1825_ RA1 1980
Asked about his reactions to the news from Paris, Mr. Mensies
saids " Well, I suppose I'm like all the rest of us it makes one
feel very anxious but my first reaction to what appears oe the surface
of the problem so far is that it is an unparalleled piece of hmnbug.
I mean, the greatest experts in spying in recent tines asking another
Power to apologise humbly seem to me to be almost unbelievable. In
fact it is so absurd it can't really be the whole root of the matter.
From the time this incident occurred about this aircraft the one thing
that stuck in my mind is that it was near enough to a thousand miles
inside Russian territory, if that's the right word. That alom of
course wouldn't be very comforting to Ehrushcher, because if aircraft
ean travel as far as that at great heights undetected, quite obviously
S the capacity of the Western Powers to deliver the aeclear weapon is
greater than perhaps the Soviet leaders have permitted their people to
believe. That will explain the real anger on his part. If there is
no sueh explanation then it is simulated anger and I would think it is
a pretty poor thing when the people of the world, who have a vested
interest in peace, or a contingent interest let's say, or a great belief
in it, or a wonderful desire for it, should find these negotiations just
set aside for propaganda points. That I think would be unpardonable
and I believe that the uncommitted portions of the world would think so.
Q the whole therefore I think that Khrushchev has done more harm than
good to his own cause".
Asked about future prospects Mr. Menzies went on:
SCh well, that's anybody's guess. Tou're thinking in terms of
a Treaty with East Germany, pressure on Berlin. You see, for all we
know they will meet this afternoon. How do we know? hrushchev's
nothing if he is not spectacular. I think he is the best propaganda
expert in the world. He has made a slip this time, if it is propaganda".
SQuestioned about the possibility of pressures within Russia
itself, Mr. Measies indicated that one knows little about that. It was,
however, quite conceivable that there may have been unobasant reactions
to the journey of a thousand miles over Russian territory. Mr. Mensies
also referred to " some symptoms of the rise of what we might call the
new Bourgeoisie inside the Soviet Union. It is bound to happen when some
people are paid a great deal more than others and live rather better than
others. You caa' abolish these distinctions just by act of Parliament.
I think there are a few symptom of some growth of that kind but how far
it goes, how far it is vocal and how far it can exercise pressure I
wouldn't know". Mr. Menzies further said that Khrushchev is very flexible about
his tactics but they don't affect the direction of the battle or the
objectives of it.
-2
Asked about the suggestion in the United States that the
plane was delivered to him and not shot do=, Mir. Menzies replied:
* In these fields I an the least expert of people and I
have had no mpert advice. But as a layman like most of usn hero,
I find it a little difficult to believe that if you shot a plane
down at that enormous height by some rocket device there would be
time for the pilot to bale out or that you would collect so neatly
coins, wedding rings which in the event of semething of that kind
must have been sea aduIover many square miles.* Therefore, one is
peormitted to be skeptical and to think that the plane perh~ aps for
other reasons had to ceme down and that the pilot baled out".
Asked about his own hopes from the Summit, Mr. Menzies said:
* I had hopes that some result would come out not on a wide
field but for zaxple there were two things
the suspension of nuclear tests. Thy got so close
to each other at Geneva on this matter that I had
hopes that the four leaders sitting down together or
at anry rate three of them, I am omitting Do Gaulle
ifto, r It htihso upgrhpt oteh, a bt ecleaaudsee rsh em migihgth t bne oat bblee tionv oslevtetdl ein-'
that matter by giving a broad diretion to the Geneva
negotiaters which wouild produce a moratorium right
down the sale; and
not to settle the berlin quetion ( which is still
bedevilled by all sorts of juristic and military
considerations) but that they might have got some
standstill arrangement in relation to Berlin for a
period of time even though it might not be a long
period. If we could have got one of those or both
ot those out of the Summit Meeting it would have
loosened things up and given people a good deal of
hope for the future".
In reply to a question on the future of Woomera, Mr. Menzies
said: " Woomera wo't of course by any means disappear, but whether
it will mintain its full range of activities I would think would depend
upon the study that is being made here now on its possible wse for space
research. I think there is a good deal of feeling that in Whs spae
research business the United Kingdom ought to have a hamd. If the result
is that we are going to have space rfmearok, then the overall eff ect of
the abandonmet of Blue Streak as a weapon would be comprative3y small.
But I think it all has to be understood that their judgement as to whether
Blue Streak should be continued must be parimount. ThqV are the people
who are in the immediate firing line. Thqr are the people who under
the pressat arrangements possess some share of the deterrent and it is
their military advise which must be of paramount importance in determininag
whether you are going to have a vehicle of this kind sent from a fied
place. Sir Charles Lambe came out to Australia and he discussed this
with = and with three or four Ministers direetly e. aorned,, including the
Minist er for Def ence. We were by no means disposed to disagree with the
views that thq were taking*.
