VISIT TO THE U. S. 1968.
WASHINGTON
PRESS BRIEFING GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER,
MR. JOHN GORTCN AT BLAIR HOUSE 28 MAY 1968
Q. Can you tell us anything of substance about today's talks
with the President?
PM. I cannot go into any sort of-any sort of detail, or any sort
of substance, really, other than what is covered in the communique.
Q. In general, Sir, would you say that you have achieved the
objectives which you brought here with you?
P. M. I think that I have a much better idea in my own mind, I
think on matters on which I wish to have ideas, and I think it has been.
and will be of Considerable assistance to me. And I think probably that
was a major objective.
Q. From what Mr. Bundy told us at the White House Conference,
he defined the ANZUS Treaty as applying to forces of all the signatories
in the Pacific area. But he left ambiguous, whether this would apply to
Australian forces in Malaysia, Singapore under a new setup such as would
emerge ultimately from the June conference. Have they in fact expressed
any opinion on whether ANZUS does apply in that?
FM. I wouldn't say any definite--I don't know I can give you any
definite answer to that either. ANZUS is a treaty--I think it does apply
in the three defined areas.
Q. It does or does not?
FM. I think it applies in certain defined areas. But I would want
to check this with the External Affairs people before I was sure that that
was correct. But by and large, I thinkC it has been, what shall I say-I
cannot think of the exact words--a matter--never spelled out whether it
applied in Malaysia and Singapore area or not.
Q. But that is exactly the point. It has never been spelled out.
The point is have you made a judgment in your mind now as to whether it
would apply to these two countries?
PM. Well, you are asking really the sort of questions which one
can pursue it to the point where it is the whole sort of subject of discussions.
And I do not think I am free to do that.
Q. Can I ask you this, then. This question, was it raised with
the President? Can you say this publicly?
PM. I do not think I am going to say anything about specific
questions raised with the President. / 2
S 2.
Q. Possibly you would feel free to do it if I asked the question
in a different context. Are you in a position now to make a judgment on
the suggestions by the Tunku, Mr. Lee, that Australian forces should
remain in the Singapore -Malaysia area?
PM. I would answer that question saying I think I am in a
better position to form judgments on the whole of the area, Far East
Asian area, not just confining it to the part of that area which you asked
about.
Q. There is no reference in the communique to any statement
of Australian views on the nuclear non -proliferation treaty?
PM. Our position I think is known to the American Government.
They have been transmitted before. They have been made clear in the
United Nations by our spokesmen there. I would in a shorthand way
express what our man in the United Nations said--" Yes, but. Yes in
principle, but. And that is well-known. The " buts" being quite significant.
Q. Yes. Vie get back to asking you about the but. Was it
discussed?
PM4 I think the whole var~ iety of questions were discussed, and
if we get down to the question of whether this one was or was not, or the
other one ' was or was not, by an elimination contest we get down to me
saying--disclosing things which I do not feel free to disclose.
Q. Are you going--has it been decided that you will definitely
go to Texatom--on Thursday?
PM. Cn Thursday. I think this definitely has been. This has
been. Yes--we will be flying down from New York to the ranch and back
again. We will only be there for a couple of hours. I will be missing a
lunch I was otherwise going to attend, although not missing I gather
seeing Governor Rockefeller who we had hoped would be at the lunch but
who in fact is apparently not going to be. But there it is.
Q. What do you see as the value of this? I know apparently
General Westmoreland is going to be there. Can he give you aniy more
of an up-to-date picture of what is going on than Mr. Rusk or Mr.
Clifford must have given you?
PM. Can I answer that question in my way. If a Head of State
is visiting Australia, and I asked that Head of State to come down to my
farm and that I would arrange a meeting with somebody I considered
important for him to meet, I would expect that He-ad of State to accept
the invitaticn that I gave. Cn your specific question as to General
Vlestmcreland, I do not kAnow that I could s. ee any direct information
that would not be available in other ways, except perhaps a fresher
and more up-to-dato and more immediate report on the situation as
he saw it--he having within a matter of hours I think, having left it.
But that kind of information I suppose would have been available in a
day or two anyway.
Q. When are you seeing Rockefeller Sir? Would that be
Friday?
PM. WNe are still trying to work that out. You mean the
candidate? Z / 3
3.
Q. Yes.
PM. Yes. We are still trying to work that out.
Q. But you plan. to be back in New York by Friday morning?
PM. No--Thursday night.
