PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Howard, John

Period of Service: 11/03/1996 - 03/12/2007
Release Date:
11/07/2003
Release Type:
Interview
Transcript ID:
20790
Released by:
  • Howard, John Winston
Interview with Neil Mitchell, Radio 3AW

MITCHELL:

In our Sydney studio the Prime Minister. Mr Howard, good morning.

PRIME MINISTER:

Good morning.

MITCHELL:

Mr Howard, first - North Korea has warned overnight to you, their words - the dark clouds of nuclear war are building and that country's prepared to go to war over the nuclear arms issue. Is Australia prepared to go to war over this?

PRIME MINISTER:

What we have decided to do is to take part in some interception training exercises. We don't want to go to war with anybody. The question of how we deal with North Korea is a very difficult question. We would like it solved diplomatically, we will try very hard to solve it diplomatically. We can't walk away from the issue and the Australian people wouldn't want us to do, but it doesn't help for me to be answering at this stage hypothetical questions.

MITCHELL:

Okay, well how…

PRIME MINISTER:

I think you understand that. I mean, nothing is to be gained by my dealing in black and white issues about whether or not we're prepared to go to war, nobody wants to go to war with anybody about anything. It's always very much a last resort thing and one to be avoided. But North Korea is a huge challenge; it is a rogue state; it does operate outside accepted norms. We're trying to build as much diplomatic pressure as possible. We've had this meeting in Brisbane and out of that 11 countries have agreed that they will take part in some exercises, training exercises. We haven't at this moment decided to put together an interception force. Clearly, the training that will take place over the next few weeks will mean that different countries, including Australia, are ready if we do decide to do that.

MITCHELL:

So how will the training exercises work? What will we send to the area and what will they do?

PRIME MINISTER:

At this stage we have some exercises planned with the Americans in September. The… I think they're broadly called Coral Sea exercises, and there'll be some naval exercises and there'll be some add-ons to that. I hope involving other countries as well, but the details of that are being worked out. I don't want you to take, or your listeners to take that as the final word on what we're going to do there.

MITCHELL:

Will those exercises involve interceptions if necessary?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well, they'll be training exercises to practice, if you like, interception skills.

MITCHELL:

So, no real interception to be carried out at this stage?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well, I don't know. I'd have to get some technical advice on that. I'm not, myself, off the top of my head….

MITCHELL:

No, I mean not in real interceptions with other North Korean vessels.

PRIME MINISTER:

They're [inaudible] to be doing training exercises, no.

MITCHELL:

Do you believe the North Korean rhetoric about that they are willing to go to war?

PRIME MINISTER:

I just don't know.

MITCHELL:

Does that worry you?

PRIME MINISTER:

It worries me a lot, you bet, you bet it worries…

MITCHELL:

We're talking about nuclear war.

PRIME MINISTER:

Yeah, I mean, this is a very dangerous, difficult situation. That's why you'll forgive me for not answering simply yes or no and directly to every single question about are you prepared to go to war. I mean, it is a very difficult, serious situation and it is exercising everybody's attention.

MITCHELL:

Is it fair to say that these exercises are in fact a warning shot for the North Koreans?

PRIME MINISTER:

They're designed primarily to put us in a position to effectively gather an interception force if that's what we ultimately decide to do. It would be wrong to see them merely as a ploy to send a warning shot to the North Koreans. If they help to build the pressure on the North Koreans to behave in a more reasonable fashion then that's a good idea.

MITCHELL:

Prime Minister, given the information that's coming about the quality of what we were told before the Iraq war. Why should we trust the information we're getting about North Korea?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well you should because it's pretty obvious both from, not only intelligence sources but also from statements made by the North Koreans themselves that they are in the serious business of at the very very least having nuclear aspirations which is a breach of their obligations under the treaty. But could I go back to the Iraq issue, the uranium issue - the ONA statement yesterday, which is obviously the source of your question.

MITCHELL:

Yes.