11r. Mensies was asked -" Now that you have had an opportunity
to got a true picttre of the situation in South Africa from Mr. Louw, will
you say what the Australian Government's attitude in to South Africa's
racial policy". He repliods
01 don't know that I will. I man, whenever I say something
like that it is suggested in some quart-ers that we are approving of their racial
po3. icy, That is not the position at all. What we have done in to adopt
what the Conference in London agreed was the correct attitude. We do not
interfere in th. domestic policies or affairs of another memiber of the
Comonwealth. The whole Conference here abreed with that. I don't know
whether we have the complete picture yet because several of us had-, private
talks,. I suppose all of us one way or another with Mr. Lmzw, he has very
strong views, but in the course of these private talks at least five of us
of the group to which I vas attached ( and that includes one Afriopn and
two Asian Prime Ministers) put to Mr. Lauw after a good deal of to * 3d fro
and explanations by him, certain ideas which we thought would softeA the
asperities of this policy and perhaps make it a good deal more workalg. e,
practicable, rasonable, witower word you care to use, and he told 4~ that
he would convey those notions to the Prime Minister. He was in a difficult
position bemause he was representing his Prime, Minister; he just couldn't
speak with much authority as if he was Prime Minister. I must say that all
these suggestions were made in the i~ odeato and good tempered way. I mas
greatly imnpressed by the fact that those three colleagues ( Ekrmih and
I Taaku) didn't s* am to be making hysterical extravagant remarks or proposals
at & 34. On the contrary they recognised the difficulty that presented the
South African sukment, the difficulty which so maxr people don't appear
to realieq because they have a grnat difficulty one that I am very glad
we don't have to deal with in Australia. It is easy to be theoretical
about what you would do if you had a multi-racial society. We don't have
the problema to cope with and under those circumstances I feel that their
recognition of the, fact that there was that problem and that you couldn't
do thing in a hurry was very good.
" I didn't hear an illtmpored remsk made om the matter.
In point of fact the Confere* ce its elf realised what a nuimber of people
outside do not realises that the argument was not all Sbarpevifle.
Sharpevifl was not discussed in the Prime Minister'sa Conference as an.
incident. What vas discussed was the policy, to the extent that it van
not discussed in formal meetings but what we were talking about in private
meeting was the policy of Apartheid and its political, social, JJAUstri
manifotations. -Of course, the incident of Sharpowille broUg~& t4 ito
the picture betause it is not to be forgotten that this polic7 Allsit
start yesterday it is 15 or 20 years olds and ar a matter of fact
Louw claimed, and I think he is right, it was first stated Saduts
himself, though Smuts himself, of course, had ideas of method * W dogepe
and temper whiqh were not necessarily those of his suM eon I I"
it has nibeenbo brougtt up before at the Prim Minister's 6otre. t
but taihtks time, no doubt because of the world wide reaci -,, ito tho
to the Sbarpoville incident and the undoubted fact that in 4 h
countries of the Cm~ nwealth outside South Africa there w, 7t Uf~* m oW52
strong feelings.
-4-
* I agree with the Tunka, ( what the Tumku. ins upposed to
have said) that the knowledge pined by Leow here of the depth of
feeling, non* the less deep because it has been moderately expressed,
mst have some effect on his mind. It may very well have an effect
on the mind of his Prime Minister". Mr. Menzies continued:
N kid my piece on these matters in May private talks
and I think it would be very unwise of ae to be reproducing publicly
what the private talks that couldn't have been held under other
countries".
AID TO AI Asked about a " Colombo plan for African oountries*
discussed at the Conference, Mr. Uen21ems aidt
" I think there is reference to that in the comwanique,
but what happened in effect was this. It uas raised when we were
having a general discussion on regional economic problem, and the U. K.
mentioned this in relation to the Colombo plan. I said that the
problem of the development of Africa was tremendously important, that
we had in the pest, I thought, under-estimated it. Now there are
people in Africa. The movement towards independence is rapid
and accelerating. The fact is itis going faut. We will have a position
in which politically independent commuities will be in many cases
, economically dependent, which is an unhappy state of affairs and could
easily lead to social disorders and propagunda results of a very unhappy
kind and under thoe circumstances I believe that we have to take
into immediate study the possibilities of decidinig a comprehensive
plan of some kind for Africa, not necessarily along exactly the same
lines as the Colombo plan but one worked out.
" Nobody is agreed in principle to this thing yet but we,
are all attracted to the idea.* When I get back hoe I will have my
people work on these, and in fact one of the official committees already
existing is going to have a look into this, to examine its practicability
and what sort of scheme could be worked out of a practical kindN.
LHC as
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