AUSTRA4IA'T BROADCASTING COMMISSION
FOUR CORNERS
The Prime Minister interviewed by John Penlington
EMBARGOED UNhTIL 9.30 P. M. SATURDAY 6TH APRIL_ 1968
Recorded 5/ L1/ 68
Penlington Prime Minister, you told your Press Conference
last Monday that this de-escalation was the greatest concession
' that the Americans had made. Now, did they make this great
concession without asking Australia whether we agreed they should
or not?
Prime Minister: Well, they informed us on Sunday morning that
the President was proposing to make a statement and in that
statement he would include the decision on removing the threat of
bombing, removing bombing, from all the northern part of North
Vietnam where 90 per cent of their population lives. This was
conveyed to Mr. Hasluck, in fact, because I was in New Zealand,
or just returning, but as soon as I got back it was also shown
to me. I suppose it would have been possible for us to raise
objections b'~ t we wouldn't have of' course done it.
Penlingto: Would it be fair to say though as it happened
we were informed and not consulted about this drastic change in
American policy?
Prime Mini~ tlD: I think that would be a reasonably fair way of
putting it. We were informed, we were informed in advance. We
could have raised objections. We were asked for our reactions
to the proposals but there was no week-long discussion beforehand.
Penlingto Well, had we thought that this was an unwise
concession to make at the time, do you think our decision would
have had any effect on the final result?
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Prime Minister: Well, that's such a speculative question that
I couldn't answer it but we would have had time to make our objections
known had we had any objections.
Penlington: Can we assume then that as America has acted
unilaterally that the actual conduct of the war is completely out
of our own hands?
Prime Minister: The military conduct of the war in the sense of
military operations and moving troops around and that kind of thing
has, of course, not really been in our own hands except for the
control of our own troops up there which has been and will remain
in our own hands. I am not quite sure just exactly what
perhaps you could rephrase the question a little...
Penlington: Can we make any suggestion about the conduct of
the war and have a reasonable feeling that some action will be
taken as a result of them?
Prime Minister: I think we could make suggestions to the Americans
as to the conduct of the war and I am sure they would be taken into
consideration but that I think is all one can expect. One can't
expect, yes we will make suggestions and they'll automatically be
accepted. ienlington: Well, Prime Minister, with peace now hopefully
on the horizon, would it be possible for America to accept peace
terms which would not be peace terms we would like to have? Could
this happen?
Prime Minister: Could America accept peace terms which we would
think were peace terms which didn't give a true, just, lasting peace
to the people of South Vietnam? Well,. here again, you're asking
such a completely speculative question that I don't think I could
give you a meaningful answer to that.
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Penlington: Will Australia be seeking a seat at any conference
which decides on peace terms?
Prime 11inister: Well, our thinking at the moment, this is the
thinking of Mr. H-asluck and of myself, is that we should be in the
days or weeks or however long it is ahead that these matters are
unaer discussion, that rather than sitting round with all the
nations which are engaged in the Vietnam conflict with Thailand
and the Philippines and South Vietnam and Korea and New Zealand
all constantly sitting round a table, that rather our interests
would be served and it would be simpler to have bi-lateral information,
exchange of information, with United States principally but
not leaving out the other matters but rather just bi-lateral talks.
Penliigton: Would you agree though that this would appear as
though we were letting peace be decided without our own opinions
being made thoroughly known?
Prime Minister: Well, I don't think there has been any suggestion
f-er peace conferences, has there? I think the only suggestion has
been that the North Vietnamese will appoint a representative to talk
0 with a representative of the United States. Now this is the only
proposal that I have heard of.
Penlington: Sir, where would we stand now, where would
Australia stand at the moment on the question of allowing the
N. L. F. some participation in the future government of South Vietnam?
Prime Minister: I wouldn't think of commenting on any sort of
possible peace terms or any possible proposals unless they were sort
of concrete and therefore could be commented on.
Penl ington: Prime Minister, you said in Hobart less than two
weeks ago and I'm using your words: " If there were great changes in
the United States' involvement in Vietnam I think the Australian
people would be forced to accept those changes." Nowi, does this
mean that Australia simply has to go along with whatever happens
to be American foreign policy at the time?
Prime Minister: No, it doesn't mean anything of the kind. The
basis of that question was, it may not have been spelt out as
completely as I am spelling it out now but the whole basis and
implication was unmistakable, was that if there were a change in
the leadership and the administration of the United States and
if as a result of that change in leadership and administration
the United States in effect withdrew from South Vietnam, what
would Australia's position be? And the answer, I think, is the
answer I gave and quite self evident: " We can't stay there alone".
Penlington: But when you use the words " the Australian
people would be forced to accept those changes in Amrias
policy", are you areally saying that we can't be independent?
