PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Holt, Harold

Period of Service: 26/01/1966 - 19/12/1967
Release Date:
19/07/1967
Release Type:
Media Release
Transcript ID:
1627
Document:
00001627.pdf 2 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Holt, Harold Edward
FOR PRESS: PM 74/1967 - BRITISH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE - COMMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR HAROLD HOLT

FOR PRESS: 2 C, 9
2 4 JUL 1967 S. FM. No. 74/ 1967
LBRAF
BRITISH WHITE PAPFL ON DEFENCE
Comment by the Prime Minister, Mr Harold Holt
The principal decisions relating to British defence policy east
of Suez now announced in the British, Government's White Paper on Defence
have been the subject of consideration by the Australian Cabinet.
My visit to London in June this year was, of course, primarily
to discuss these important issues w-: h Mr Wilson and other senior members
of his Cabinet. Mr Wilson and Mi: * e. rs also held talks with the Prime
Ministers of Malaysia and Singapor-arid also with the New Zealand Deputy
Prime Minister, who was represenr!:;-Mr Holyoake. Consultations also
took place with the United States Administration.
These discussions were clearly desirable since it is not only
British interests that are affected by the decisions taken.
The VWhite Paper sets forward a number of decisions and states
plans or planning intentions. It is important that it should be seen in full
perspective. The decisions and the plans will be phased over a considerable
period of years running into the mid-7C's.
There will first be a reduction of British forces deployed in
Singapore and Malaysia between now and 1970/ 71 to about half current levels.
We have for some time assumed that some reduction would occur. British
forces in Malaysia and Singapore were increased at the time of confrontation
and we have recognised throughout that this increase would, as occasion
permitted, be reversed and the level of forces reduced. There are, however,
reductions proposed over the next few years going conside. rably beyond our
earlier expectations. Beyond 197C/ 71, the United Kingdom Government plans would,
as they stand, lead to total withdrawal of British forces from their bases in
Malaysia and Singapore some time in the mid-1970' s. By then Britrii proposes
to have reorganized its armed forces about a highly mobile strategic reserve.
But it has clearly stated that it cannot plan beyond 1970/ 71 in the same detail
as for the period up to that time, and the precise timing of the w'thdrawal from
the mainland will depend on progress made in achieving a new basis of
stability in South-East Asia and in resolving other problems in the Far East.
This is an important element in British Government intentions. It indicates
that Britain will play a continuing military role in the area.
This intention is again illustrated by the plan announced in the
White Paper, to maintain a military capability for use in the area if required,
even after withdrawal from mainland bases. Further Britain undertakes in
the White Paper to continue to honour obligations under SEATO and obligations
under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. The Australian Government
welcomes these particular policy decisions.
The British people have made a notable and indeed historic
contribution to the establishment of stability and security in the Malaysia/
Singapore region since the Second World War, and, in our view, Britain can
a till play a role no other country ' s so well qualified to play. / 2

-2
Some aspects of the British Government's announcement, of
course, are disappointing to us. ' Ile do not overlook the economic problems
with which Britain is at present contenft": mg, and the substantial savings in
defence expenditure, including expenziiure overseas, which its Government
believes to be necessary. Neither do we overlook the British view that the
requirement to station large forces in bases in Malaysia and Singapore will
lessen as those countries, over the next decade, increase their own military
capacities. But even so, we very mxth regret that the British Government
should feel itself impelled to plan now for final withdrawal from Malaysia and
Singapore at a date so far ahead, and when it is so diff icult to predict how the
situation in South-East Asia will move.
One of the principal aspects of my discussions with Mr W~ ilson
was to urge that his Government retain as much flexibility in its forward
planning as was possible. His Government has felt it necessary to set out
a plan for withdrawal. It has explained its reasons for this, It has given
recognition to the need to have the precise timing of the further moves beyond
19,70/ 71 towards withdrawal from the bases depend upon progress made towards
stability in South-East Asia and on other factors in the Far East. We attach
considerable importance to this.
The British announcement carries implications which obviously
must form part of the continuing review we make of our defence policy and
planning. The WI-hite Paper mentions the possible use by Britain of facilities
in Australia. This flows out of the discussions which Mr Healey, the British
Mlfister for Defence, had in Canberra early last year with the Australian
Cabinet. The examination of these pos sbi lities, including feasibility studies,
has been conducted at Service level. This examination will be continued.
I would add that I have maintained personal contact with
Mr Holyoake, the Tunku Abdul Rahman and Mr Lee Kuan Yew, and our frank
and constructive exchanges with them and also with the British and American
Governments in relation to these matters will also continue.
CANBERRA, 19th July, 1967

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