that Iraq did not have WMD was in fact the then Government of Iraq.
Very significantly Mr Flood's report firmly rejected any suggestion of political interference in the intelligence community. Now this is a very important finding because the Government and the intelligence agencies have been subjected to an unremitting litany of allegations that we applied pressure to the individual agencies, that we forced members of agencies to give us the intelligence we wanted. That has always been untrue, it has always been an unfair slur on the Government and it's also been an unfair slur on the agencies.
Can I read to you the relevant paragraph, or one of the relevant paragraphs, from Mr Flood's report on this issue? "Finally", he says, "the inquiry has found no evidence of politicisation of the assessments on Iraq, either overt or perceived. The inquiry received no indication that any analyst or manager was the subject of either direct or implied pressure to come to a particular judgement on Iraq for policy reasons or to bolster the case for war. While agencies and their analysts are conscious of the policy environment, both their processes and their cultures and in ONA's case its legislation, promote independence of assessment. The inquiry's conclusion that on the basis of the available information ONA and DIO drew the most likely conclusions is consistent with and supports the finding that there was no evidence of politicisation." I want to say that again, "the conclusion that on the basis of the available information ONA and DIO drew the most likely conclusions is consistent with and supports the finding that there was no evidence of politicisation." I might say that this is now the fourth report, the first one was the Jull report, the second was the report of the United States Senate, the third was the Butler Report in the United Kingdom, and now we have the Flood Report. All of which have given lie to this proposition that the political leaders of the three countries involved applied pressure to intelligence agencies to give us the assessments that we allegedly wanted to mount a case for war. That did not happen in the case of Australia. I've always asserted that and Flood's inquiry now supports it and I continue as do my colleagues continue therefore to reject the proposition that we took this country to war based on a lie. That has never been the situation. With the fullness of time, those assessments have not so far been matched. But they were honest assessments arrived at without political pressure.
Could I go on to say that the report also deals with the rise and incurrence of Jemaah Islamiyah in our region and Mr Flood has found that Australian intelligence agencies before the period December 2001 should have known more about JI as a group developing terrorist capabilities and intentions. However, the inquiry saw nothing to indicate that any Australian agency, including ASIO, had any specific intelligence warning of the attack in Bali. Can I finally again thank Mr Flood for the work he's done, as I say the Government with the exception of the name change which I see no value in at all, you will accept without qualification the recommendations that he's made. I would also like to offer to the leader of the Opposition if he wishes a briefing on contents of the classified version of Mr Flood's reports and if he wants to take advantage of that offer it will be made available as is appropriate. There is a classified version as well as the unclassified version and I'm perfectly happy for Mr Latham to have a briefing on it.
JOURNALIST:
Prime Minister, is it timely now for an apology from those people who suggested that Governments heavied those intelligence agencies?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, it would be pointless to make such a request because they did out of political motivation and with complete indifference to the professionalism of the people involved. I mean, disagree with our decision, say that we were wrong, say that we were misguided but don't accuse us of heavying the intelligence agencies. Now this is the fourth report that has given the lie to that. We did not heavy the intelligence agency, we never did, we respect their intelligence but frankly I wouldn't expect given the sort of people who have made those allegations, I wouldn't waste my time making such a request. But this is a very strong conclusion on that issue and this is a case where the intelligence agencies made an assessment and what Flood is saying is that their assessment was more consistent with Iraq having the WMDs than the alternative hypothesis. Now that is a very important finding and it's not a finding that has emerged from any of the other reports.
JOURNALIST:
Does that mean you stand by your statement that there was a real unacceptable threat?
PRIME MINISTER:
Look, I understand the Government's decision. I made a lot of statements. What is important is the decision we took. The decision we took was justified both on the assessments we received from our intelligence agencies and the other policy considerations including our alliance with the United States that I outlined at the time. I do not retreat in any way from the Government's decision. If I had my time again I would take the same decisions, the World, and the Middle East, and Iraq are better places because Saddam Hussein has gone.
JOURNALIST:
...flavour of what is in the classified report?
PRIME MINISTER:
No, I can't give you a flavour of what's in the classified report - it's classified. Mr Parry, we can't do that. But what we can say is that, I think I can fairly say, there's not sort of some dramatic expose in that which is not contained in the unclassified version. We're not sort of holding something back from the public. It's just that inevitably there is material in a classified version which if made public might compromise operational things and might possibly compromise sources, I can perhaps suggest that they are the sort of criteria that have governed the inclusion of that material in the classified version, but the findings and recommendations are essentially consistent.
JOURNALIST:
Mr Howard, will you, like Mr Blair, accept some responsibility for the failure of...?
PRIME MINISTER:
Look, I'm responsible for everything that goes wrong - you know that.
JOURNALIST:
Look, I accept responsibility for everything the Government did. Everything. The decision to go to war - of course I accept responsibility for it.
