' THIS DAY TOINiGHT"
Interview given by the Prime Minister, Mr John G#. to6n
on ABC Television 7.'
Interviewer Philip Koch 9 JUNE 1969
Q. Prime Minister, could this American withdrawal of
troops point the way to you bringing home some of our own
soldiers?
PM: I don't t ' hink sD. As I said in the House on the 15 May,
this unilateral withdrawal was quite possible. But I think it
would be wrong for various reasons to think of bringing home
Australian troops at this time. For example, since our Army
was built up to its present strength our Army contingent
the Americans have increased their forces by some 50, 000
and what they are doing now is taking away some of the increase
that was made since we made our commitment. They have got
540, 000 troops there. Secondly, I think it would be rather shabby
to withdraw Australian troops at this stage because the Americans
have built up the South Vietnamese to try and take some of the
burden off the half million troops they've got. We wouldn't want to
add tO the burden, or at least stop the burden being reduced.
Thirdly, our force is a self-contained force and unless it wais
all withdrawn, withdrawing parts of it would be militarily quite
ridiculous.
Q. Did President Nixon consult with you in any way on. what
he might or might not do at the midway talks with President:
Thieu?
PM: Yes, I had a personal letter from him yesterday about
it, but I had discussions with him in the United States as well
and we had previous correspondience, and indeed, we have
expressed a view ourselves. But it was because I knew this
kind of limited unilateral withdrawal was a possibility that I
made my statement in the House on the 15 May, pointing out that
it was possibility and that if it took place it should be taken as
a sign of strength and not in any way as a sign of weakness.
Q. Well, then how do you feel about the pressure on
President Nixon at home to end the Vietnam war. Do you think
he might be forced into making poor concessions which would be
less than satisfactory to South Vietnam and Australia? a. / 2
-2
PM: I don't believe so. 1 believe he realises there will be,
as there are, quite strong pressures from various quarters in
the United States to end the wars that he recognises this and he
accepts that it would be the wrong thing to do to end it other than
by attaining the objective of giving the South Vietnamese people
the right to free elections and to choose the sort of government
they would wish. He made that clear to me and I believe his
communique from Midway makes it equally clear.
Q. Now, before the Midway talks, President Nixon put
forward a peace plan in which he called for a mutual withdrawal
of American and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam..
Do you expect Hanoi to reciprocate now in any way?
PM: I would be surprised if they did as a result of that
gesture by the United States. This must not be confused, this
unilateral withdrawal of some 25, 000 troops who are going to be
replaced by South Vietnamese troops. This must not be confused
with a mutual withdrawal such as was suggested
Q. I was thinking more in terms, Prime Minister, of later
on. This is the first 25, 000 and President Nixon has indicated
that he might withdraw more. If he did, would you expect Hanoi
to come to the party?
PM: I would again be su rprised if Hanoi took any note of
anything except an agreement for mutual withdrawal. I think the
President has made it clear that though in future he is going to
examine further possible unilateral witharawals and replacement
by South Vietnamese troops, he would want to be sure if he did
that, it didn't weaken the Allied po. nition and he has also made it
clear that he is adhering firmly to the objective of self-determination
for the South Vietnamese people.
Q. So then you don't feel any concern that perhaps there
would be too many American concessions at Paris in this regard?
PM: I don't think we should confuse the Paris peace talks
with what is actually happening now in South Vienam, but I myself
believe that the United States President would be quite firm
flexible but quite firm in attaining what he stated over and over
again to be the objective, that the South Vietnamese people should
be able to choose a government of their own free from terror and
at free elections, at which anybody could stand.
3-
Well what would happen if the North Vietnamese Hanoi
launched an all-out offensive later on this year in South Vietnam
in which the South Vietnamese forces broke down,? Could you
envisage President Nixon sending back troops to Vietnam?
Well, in the first place, I don't see that the withdrawal
of 25, 000 troops out of 542, 000 is going to lead to a situation
where the whole thing can break down. That doesn't appear
reas onable. I believe if there were a general offensive by North
Vietnam, it would be a tragic misinterpretation on the part of
North Vietnam. They would be interpreting this as weakness when
it isn' 1t a sign of weakness at all.
Thank you, Prime Minister.
I
.1
Q.
PM