PRIME MINISTER:

Let me say that, not your question, but I think the prominence given to this issue is out of all proportion to its significance.

MITCHELL:

Why?

PRIME MINISTER:

Because firstly, what I said in Parliament on the 4th of February was that British intelligence had formed the judgement that Iraq was trying to acquire uranium from Africa, British intelligence still has that judgement and nothing that has come out since has yet disturbed the judgment of the British intelligence services that that was the case.

MITCHELL:

Prime Minister, you said unequivocally, quote, Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear application in Iraq. That is wrong is it not?

PRIME MINISTER:

No, not according, the source of the African claim was British intelligence and I quoted and I attributed to British intelligence the claim about Iraq having a general nuclear aspiration was based on a series of pieces of intelligence which have not been disturbed by the forged document issue.

MITCHELL:

So you';re saying that Iraq did have nuclear…

PRIME MINISTER:

What I';m saying is that nothing that has come out since I made that statement has altered the basis on which that statement was made, except two things, firstly the decision of the finding on the 7th of March by the International Atomic Energy Agency that a document related to the uranium issue was a forgery, that British intelligence say that their assessment was based on information additional to and separate from that document. And secondly it';s been brought to my attention as disclosed yesterday in the ONA statement that one line in a 86 page document and then in an annex said that a section of the State Department had doubts about whether Iraq was trying to get uranium from Africa. Now could I say that that';s the context in which this has taken place, I understand why people will jump on this because we had our many critics but can I say to you Neil and to all of your listeners that if that State Department doubt had been in front of me that would not in any way, in any way have altered the Government';s decision to participate in the war against Iraq.

MITCHELL:

I understand that Prime Minister but do you accept that you have misled the Australian people?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well anything that I have said that might be seen as misleading was not a deliberate misleading…

MITCHELL:

Oh no, I';m not saying that but…

PRIME MINISTER:

Well when you say by misled people the literal statement I made, literally what I said in that statement of the 4th of February remains correct. And that is there';s a judgement by the British intelligence agencies that Iraq tried to source uranium from Africa.

MITCHELL:

When did…

PRIME MINISTER:

No, no let me pursue this because it goes to the very issue you';re properly raising and that is whether the Australian public should react to things I say, what I said in that speech was that it was a judgement of those agencies, and as of yesterday whether in the end they proved to be right or wrong those agencies are still holding by that view, I mean this point appears to have been missed largely in the preponderance of the reporting of this matter.

MITCHELL:

But their view is not Iraq was trying to buy uranium in Africa, is it? Is that…

PRIME MINISTER:

No, I';d have to get the speech, I';d have to find, but what I said in the speech was I referred to the judgment of the British intelligence agencies and those British intelligence agencies are still holding to that judgement.

MITCHELL:

That Iraq was trying to buy uranium?

PRIME MINISTER:

Yes, they';re still holding to that and what they are saying…

MITCHELL:

What do our agencies believe?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well our agencies have not seen the raw intelligence on which the British assessment was based.

MITCHELL:

So why did our ONA in January believe the information was wrong?

PRIME MINISTER:

No, the ONA has not said that it believed it was wrong, ONA has simply acknowledged that it got a document, an 86 page document from the Americans and in one line in an annex to that document it referred to some doubts that the American, a section of the American State Department had. What, I know it is…

MITCHELL:

It';s a pretty important section of the State Department though, it';s the US State Department Bureau of Intelligence, ONA take them very seriously.

PRIME MINISTER:

Neil, I didn';t say whether it was important or unimportant, I simply said it was a section of the State Department, the reason I say that is that the American Government operates far less in a whole of government fashion than we do and you often have, coming out of the American administration, you often have competing views, not only on intelligence matters but on a range of other issues because the American system of government is different.

MITCHELL:

Well when did you find out the document was a forgery?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well that was made known, publicly, on the I think it would have been the 7th of March and that';s been acknowledged by Mr Downer.

MITCHELL:

When did you find out?