Prime Minister: I am really saying that if a situation arose
where other troops were withdrawn from South Vietnam that we are
not the sort of country that can leave our troops there going on
fighting without the United States or without the United
States, and I think that's pretty self evident.
Penlington: Well, if the United States, without a satisfactory
peaceful solution in South Vietnam, began to reduce its
troop commitment to Vietnam, would we be likely to do the same?
Prime Minister: Well, I'd again want to see whatever propositions
were concrcte Dropositions before I could comment on that.
PEenlington: Do you think the fact that you made various
statements earlier this year that our present commitment to
Vietnam is virtually at its limit? Do you think that could have
had any effect on whether or not President Johnson consulted you
about his decision not to stand again?
Prime Minister: I am quite certain it couldn't have had any
effect at all. The Americans have 525,000 men in Vietnam, the
South Vietnamese army is around 800,000; there are lots of
others. Another 1,000 or 1500 or whatever it might be from
Australia would have no effect whatever, well, I won't say have no
effect whatever, a minimal effect on the overall military
effectiveness there.
Penlington: Prime Minister, can we look now at the long
term significance of President Johnson's decision not to seek
another term in office. Do you accept his statement that this
statement is irrevocable?
Prime Minister: Well, yes, I do. It's been stated firmly,
it's been stated definitely. There doesn't seem to me to be any
after-thought about it. I think one must accept it. I suppose
it is always possible at any time for anyone to change their mind
but it doesn't seem to me to be likely.
Penlington: If the next President of the United States has
an attitude towards American involvement in Asia which is very
different to President Johnson's, how ready are we to adjust to
that drastic change?
Prime Minister: Well, how ready are we to adjust to a change?
Are you asking again could we take on a burden of defence in Asia
if there was no United States?
Penlington: No, what I am really asking is, is the Government
already working out what it would do if a very different
President from President Johnson took a different policy towards
South Vietnam?
Prime Minister: Well, we would merely have to do all we could
to see that the United States remained interested in this part of
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the world, with the presence in this part of the world, because the
more that presence continues the safer Australia is.
Penlington: Well, how serious do you think is the present
need to persuade Americans to stay in South East Asia?
Prime Minister: And, again, you're talking of to stay in Vietnam?
Penliggton: Yes, Vietnam and South East Asia.
Prime Minister: Have a continuing interest in the area of
South East Asia. Well, I believe that they can contribute considerably
to the stability in South East Asia, particularly in
countries not engaged, I mean South Vietnam is war, but to
contribute stability in the way which the United Kingdom has, for
example, contributed to stability, though it didn't prevent
outbreaks of minor hostilities, contribute to stability in
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaya. But therefore if they do contribute
then they would hb1p, I would think, to the building up of
the living standards and the economies of these countries which in
the long run contributes much more to the stability. So I hope
that they would continue that interest and, indeed, we obviously
rely very heavily ourselves on the ANZUS Treaty as far as Australia
is concerned.
Penlington: Do you think Americans are going to need more
persuasion though to stay there? Do you think they are beginning
to wonder whether they should stay there?
Prime Minister: I don't think Itd have enough information to
answer that question, or I doubt if anyone would without just
making an assessment, a speculative reply.
Penlington: Prime Minister, if America's foreign policy moves
further towards isolationalism, should Australia's foreign policy
towards Asia do the same?
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Prime Minister: I don't think we should move towards isolationalism.
We have many contacts with Asian countries, many ways of
assisting them, and we are so close to them. We have.. I don't
mention just the Colombo Plan but I mean we have a technical capacity
which can help build their industries very much; we have an agricultural
know-how which has been effective up there; we have the
capacity to teach, a capacity to help; and also to a limited extent
a capacity to provide some Und o'f military training or military
assistance or whatever it might be; so I wouldn't I would hope
we wouldn't well, we would not move towards isolationalism.
Penlington: As a result of the events of this week, do you
think the leaders of South East Asia have any greater reason to
feel less secure?
Prime Minister: Not as a result of the events of this week. I
think some of them would feel perhaps less secure should the
Communists win a military victory in South Vietnam because they
have always felt the Domino Theory, which is disparaged by some
quarters in Australia, was a valid theory.
Penlirigton: Prime Minister, finally, this has been the most dramicnk
of yoar tcrn of effice so far.* How would you sum up how you
feel as you approach the end of it?
Prime Minister: Well, there has been an awful lot happening.
Yes, it's been a highly dramatic week, but there have been others.
After all, like Britain sort of accelerated its withdrawal from
Malaya and Singapore which again was a pretty dramatic move. Not
only accelerated its withdrawal but rethought the forces it would
have available to come here, and this too was pretty dramatic.
How do I feel as I approach the end of it? Well, its been a heavy
and dramatic week.
Penlington: Prime Minister, thank you very much for giving
us some of your time this week. EN D.