COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SPEECH BY
The Rt Hon. J. G. GORTON, M. P.
ON
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THlE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA
Ministeria Statement
[ From the ' Parliamentary Debates', 15 May 196R]
, Mr GORTON ( Higgins-Prime Minister)
leave-Mr Speaker, the House
will recall that I was to have had discussions
with the President of the United
States and members of his Administration
on the 1st and 2nd of April, but because
of the death of General Eisenhower the
discussions which were to have taken place
assumed the nature of preliminary discussions,
and it was agreed that these
should be continued on the 6th and the 7th
of May. I now take the opportunity to
report to the House on those discussions.
They took place with the President, with
the Secretary of State, the Honourable
William Rogers, and with the Secretary of
Defence, the Honourable Melvin Laird. I
also took the opportunity to meet the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
some members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
The purpose of my visit was not to deal
with any one specific subject. It was, in
one sense, a practical expression of the
close, frank and continuing relationship
between two good friends-Australia and
the United States of America. And it was,
too, a visit designed to get to know the new
President personally, to understand his
thinking and to let him know my own. The
ties between our countries, the common
objectives of peace and progress and
16447/ 69 human dignity transcend the personal
relationships of any two individuals. But
I believe these ties are reinforced, and
practical working between two countries is
made smoother, if two individuals-one a
President and one a Prime Minister-have
discussed common problems, have come to
know one another, to understand one
another, and to trust one another. And I
believe that * this understanding was
attained, and one result which has some
value for us was the arrangement made
between him and me for direct communication
on matters of concern to both our
countries during the formative stages of
policy and prior to major announcements
of policy.
The subjects covered in the various discussions
were the situation, and the courses
open to us, in Vietnam; the importance
attaching to the ANZUS treaty; the question
of the continuing interest of the United
States in Asia post-Vietnam; the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty; and such matters
as defence procurement in Australia and
the present plans of the United States Air
Force regarding the Fill aircraft. Through
all these discussions there was a deep feeling
of warmth towards Australia, a feeling of
a special relationship, a generous acknowledgement
of the part Australia had played
and was playing to achieve common objectives.
And I felt this to be so not only in
the Administration but amongst the Senators
I met on Capitol Hill.
-Sir, it is understandable that my discussions
with the President should have begun
with Vietnam. We both wish ardently for
peace in that country-but we both believe
that peace can only be secured on any just
or lasting basis by guaranteeing to the
people of South Vietnam the right to choose
the government they wish without the fear
of terror or intimidation; the right to live
without the ever present threat of murder,
kidnapping or extortion. The President
has today spoken publicly along the lines
on which he spoke to me, and his speech is
clear and unambiguous. We must now
await the response of North Vietnam. But
this Government agrees completely on the
objective of free, internationally supervised
elections, at which candidates of all parties
could stand, as the objective for which the
struggle is waged. This was discussed both
during my original visit in April and during
the visit just concluded.
As a result of our discussions, and of the
President's speech today, there are three
things which I firmly believe to be true.
Firstly, I do not believe that America
will accept any fake peace or disguised surrender,
nor will she retreat from the requirement
that the South Vietnamese people
should themselves choose their own
government. Secondly, if in the future and before
there is any agreement on the proposals
made by the President today it is decided
to, withdraw some United States troops
unilaterally-and I do not say that this will
happen-this should be regarded as a sign
of strength. It should be so regarded because
it would indicate a belief on the part of
the United States that the South Vietnamese
had so strengthened their own forces, and
been provided with equipment for those
forces, that they were themselves able to
remove from the United States some of
the burden which -that nation has borne.
It would, I believe, be a tragic mistake on
the part of North Vietnam or anyone else
should they interpret any such move as a
prelude to a general withdrawal or as indicating
any retreat at all by the United
States from their determination to persevere
until the attainment of the objective of a
free choice by the South Vietnamese. There will be those who will say, should
there be such American reduction of force,
that Australia too should at once reduce its
forces. I believe that would be a wrong thing
to do. For one thing, the Americans have
greatly increased their forces since our contingent
was committed; and for another it
would be a shabby thing, the Americans
having built up the South Vietnamese
forces, to take some of the burden that is
borne by half a million Americans, for us
to withdraw our own forces and, to that
degree, impose a further burden-or at
least, to that degree prevent a lessening of
the burden borne by -the United States.
Thirdly, I believe that President Nixon,
as his speech showed, and subject to the
requirement for a free choice by the South
Vietnamese people beinZ attained, will be
flexible, untiring, and persistent in seeking
to bring the fighting to an end. In this he
will have our full support and our prayers
will go with him as he tries to achieve
this end.