PRIME MINISTER:

Neil, I know it was made public on the 7th of March, I would have to go back and check my records to be able to say exactly when that came, or should have come to my knowledge. I can';t do better than that. I';m not an encyclopedia.

MITCHELL:

No, fair enough. We';re in the position, you';ve made the speech on the 4th of February, the ONA on what they knew at that time would have known that what you said was wrong…

PRIME MINISTER:

No, no…

MITCHELL:

… they knew it was in doubt, they knew it was in doubt, did they not ring you up the next day and say hang on Prime Minister, you told Parliament this, on the information we';ve got, that is in doubt?

PRIME MINISTER:

The answer to that is they did not ring me up.

MITCHELL:

They didn';t tell you?

PRIME MINISTER:

No.

MITCHELL:

Did you get briefings from them after that date? Obviously you would have and they never raised it?

PRIME MINISTER:

No, no it';s never been raised to me until…

MITCHELL:

… doubts of the last days.

PRIME MINISTER:

The last few days, yes.

MITCHELL:

Doesn';t that raise the doubts about the competence of the Office of National Assessments?

PRIME MINISTER:

No, I don';t believe so.

MITCHELL:

Well the Prime Minister';s made a statement of this importance, they believe it could be wrong and they don';t tell the Prime Minister.

PRIME MINISTER:

They would have, obviously they and they alone are best able to answer for themselves. What I';m doing, as you';re asking me the question, is putting into context the fact that they would not have seen this particular piece of information because the uranium from Africa issue was not central to the judgements being made about the threat posed by Iraq. But they presumably made an assessment at the time that there was no particular need to pass it on. I mean obviously that is something they themselves can best answer, I can';t answer that.

MITCHELL:

When did foreign affairs find out?

PRIME MINISTER:

Oh well, I';d have to…

MITCHELL:

Did ASIS know? Did any other agency know?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well I would have to ask all of those agencies and as I haven';t done so yet I';m not in a position to answer…

MITCHELL:

Do you intend to do so? Do you intend to…

PRIME MINISTER:

Well look obviously I will be following up aspects of this, but I do not want that to be interpreted as some kind of pursuit of the intelligence agencies. You may find and some may find it strange of me to say this but I have, I retain enormous confidence in our intelligence agencies because it is a very difficult, hazardous by definition imprecise exercise. You never have direct, what I frequently call, an Old Bailey jury proof of things in intelligence.

MITCHELL:

Do you agree an error has been made here?

PRIME MINISTER:

Obviously it would have been better if this had been brought to my attention.

MITCHELL:

And it';s been made at several levels, ONA, Foreign Affairs…

PRIME MINISTER:

Sorry?

MITCHELL:

ONA, Foreign Affairs, perhaps other agencies knew about it and the Government, you';re saying, didn';t. Surely in such an atmosphere of international tension that is a crucial failure of our system.

PRIME MINISTER:

Well I wouldn';t share that view.

MITCHELL:

Why not?

PRIME MINISTER:

Because you have to see it in the context firstly of the significance of the uranium out of Africa issue and secondly you have to see it in the context of it being virtually, a one line in an 86 page document and obviously it didn';t register as very important assessment otherwise they would have drawn it to my attention.

MITCHELL:

Prime Minister, isn';t this similar to the children overboard issue where people have been misled at a level, you would debate the level, the people have been misled by you, unintentionally you say, but it';s somebody else';s fault. Where is accountability?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well I think I';m being made accountable right at the moment by you, which is fair enough. You say what';s the accountability? I mean of course, I';m explaining it. We';ve spent a quarter of an hour on it and you';ve got a perfect right to make me accountable and I';m explaining to you what happened.

MITCHELL:

Do you think the Australian people deserve an apology over this one?

PRIME MINISTER:

An apology? Well, I mean I apologise if I mislead people.

MITCHELL:

You don';t accept you misled people?

PRIME MINISTER:

I don';t accept that I deliberately misled people.

MITCHELL:

And your confidence in our intelligence agency remains unshaken.

