-7-
" FOUR CORRS" 14 JUL 19
67
TELEVISION INTERVIE : ITH THE PRIME MINISTER, p/ BRRI*
MR. HAROLD HOLT OE : TLEVISION I-ET.: ORK
v
7, SD P OTH JULY, 1967.
14JUL1967 SInterviewer Mr. Rojert Moore
LIBRN
MR. MOORE: Eighteen months ago Mr. Holt became Prime Minister.
And just a few days ago he returned from his fifth series of
meetings with President Johnson and his third meeting with Mir.
*. ilson. ell in mid-term, so to sneak Four Corners looks oack
over the first eighteen months of Mr. Holt's office and examines
his policies at home and auroad.
Prime Minister, I think if one was tempted to give a
label however brief, to your period of office it's very tempting
to call you a " foreign affairs Prime Minister. Now what's your
comment on that?
PRIIM MINISTER: 7vWell, I've never lost sight of the importance
of the home front. No politician certainly one who's been there
as long as I have, can afford to do that unless people are finding
themselves doing well through the economy, their social progress.
They don't want the kind of government tnat can't give them these
thins. But my interest in foreign affairs I think has been
overlooked by neople who have seen me through seven years as
Treasurer and have ignored the fact that I've been the first
Australian to chair at least four significant international gatherings
the snly Australian in respect of three of those.
MOORE: . Hell, certainly, Sir, since you came to office
you've probaoly done more in the foreign affairs field and had
more newsoaper publicity about your doings in the foreign affairs
field than any Prime Minister we've had.
P. M. Yes well some of that is exnlained by the need
to make direct personal contact with leaders like President Johnson
and Prime Minister Harold ilson, and also what seemed to me to be
Australia's increasing involvement in Asia made it necessary that
I should spend a lot of time early in my period of office in some
of these countries of such importance to us.
MOORE: I wonder, Sir if I could get straight into that
then now. It seems to me that although in some ways you've merely
carried forward trends that were there before you came to the office
of Prime iinister, what has happened since you ve been Prime
Minister is what one might call a firmin o our priorities, and
I would like to look at these. And the four priorities of our
foreign policy that I'd like to look at in order are: our
relations with the United States, with ritain, with the Commonwealth,
and lastly in your own special interests so far, in Asia. Now, I
wonder if we could look first of all at our relationships with the
United States. It's been often stated by you and your Ministers
that this is a corner-stone of our foreign policy, and in fact, in
the last election a great deal was said about this and what has
been mentioned repeatedly, and I'm sure you're sick of it, but I'd
like to bring it up just again, is your phrase " All the way with
LBJ". Now some of your critics have said that this meant a total
commitment to the United States, but you've gone on to point out that
you restricted this to America's policy in Vietnam. Now what I would
like to ask you is, how far do we go with the United States, just
how committed are we? / 2
. ell, first I think we realise how much we have in
common in our international oojectives. . e oelieve in much the
same sort of society, world order, as the United Stites of America.
The Unitei States has taken an increasing interest itself in the
South East Asian and Pacific region and in the Asian region
generally, much more so than earlier in its own history. Our
association with the United States in, say SEATO, in ArZUS, these
are powerful elements in australia's own security. Now quite rightly,
as you say, I have used the phrase " All the way with LAJ' in
relation to our involvement in Vietnam, because frankly I jelieve
Australia has an even , reater stake in the outcome in Vietnam than
has the United States.
MOORE: Sir, sorry. Outside Vietnam how far do we go
with L3J? ell, where our interests are in line one with
the other, and in most things they are in line one with the other,
that's an entirely realistic apnreciation. lut there are some
directions. For example, we differ from them in that we've
recognised Outer Mongolia. Ie have diplomatic relations with
Cambodia. In fact, we represent American interests in Cambodia
and Cambodian interests in South Vietnam, which makes us a pretty
good bridge around that area.
MOORE: Do you see any sorry, any division in American
policy and Australian policy towars Communis China, say?
P. M. I think not. '. e've had the same meneral attitude
in relation to the recognition of Communist China. That doesn't
mean zur minds are closed to this possibility, but it does mean that
the conditions have to Je right, and there has to be an acceptance
by China of certain international obligations, certain international
codes of conduct. There also has to be, of course an arrangement
which will assure the future of Taiiwan. out I dont think there's
all that difference anyhow in the attitude of our two governments.
MOORE: On the question of our trading with Communist
China, say, is that a serious.....
P. M. aell that is, that is a si: nificant point of
difference. I've said in America that at some time there has to
be an accommodation with China. It's unrealistic to imagine the
world going on indefinitely with seven hundred million people kept
as it were in coventry, but..... and trade, diplomatic exchanges
cultural exchanges, the exchanes for sportin events, the visits
by journalists and things of this sort can all help to build bridges
. ut nothing more effectively so than trade.