Mr Speaker, perhaps the strongest
guarantee of Australia's future security
against physical attack is the ANZUS treaty.
It was first concluded under Mr Truman
in conditions prevailing after the close of
the war with Japan. But recently it has
appeared that there was in some quarters
a tendency to question whether the provisions
of the Treaty still apply with the
same force and certainty as at the time of
it5 conclusion. Any grounds for such questioning
should surely now be removed. The
new President and the new Administration
have strongly underlined the importance
and the significance which they attach to
that treaty. To quote from the public statement
issued by the President:
Australia is a member of Anzus and Seato,
-two alliances which are fundamental to our--
That is Americanstrategy and position in South East Aaia. As
between us-
America and Australia-
Anzus with itz provisions for mutual aid in
developing our individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack, and its declaration that
, no potential aggressor should be under the illusion
that any of them-
That is, Australia, New Zealand or the
United Statesstand
alone in the Pacific area' is of great importance
to both our countries.
And again:
All things considered I think Australia and the
United States can both be proud of the contribution
we are making, as partners, to the security
and progress of the Pacific region to which we
both belong. That partnership and that contribution
will continue.
Mr Speaker, those two extracts are a strong,
forthright and unambiguous re-affirmation
of the application of the Treaty-and rather
than weary the House with the statement
as a whole, with the concurrence of the
House I incorporate it in Hansard.
THE WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
It has been a great pleasure to welcome Prime
Minister and Mrs Gorton to Washington. Mrs
Gorton is of course returning to the land of her
birth, so we always have a special greeting for
her. Prime Minister Gorton is no stranger to our
shores either, and he has come as -the Head of
Government of one of our closest friends and
allies in the world. We will always be delighted
to see them both. This visit has been most useful
for me and, I think, for other officers of this
Government. It has given us a chance to get
acquainted with an outstanding statesman with
whom we expect to be working very closely in
the future.
Australia is a member of ANZUS and SEATO,
two alliances which are fundamental to our
strategy and position in South East Asia. As
between us, ANZUS, with its provisions for
mutual aid in developing our individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack, and its
declaration that ' no potential aggressor should be
under the illusion that any of them ( Australia,
New Zealand or the United States) stand alone
in -the Pncific area,' is of great importance to
both our countries. Australian troops are fighting
beside ours and those of other free world nations to
help South Vietnam preserve its independence.
Australian forces are stationed in Malaysia and
Singapore as part of the Commonwealth Strategic
Reserve, and Prime Minister Gorton has recently
announced that these forces will remain after the
British forces withdraw in 1971, to continue
making their important contribution to the security
of that area. This is a historic and far-seeing
decision, and needless to say, it has our full understanding
and the decision has our support.
Australia is also making an outstanding contribution
to peaceful co-operation and economic
development in its part of the world. It participates
wholeheartedly in the Colombo Plan, the Asian
Development Bank, and many other regional
activities. In percentage of national income devoted
to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the
world. This is a record of which any nation can
be proud. All things considered, I think Australia
and the United States can both be proud of the
contribution we are making, as partners, to the
security and progress of the Pacific region to
which we both belong. That partnership and that
contribution will continue.
These two days have provided opportunities for
us to discuss a whole range of subjects, including 3 of course, Vietnam and regional security generally,
but including also a number of topics outside the
security field. Australia is geographically closer to
some of these problems than we are, and Prime
Minister Gorton has been in office a year longer
than I have, so I have very much appreciated
he opportunity to exchange views with him. I
have obtained a number of new insights, but
fundamentally, I find the perspective from ' down
under' is very much the same as it is from
Washington. This visit has been both profitable
and enjoyable for us. I hope that you can say
the same, Mr Prime Minister, and that you and
your charming wife will come and see us again.
It may be said that this statement affirms
nothing new since the ANZUS Pact already
existed-and in one sense that is true. But
I believe that for a President just come to
office newly to re-affirm, in such strong
terms, the importance of the Treaty is of
considerable significance to us, and to our
future-and that that in turn is of significance
to the United States and other free
nations of the world.
One further outcome of the talks on
ANZUS is that it has been decided to hold
a meeting of the ANZUS Council in Canberra
in August. The United States will be
represented by the Secretary of State, the
Honourable William P. Rogers. We have
also agreed that meetings of officials of the
three countries should continue to take place
from time to time, and for this purpose there
will be a meeting in Washington later in the
year. But the ANZUS Treaty does not merely
provide that we shall be assisted if our
forces or our country is attacked in the
Pacific. It also provides that we shall
co-operate in the establishment of installations
to help our joint defence. Under
Article II of the Treaty we have an obligation
jointly to maintain and develop our
collective capacity to resist armed attack. To
say we have this obligation is not to sayas
some falsely pretend-that we must
accept any and every proposal for any
establishment for any purpose.