JOURNALIST:
...(inaudible)
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, look, I accept responsibility for things that we have decided. I can't accept responsibility for other people's judgements, I accept responsibility for the decisions I make based on those judgements.
JOURNALIST:
... the funding directed.
PRIME MINISTER:
I beg your pardon?
JOURNALIST:
Where would you like to see the increased funding directed?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, it's been recommended that it go to the Office of National Assessments.
JOURNALIST:
(inaudible)
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, that is a matter for discussion between the Government and the ONA.
JOURNALIST:
Can you tell us what did Mr Flood ask you when he interviewed you?
PRIME MINISTER:
No.
JOURNALIST:
(inaudible)
PRIME MINISTER:
It wasn't, you know, particularly dramatic.
JOURNALIST:
Who decided what was classified and what's not?
PRIME MINISTER:
Who? Well, in the end it's me, but I take the advice of people who are qualified to give that advice. The Government decides whether something is classified or not in the end and ministers have the power to declassify any document. But you don't normally declassify something unless there's a reason but there are often reasons. But it's been suggested by Mr Flood and he's a former head of the ONA that certain things remain classified and they are of the nature of operational details and things relating to where people might operate and that sort of thing an that sort of information should remain secret.
JOURNALIST:
(inaudible) country now come to this conclusion, as you say, that they haven't been heavied and again, if you say they've made assessments they have not just been matched. Do you think people should really have a right to think that their assessments should be matched, intelligence agencies?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, people will make all of those judgements and this is a democracy and we have had open inquiry, we've had an inquiry which was recommended by the parliamentary committee and we can do no more than that.
JOURNALIST:
(Inaudible) had not been matched, is that acceptable?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, it is... when you say is it acceptable, what I would say is that that is a factor that people take into account in making judgements about people who take decisions. I can only report to you what I was told and I can invite you to read the Flood Report and the Flood Report on any fair reading will reveal that although the intelligence was of the type that he described it, the assessments made by our agencies were fair and reasonable and cautious and that they were more consistent with the hypothesis that he had it than the hypothesis that he didn't have it.
JOURNALIST:
... of the ONA Prime Minister, in terms of funding and in terms of people, just a body that advises you directly, does that increase its importance in the intelligence community taking it a step above any other agency or that...?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, I don't know that it increases its importance, it is already important because it's the central assessment agency. The others are collection and reporting and to a degree analytical. But ONA is the one that has the prime responsibility for making assessments and this will certainly boost its role, I'm not saying it makes it dramatically more important, they're all very important and they're all part of the one intelligence community. And, as you are aware, we have responded to the requests we've had from bodies up to now, including ONA and to the extent that ONA has asked for additional resources over the past few years, they've received them, it's just that coming out of this report Flood is recommending a very big increase.
JOURNALIST:
Is it more clout in terms of operation?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, I think it... it will be more strongly resourced and therefore it'll have more people to make evaluations and more assessment. But I don't want to suggest that this is an ONA takeover, but certainly ONA would be greatly strengthened as a result of this.
JOURNALIST:
... Mr Flood's terms of reference didn't include an examination of what happened to the intelligence once it moved into the political process.
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, I don't think there are any unanswered questions. He deals with the issue of, in his report, of clearing statements that were made and he quite rightly makes the point that the four major statements that I made on Iraq were in relation to the accuracy of the references to intelligence were cleared by ONA. But people should understand that there is a difference between an intelligence assessment and a political decision and there's all too ready a willingness to accept the proposition that the intelligence assessment determines the political decision, it doesn't. The intelligence assessment is one of the things that a government takes into account when it makes a decision. And I never expected agencies to clear political language that I might use. But I did expect them to clear the factual things. And, you know, I might say famously in relation to the debate about the sourcing of uranium from Niger, which seemed to occupy a furious amount of time in the Federal Parliament at one point last year, the Butler Inquiry in England has concluded that findings of the joint intelligence committee on which my comments were based were in fact quite justified and the... it was one of those cases where American intelligence and Britain intelligence had different views.
JOURNALIST:
(inaudible) intelligence agencies don't have enough people with (inaudible) experience...
PRIME MINISTER:
They don't have enough people of what?
JOURNALIST:
... with defence experience.
PRIME MINISTER:
Yes, he refers to that. Well, I think it's something that ought to be taken into account, yes I do. I must say that when that criticism was made by, I think, the defence association it struck a bit of a chord with me. I didn't say much at the time because I wanted to hear what Philip Flood had to say. But he refers to that criticism, I think, with some approval.
JOURNALIST:
(inaudible)
PRIME MINISTER:
It is. Well, $13 million is not going to send us broke and it's a very high priority and I'm very strongly in favour of it being given. Okay anything else?
Thank you.
[ends]