PRIME MINISTER:

Yes, because that is a generic thing. It doesn';t mean to say they don';t make mistakes. I mean you can have or not have confidence in me as an individual. That doesn';t mean to say that I don';t get things wrong on occasions, that I don';t make mistakes. I';ve made plenty of mistakes, and I get things wrong like everybody else. But you form a generic judgement of somebody, and I form a generic judgement of our intelligence agencies, and I stand very much by the assessments they made in relation to the threat that Iraq posed. If I had had this information in front of me, I would not in any way have altered the decision I made in relation to our military participation. I think the whole thing has been blown out of all proportion to its real significance. It did not have any significant impact on the Government';s decision to go to war, and if I';d have known…

MITCHELL:

But doesn';t it go to credibility though, to trust? I mean we were going to war. There is no more important decision.

PRIME MINISTER:

Yes, that';s right.

MITCHELL:

Arguably the people have been misled, regardless – and I accept that we would have marched to war regardless, I accept that – but it is a crucial issue if there has been an error such as what seems to have happened.

PRIME MINISTER:

Well issues of trust go to motive and deceit and honesty. There has been no intention on my part to deceive or mislead the Australian people. None whatsoever. The question of whether ONA should have passed this information on, the question of whether it made an error of judgement, does not go to the credibility and the honesty and the trustworthiness and the decency of the people who work in the organisation. If we';re going to criticise people, by all means do so, but let us choose our words carefully. Once you use words like trust and honesty, you are implying bad faith, bad motives, deliberate intention to deceive. Everybody is capable of human error. Everybody is capable of making a wrong judgement. And if there has been a failing by ONA, it';s a failing of judgement. It';s not a failing of their integrity.

MITCHELL:

This is exactly the discussion we had, with a few names changed, around the children overboard issue.

PRIME MINISTER:

No, there is a very crucial difference in relation to the children overboard. A very crucial difference.

[break]

MITCHELL:

It';s 8 to 9. I apologise. We won';t have time for the calls for the Prime Minister. I';ll take those calls immediately after 9 o';clock. Mr Howard is in our Sydney studios. Still on Iraq Prime Minister, there';s a couple of other things I would like to raise. Do you still believe that weapons of mass destruction will be found?

PRIME MINISTER:

I believe that evidence will be found that Iraq had a nuclear weapons of mass destruction, WMD capability, yes I do.

MITCHELL:

So will we find evidence of programs of weapons of mass destruction?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well precisely what will be found, it';s impossible at this stage to say. But we had very strong intelligence to the effect that Iraq had a biological and chemical warfare capability. The evidence in relation to the nuclear capacity was less strong…

MITCHELL:

Mr Rumsfeld is now saying there was never any dramatic new evidence that there were weapons of mass destruction, they';re just looking at old information differently because of September 11.

PRIME MINISTER:

Well I can only answer, and I';m going to be very deliberate about this, because every single word I use on this issue is being analysed which is fair enough, I can only react to the assessments that we made. The assessments that we made and our agencies made and we relied on them and we accepted them and we think they were properly based was that Iraq certainly had a capability in relation to chemical and biological weapons. It certainly had a nuclear aspiration. The capacity in relation to the nuclear aspiration I think if you go back over the statements that were made at the time was less intense. Now exactly what is going to be found is too early to say. I know it, in the eyes of some people will be hard to accept, but I think we have to be willing to wait quite some time.

MITCHELL:

Well did we have information the Americans did not have because Mr Rumsfeld said….

PRIME MINISTER:

Did we have information that the Americans did not have?

MITCHELL:

Yes Mr Rumsfeld said they had no new information on weapons of mass destruction.

PRIME MINISTER:

Well I don';t know the basis of that statement. Look I will answer for my statements. I like Donald Rumsfeld and I think he';s been a very good Defense Secretary but his turn of phrase and his description of things is for him to justify, not for me. We certainly to my knowledge wouldn';t have had information that he didn';t have. We made an assessment based on the material that was before us.