Q. Ch, I see.
M. This is a very rushed, very hurried visit. I gather it is
sort of a lunch. And then away again, back-to New York.
Q. Were you able to make any arrangements with Mr. Nixon?
PM. No. He is down in Texas, and he will be down in Texas
on the Thursday when we are there, at Dallas. But he is fully engaged
in his primaries until ter, o'clock at night on that Thursday night. And
this time change makes it impossible to fit that in. We then have to be
back in New York. We have to fly back. I think that--I am~ suff iciently
short of sleep as it is
0 He won't be gping up to New York on Friday?
PM. No, he is down campaigning down there. So, so far, the
only people that I am sure to be seeing are the President himself and of
course candidate Humphrey. And I would hope that one could see Rockefeller,
and if it were again possible on the way back through California, where I
think he is still going to be, Mr. Kennedy. But these primary campaigning
seem to be pretty solid sort of jobs. I will miss seeing as many candidates
as I should ideally have liked to see.
1Q. Sir, getting back, you said earlier that you had a much
better idea of the matters which brought you to Washington. Have you
made up your rWd on these matters, or are they still fluid?
PMi . I think I have got impressions and beliefs which would--which
will help in the e ventual making of decisions. Does that answer your
question? I think it does. I think it answers it precisely.
Q. Ycur talks with Mr. Vance, or the brief ing that you attended
this morning given by Mr. Vance, can you discuss this?
PM. Only in the most general terms, I think, But-it was a
progress report, I think you can describe it, if that is the right word.
It was a report on the attitudes which the North Vietnamese have been
taking up. In fact, after the point of refusing point-blank to admit there
were any North Vietnamese troops at all in South Vietnam, an indication
of what the North Vietnamese had refused to admit, and the intransigent
attitude they had taken, of a certain disappointment that what was thought
to be constructive suggestions by the United States on " Let us get this
established and try and start from there, had just been turned down--
and I suppose one could say forecast or speculations or hopes of what
might or possibly might not happen in the future.
Q. Did ' yot feel rhpt Mr. Vance was not very hopeful about
what ccould evenririe? o. / 4
PM. It seemed to me that he thought it would be a long time
befoe-~-long time before the present phase might finish. Although again,
the thing is unpredictable.
Q. Sir, can you tell us something about the talks you had this
afternoon with the Secretary of Commerce Smith and the Secretary of the
Treasury Fowler?
PM. Well, we discussed-expressed Australian interests, and
our hopes that such things as our export of meat to the United States would
not be affected by any action, that the international agreement might be
proceeded with--expressed our hope that it would be proceeded with,
expressed our interest in sugar, international sugar agreement business
in Geneva coming to a successful conclusion. And that kind cf those
are examples of the matters upon which we put forward arguments designed
to indicate that we felt that any prevention of our access to this market,
any additional prevention would go badly in our interests, and eventually
not really be good for the United States interests, either.
Q. Did you discuss the equalization tax, Sir?
PM& No, no--it was commodity matters.
Q. W,' hat about the wool tariff? Did yoU discuss that?
rFM. Well, that falls in with--yes--wool and neat.
Q. Are you -any more hopeful?
PM. Well, we put cur case as strongly as we could. But there
are a lot of difficulties, as you know, inside the United States, as you know
indeed inside our own country, the particular interests involved.
Q. Along the same direction, but I am going to do it in a different
way--and ask if you are under any compulsion to revise your warning to
your Party meetings that the forward defence policy of the Menzies era may
have to. be amended?
PM. Well, the report of what I was alleged to say at the Party
meeting indicated that there were a number of possibilities in front of
us, but the situa, 3tion was not as clear-cut as it has been, and those
possibilities are still possibilities. And I do feel that, at the beginning,
that I am in a better-I feel inside myself I am in a better position to
form judgments on which of these possibilities we should eventually
decide to do.
Q. Do you fore see a defence review in Australia, Sir, after
you go back?
PM. Not a defence review, I do not think. We will be looking
at defence in context of the budget. But sort of, you know-I am not
quite sure what you mear, by defence review.
Q. Well, a general review of Australia's strategic pcsiticn
in South East Asia.
PM. Ch, well-I daresay that that will be a subject of Cabinetdiscussion,
yes. But that is not a strategic paper or anything, a three
year plan or anything of that kind.
S
Q. Could you give us a hint, however slight, what this ultimate
judgment might be?