MOORE. Do you find that American leaders use this same
kind of language when they talk about China, about the need for closer
experience of each other
P. M. I find they do nrivately, out the official policy
of the Government, up to the nresent time, has not favoured trade.
But I think there is trend anyhow in that direction.
MOORE. INow, Sir, I wonder if we could look at the other
side of our relations with the United States, the economic relations
between the two countries? Now it's being suggested that in so far
as it appears that the United Statos Government is bartering their
tobacco for our wool in the tariff question that the United Jtates
Government is not as sympathetic economically towards us as it might
De in view of our overall alliance. :. hat's your comment on this?
P. M. 4ell, once you get to trading questions you find
domestic politics having a very big influence on the decisions of / 3
the government. I ointed out quite vigorously in the United
States, as I have here, that Australia is a very Pig purchaser
of American ' oods I believe the most ranidly grovlng market
that the United States has. I pointed out on my last visit that we
buy ' 68 ner canita in velue of American goods and they buy less
than ner cabita of Australian goods, and there's a very heavy
balance of trade in their favour. I'm sure thtt in the President
we have a friend who wishes to be helpful in these trade directions,
but he, of course, has to look to a 3enate, and a Senate in which
the smaller states, the rural rroducing states have just as much
voting strength as a LC York Stacte r the Ste of California.
And to the extent thau he can be helpful, I'm sure he will and
that his administration could be helpful.
MOOE. ell could I look at the, what I ima: ine are
somewhat similar problems for yourself in Australia? gow do you,
or is there a need for you, to wei'h un the desires of the
Australian tobacco grower a : ainst The ustralian woolgrower? Is
this a real problem for you?
-ell, every nrimary industry is a real problem
for us. I've been pointing this out in Englsand on their'Common
Market application. It ma ue that it represents a small
percenLa'Le relative of trace, but in a vast continent where you
ave sca tered communities some derendent almost entirely on a
particular form of production you can't treat any form of production
as unesser: tial. Certainly it s essential to those people essential
to the balanced develonment of the continent. So we pointed out in
America, where it is the one country in the world industrialised
that imposes a suostantial duty on raw wool. 3ut tobacco in certain
districts of Australia is of importance to us. Jut even so we've
been prepared to move a good way on tobacco to come to a deal with
them.
MOOirE. God. No-the last noint I'd like to deal ; ith
in this area is our militar1 purchases from the United States. The
Christian Science Uonitor tnis week su ested that the Australian
Government was in danger of losin' coni-l1 of its overall budget,
the argument being that such a sutstantial part of our overall
budget is devoted to defence purchases from the United States
which in a way are denendent on the cost structure of the United
States over which you have no control, Now, what's your comment
on this?
P. M. I think this is a passing phase. You see we've
doubled the defence vote and in the course of that there's been a
very heavy equinping pro: raume, particularly for such thinrs as
aircraft, destroyers, sutmarines wihich we're gettin. from the U. K.
and th: re is this hs; . s e ouild up th. equipmcnt of th Syrvices.
ut once . e've ' e min ud to -cquiru thseo things and . c'ro spr ading
th2 p'yL. Jnts out ovcr lon period of years, thun I thinki there will
be less prssure on us cerdnly on our overseas purch-. ses. It may
inter: st you to know tA . t ustrin our. ch: ses for defnrce doubled in
the lst twelve months. e are looking more to our hom,; Ti. rk; t for
such thing-s As we can produce here.
MOOR1. but in the American purch-se, Sir, are you worried
at all about the apparent risini costs, and the fact that the costs
have never seemed to oe identifiable in the F111 anid the Charles
Adams destroyers?
P. M. giell, of course it trou; les us but we can understand
the difficulty that any country . which is an initiator of a particular
defence weanon finds in statir, at all precisely the cost which
will have to be paid. The United Kingdom is in the same nosition as
/ 4
we are, and we are still satisfied that we are acquiring the best
fighting aircraft in the world.
MOORE. Now, Sir, I'd like to move on to our relations with
the United Kingdom, with Dritain, at this stage what is your
assessment of Britain's intentions Last of Suez?