MITCHELL:

On to something else, the Solomons. When will Australian troops be in the Solomons?

PRIME MINISTER:

I can';t put a day on it. We';ve received a request, or rather the Parliament….well we';ve received a request from the Governor General, that';s the Solomons'; Governor General, last weekend and the Solomon Islands Parliament now has, I understand it, approved the request. There is some debate still going on about the extent of the legal immunity to be given to the civilians that will be participate in the intervention on our behalf. When that has been sorted out I think I';ll be in abetter position to say when. I can';t give you an exact date but it will be quite soon.

MITCHELL:

Prime Minister, David Hicks, the Australian being held by the Americans as a suspected terrorist, have we told the United States we do not want him executed if found guilty?

PRIME MINISTER:

Yes. That view';s been put by the Attorney General.

MITCHELL:

At what level?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well he';s had very extensive discussions with his, well the appropriate senior legal person at the Pentagon and I understand from him that that view has been communicated. But Neil, it';s one of those things that our policy on that is well known.

MITCHELL:

Do you stand by your statement that he';s admitted being trained by Al Qaeda? That';s denied by his lawyers.

PRIME MINISTER:

Well I can only say that that was the information that I had.

MITCHELL:

Can you tell us where it came from?

PRIME MINISTER:

No.

MITCHELL:

Are you comfortable with the fact that even if he';s found not guilty he may be kept in custody?

PRIME MINISTER:

I think if he';s found not guilty I think most people would expect him to be released.

MITCHELL:

Well the Americans say there';s no guarantee of that.

PRIME MINISTER:

No, well maybe they do that for some legal reason for their own but I think most people looking at the thing from a commonsense fair go point of view would take the view that if he';s found not guilty, well that should be the end of it.

MITCHELL:

Do you believe he';ll get a fair trial?

PRIME MINISTER:

We are satisfied, and I base this on the discussions that Daryl Williams has had, that the normal things like the presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent, beyond a reasonable doubt, that all of those things will apply and we are in the circumstances, on that basis, satisfied that the procedure will be fair and proper.

MITCHELL:

Prime Minister, another issue away from international affairs, censorship. Do you believe there should be a new film censorship system for films such as Ken Park which allows it to be seen at say film festivals but not by the public?

PRIME MINISTER:

No. I don';t think this idea that somehow or other a film festival audience has a higher or a different right than the general public. I mean if it';s good enough to be shown to them, it';s good enough to be shown to everybody else. This idea that you assume the mantle of elitism when you enter a film festival is a bit much.

MITCHELL:

There was also an attempt to prevent the screening of a film involving David Irving. Do you think that is appropriate? What';s wrong with the David Irving….?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well, I mean I don';t agree with David Irving. I mean his arguments denying the holocaust are absurd. On the other hand I don';t know that I would have prevented the film being shown. I think that falls into a slightly different category.

MITCHELL:

Well you prevent him coming into Australia.

PRIME MINISTER:

Yes because I think there is a difference. I mean there are plenty of things that get shown on the screen, there are plenty of people shown on the screen that don';t come to Australia. I mean I don';t think Saddam Hussein would have been welcome in Australia when he was running Iraq but you kept seeing him on television.

MITCHELL:

Do you put him on a par with David Irving….?

PRIME MINISTER:

No I don';t do that, I don';t do that. As much and all as I disagree with David Irving I certainly don';t do that. I';m using that as an illustration to make my point and it';s unfair to suggest I was drawing a comparison.

MITCHELL:

Just a quick personal thing, a photograph of your daughter everywhere trying on a dress. Is that going too far?

PRIME MINISTER:

Well I';m sorry they were taken and I';m sorry they were published, and I can';t really say anymore than that. It';s a free country but unfortunately when you are the child of a well known person whether you seek publicity or not, and my daughter has never been a publicity seeker, you acquire it. It';s just one of the things that happens but she';s a pretty resilient young lady and she';ll survive it I';m sure.

MITCHELL:

Thank you for your time.

[Ends]

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