PM. No. I would want to talk to my Cabinet colleagues. I would
want to make a full report to them. I think they after that should make it
on behalf of the Government to the Parliament any statement that might be
made. We are both in a very awkward position, I think--you as newsmen
and me as somebody being interviewed, because you are really asking
questions which are quite proper questions to which you ought to have the
answers, but I am in a position where I cannot give them. We have been
having conversaticons which were essentially private conversations.
Q. To put it another way, are you thoroughly satisfied in ycur
cwrn mind as to the future role the U1aited States will play in that part of
the globe?
PM. In Asia?
6 Yes.
PM. I feel the United States will not lose interest in South East
Asia.
Q. That is pretty vague.
PM. Well, I said that much.
Q. Was the private nature of the talks your idea or Mr.
Johnson's, or sort of mutual?
PM. I do not think you could say it was mine or Mr. Johnson's.
I think in the very nature of things, discussions, if they are to be completely
open and full and free and frank between two Heads of State, must be
private and must not be discussed afterwards, or : if they are, then there
are no further such discussions. But really, the val ue of them is if they
are completely open and free. And I cannot talk about what they were
about. It is self -defeat ing.
Q. There is a secticn in the communique that deals with the
support of the dollar. " The Prime Minister reiterated his full support
of the President's programme to reduce the United States balance of
payment deficit", which is three to cne in the United States favour. Vlhat
is the point of that?
PM. Well, to. tell you the truth, we did not go into that. But in
the communique, it sort of slipped past. This refers to, which it should
refer to, our belief that the taxation proposals of the Administration and
their involvement in supporting the National Bank, and the need to reduce
the United States over-all deficit, were all necessary if thle power of the
United States was to continue. Now, there was no great discussion on
those points. But this arises, I would take it just in passing noting that
we do believe that the stability of the United States dollar needs to be
maintained in the world. This has been stated departmentally, and that
I think did not engage our attention, because it was agreed.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you see any possibility that
Australia will adhere to ASEAN or one of those regional groupings that
are beginning to emerge in your part of the world there? / 6
6.
PM. You say do I see any possibility of it. We are interested
in the region. It would need careful studies by the External Affairs
Department to see whether a particular regional grouping upset some
other type of regional grouping in the same area. But we would be
interested I think. We would see a possibility in the future of participating
in arrangements which were designed to assist the progress of the region.
I think we would be interested, But then the particular proposals, whether
it was Asian or something else, would need study. But in principle, we
would be I am sure--the possibility of us being interested in regional
arrangements.
Q. Through inadvertence, the three of us were waiting outside
for the conference to begin--not realizing it was under way.
PM. You did not miss anything.
Q. I wanted to ask you about the ultimate judgment quotewhat
that might have referred to.
PM. The what what? You want to ask me what?
Q. A reference to an ultimate judgment that would have to be
reached.
PM. It was in answer to a question that was asked. Is that
what you meant?
Q. Yes.
FM. You came in just as I was answering, somebody's question.
I do not remember what the question was, but I think it was along the
lines of-I cannot remember what it was.
Q. You said you were in a better position.
PM. That is right--that I felt I was in a better position to form
an ultimate judgment, or an ultimate decision with my Government--form
an ultimate judgment and ultimate decision.
Q. If you do not get to see Senator Kennedy--and it does not
look like you are going to--and Rockefeller now has become doubtful
or more doubtful than it has appeared in the last couple of days, you will
only have seen the President and Vice-President Humphrey. Don't you
think this visit will kind of lose some of its value?
PM. I think it would be more valuable. I don't think there can
be any question that it would have been more valuable had I been able to
see more candidates. But that does not mean that it is in any degree not
without great value to have seen those I have seen.
Q. It might be better if you do not see any candidates, because
you might call on the wrong ones.
PM. It has great va lue, too, in seeing officials. I know
secretaries of the various departments change, but there is some
continuity in them, and I thin~ k there has been some value in that,
too--for the most part sitting in c~ n discussion. / 7
7.
The President the other night made a specific point that he
could not speak for his successors. But you still feel that you have learned
enough from here to make your ultimate decision.
I think I am in a much better position, I think are the words
I used, to make an ultimate decision. And of course nobody can tell what
August or November will hold. It may be a completely satisfactory
position to form an ultimate judgment. But on the other hand it may be
just in a better position.
6
4' Q. PM.