The Australian Government must and
does retain the right of decision on any
proposal. Just as it must be, and is, provided
with full information concerning any proposed
base. But we have signed a Treaty
much to our advantage, and this imposes
obligations on us if we are to live up to its
spirit. A responsible Australian Government
would therefore need to be convinced that
there was good reason for rejecting a
proposal, as, of course, it could.
There are some who argue that there is
good reason to refuse any proposal for a
joint defence establishment because such an
establishment might become the target of
attacks in nuclear war and might therefore
endanger us. My Government rejects this
argument. I cannot assert that in nuclear
war there would be no possibility at all
that such installations might be subject to
attack. But I will deny that this is reason to
reject such establishments. They contribute
to the military effectiveness and protection
of that power on whom the safety and
independence of Australia might, in the
future, depend. They assist that power on
whose capacity for military defence the
peace of the world may well depend.
In my judgment Australia is subject to
less danger, nuclear or otherwise, having
these bases and a joint defence treaty than
she would by not having these bases and
not having a joint defence treaty. Furthermore,
as a nation we expect to be given
protection in time of danger: and we must
therefore expect to give assistance in return.
What sort of a pusillanimous, unworthy,
nation would it be that said: ' We rely on
you to protect us-but oh no we won't
incur the slightest risk to help you protect
yourselves, and us, and others'?
This Government will not say that. If
there be those who take a different view,
that is their right. But it is equally their
duty, if they aspire to alternative government,
to state publicly they do take a
different view, and would not have these
bases, and give their reasons for it.
I come now to the question of maintenance
of secrecy about the purposes and
operation of such bases. This has, I know,
caused concern to others as it has caused
some to me, and it was a matter specifically
discussed with the President. In general, one
would wish to give as much information
as possible. But ' as much information as
possible' must mean as much information
as would not impair the effectiveness of an
installation or enable a potential enemy to
discover more quickly or more certainly its
purposes, and if the advice of military
leaders and military scientists is that little
or no information should be given because
it would help a potential enemy then we
should accept that advice in peace as we
would unhesitatingly accept it in war. This
we have done, and will continue to do. The President, however, agreed with me
that if any information is given, or is
intended to be given in the United States
in such a way that it becomes public, then
such information must at the same time be
given here. And if selected members of
the United States Congress under pledge of
secrecy make any visits to installations, so
too, provided they take the same pledge of
secrecy, must comparable members of -this
Parliament be permitted such visits. To use
the President's own words, in this matter:
' The same ground rules will apply to both
our countries'. The restriction of information
on defence establishments is nothing
new. To a greater or lesser degree it is
a practice of all administrations in all countries
at all times, and for reasons I have
stated, and subject to what I have just said,
we will continue the practice. But again, if
there be those who would depart from this
practice, who would insist on disclosure of
information before agreeing to a joint
defence project, it is their duty to Australia
clearly to say so now even though that
course might assist a potential enemy.
The question will be asked whether or
not provisions of the ANZUS Treaty, so
clear in relation to Australia, New Zealand,
and New Guinea, apply as clearly to Australia's
forces stationed in Malaysia and
Singapore. It would be misleading of me
to say that this was so in all the variety of
, hypothetical situations which might arise,
for while the Treaty is quite specific as to
certain areas it is not specific about those
of which I now speak. Yet I think it would
be equally wrong to assume that in certain
circumstances United States assistance
would not be forthcoming either under the
ANZUS Treaty or in some other way.
Indeed any attempt now to codify in advance
those situations in which ANZUS
might apply and those in which it would
not apply could well be restrictive, and,
being restrictive, do harm.
Answers to questions about our forces in
these areas are to be sought not in the
ANZUS treaty alone but in the whole complex
of actions and undertakings -by Australia,
New Zealand, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the countries of the
region. These actions and undertakings may
be summed up as follows: Australia has
decided that it will maintain forces in
Malaysia and Singapore after the British
withdrawal in 1971, for purposes and under
conditions already stated to the House. The
President of the United States, publicly and
privately, has backed, supported, and
applauded that decision. What we seek to
do is to prevent a threat arising against
Malaysia or Singapore or the region, and
we seek this by showing a willingness to
assist militarily in stated circumstances to
maintain security-and we see this only as
a means to the end of advancing economic
development in the area, strengthening the
capacity of the countries in the region to
defend themselves, and encouraging
regional co-operation, peaceful change, and
progress. The United States shares these
objectives and is contributing to these ends.
I am sure she will continue to share the
objectives and contribute to these ends in
Asia generally and in the region of Asia of
which I speak.
-Indeed President Nixon, during our
private talks authorised me to express his
own attitude as outlined now. He said that
it was the purpose and the determination of
the United States to continue to participate
in the Pacific and to strengthen the forces
of freedom and progress in Asia. He said
that he recognised fully the United States'
continuing role and responsibility in that
part of the world. He said that by birth,
by experience and by belief he knew that
the stakes in Asia went far beyond what
happened in Vietnam and that what happened
in Asia in the future could well
affect the future history of the world. He
had, he told me, always been Asia-oriented
as his history during 14 years in Congress
would show. He had been born on the
Pacific Coast, had gone to war in the
Pacific, and he would continue to be Asiaoriented.
The House may like to know that before
being said publicly here this paraphrase
which I have just given was confirmed with
the President as an accurate paraphrase of
his views.
Mr Speaker, I think it is not without
significance for Australia that such a firm
statement should be publicly made by the
new President at this time, and following
so soon on our own decisions. In the course
of our future history there will be many
situations which cannot now be clearly
foreseen, and as they cannot be clearly foreseen
it is idle to speculate about them. But
given the approach of the United States
as I have jus: expressed it, given the shared objectives, and given the close working
arrangements that already exist, I think we
can be confident that should -a threat
develop then there will be the closest consultation
and co-operation as to the means
of combating that threat.
I shall, moving on, touch only briefly on
the other matters discussed. I set out to
the Administration and to the President the
Australian Government's reservations as to
signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty at present. Reasons for these reservations
have been stated in -this ' House
before. Our questionings include anxiety as
to whether the Treaty offers an effective
safeguard to a threatened country; the
number of countries which have stated they
will not sign it; the other coun'tries which
have not ye" decided whether to sign it or
not; the terms of the inspection clauses, and
so on.
I found the President fully appreciative
of our position. He understood why the
Australian Government was not signing the
Treaty until our questionings were resolved
to our satisfaction. I am satisfied that no
pressure at all will be applied by the United
States Administration to induce us to sign.
I also took the opportunity, at the request
of the Minister for Defence ( Mr Fairhall),
to seek from the Secretary of Defence, the
Honourable Melvin Laird, and from the
Chief of Staff of the United States Air
Force, General McConnell, further information
as to intentions of the United
States Air Force regarding the Fl11 aircraft,
and general information regarding the
aircraft itself. The original intention to purchase
some 1,500 aircraft for the United
States Air Force and the United States
Navy has, as the House well knows, been
very considerably reduced and I understand
that the existing order is for 493 aircraft
of which 141 are FlIlAs which are comparable
with our own FIICs. The Chief
of Staff was emphatic that the United
States Air Force regarded the Fl111 as an
exceptionally good aircraft and that it
would be in service at least until 1980 and
probably much longer. The United States
Air Force expects the wing carry-through
box to be tested to 8,000 hours, or two aircraft
lifetimes, by July and intends then to
remove current restrictions on the operation
of the aircraft. However, the original
contractual arrangements called for testing
for 16,000 hours and I made it clear that
we would not wish to take delivery of our
aircraft ourselves until that period of testing
had been satisfactorily completed. It was
again confirmed that the arrangements for
the ceiling price for our planes remained
in effect.
These general matters were the subject
of our discussion, but I understand there
are many technical details and matters still
under study by the Defence and Air Departments
of Australia and that these will
still need clarification and study by the
Minister for Defence and -the appropriate
specialist officers at a later stage.
Mr Speaker, most of what I have said
has dealt, in one way or another, with
matters of defence. This is natural, for our
own security in a changing world depends
to a very great extent on our relations and
arrangements with the United States-and
on the credibility of United States power
being maintained. I believe the President will be resolute to see that this power is
maintained. He believes that if it is not, the
peace of the world will be jeopardised. He
will pursue an American position of strength
and that strength will not be reduced until
the world becomes a more secure and
peaceful place.
But defence is only a means to an endthe
end of preserving the national independence
of peoples so that they can pursue in
freedom prosperity and the provision of
opportunity for the individuals who make
up nations. We, this Government, will do
what we can to help in these objectives.
I present the following paper:
Prime Minister's visit to the United States of
America-Ministerial Statement, 15th May
1969.
Motion ( by Mr Erwin) proposed:
That the House take note of the paper.
Debate ( on motion by Mr Whitlam)
adjourned.
Printed for the Government of the Commonwealth by W. G. MuRA at the
Government Printing Office, Canberra