. ell, you asked first about our relations. I just
want to make it clear that our relations with the United Kingdom
fundamentally remain unaltered they're uasic. They're a
relationship of kinship, of mutual interest and re ard and those
relations remain fundamentally unaltered. But if the U. K. enters
the Common Ma1rket that must affect the emphasis it places on its
dealings with the rest of the Commonwealth, and if it removes its
military presence substantially l: ast of Suez. That must have some
bearing, too, on the degree of intimacy of the relationship and the
closeness of our cooperation together. So that when you ask me
now what my assessment is of their intentions there is no doubt that
Britain intends a substantial wJithdrawal of forces phased over a
period of years. One o-the question marks has been whether it
will retain a oresence, and I don't want to -o t-o deeoly into the
outcome of my bwn discussions in the United ingdom and they're
taking Cabinet decisions on those matters over the next week or so.
But I like to think that the United Kin dom will retain a presence
in the Singanore/ Malays ian area and that there will be continuing
co-operation between Australia, New Zealand, and other Commonwealth
forces with the United Kingdom there.
MOORE. Sir, assuming tha-t a presence in some form does
remair there, but on the other hand that there is a substantial
reduction of forces, what should ue the policy of the Australian
Government? I mean, would we be tempted to try to fill the vacuum
so created in terms of manpo'wer and equipment or is there some
alternative policy completely for us?
P. M. Yes. Iell first, perhans we should make it clear in
relation to the reduction of forces that there was a bi. build-up
of British forces to meet the confrontation issue, and everybody
knew that after confrontation there would je a run down. The ouestion
is to what degree, and how soon that run down occurs. Now Ausfralia
and New Zealand would naturally expect that as they grow in population
and economic strength they will ue playing an increasing part in
contributing to the security of the area. But the details of this
have yet to be worked out. Clearly they can't be worked out until
we know firmly what the British intentions are.
MOORE. How soon would you expect to know firmly enough to
make a decision?
F. M. U. ell, I'd exnect us to know their broad intentions
within a matter of veeks.
MOORE. Before our Budget?
F. M. Yes, out I wouldn't say that it would have a bearing
on the forthcoming Budget because there s no intention on the part
of the United Kingdom, on anybody's , art in their Government so far
as I can discover, to run their forces down so rapidly that we have
to have a dramatic chan-e. I w7ould hope to see a review say 1970, 71
of their position. I t ink it's unwise to commit yourself too far
ahead in this changing world.
OORE. Sir th is week oth,, Tun Abdt 1 R azak and Lee Kuan Yew
hPave called for Autralis and iNew Zeland to have disoussions with
MJalaysia and Singapore in an endeavour to, I think build up some
consortium of forces to replace an eventual British withdraiwal.
How seriously does your Government take this possibility?
. e look to a growing-contribution by the countries
of the area themselves to their own security and I think they accept
this. At the same time Australia and Zealand wweouwl d form part,
I would believe, of ny general security arran3ement made in
relation to the area, just as I would inmaine the United States
would, and other countries wvho h: ive indic-ted support around
the area in the p1st. But wie can't be precise on the details of
this. I've already said we would exnect to have to make a rowing
contribution to security in the area as a whole. But in Asia at
this time there's a meetin; of kASPAC, nine countries are rre sented
there, and they all have an interest in the security of the area.
MOORE. Sir, now I'd like to tarn rather more briefly
to our relations with the Commonwealth, the iritish Commonwealth.
You were reported as saying that at the Prime Ministers' Conference
last year you were disannointed that so much more time was given up
to Rhodesia than to Vietnam, and you went on to give your reasons
why. Now this could be looked ait in one of two ways. Either we're
out of step with the Commonvelth, or the Commonwealth is out of
step with us. Now , RAhich is it?
th t. ell, we had an eight day conference scheduled. Six
days the first six days, were devoted entirely to Rhodesia. It
wasn t just the dispronortion of time to Vietnam, it was the
disproportion of time to the affairs of the remaining nine tenths
of human kind, and this is where I made my protest. I said,
having re ard to the time avlilable to us, we ought to be turnin
to some ot these other questions, including Vietnam, which wasn'
merely of interest to Australia. After all Ualaya, ialaysia,
oingapore were also represented there and the United I( in; dom has
an interest, although not militarily involved, in the outcome.
1MOOiE. . ell in view of this obvious difference within the
Common-: eulth as to the priorities of Rhodesia and Vietnam last year
anyway, in view of this and the possibility that this could continue,
will you in fact attend another Prime Ministers' Conference?
P. M. Yes been a Commonwealth man all my
public life. I do hold the view that the modern Commonwealth is likely
to have less emphasis in our planning and policy making in the future
than the old Commonwealth did in the nast w1here we were able to come
towether pretty closel on matters of'policy. ut the concept of a
muTti-racial Commonwealth is worth preserving. After all, if fe
can't cooperate usefully and constructively ñ or neaceful purnoses
at any rate, then what prosnect is there for the United 1Natins?
MOORE. Do you feel there is enough for us to have in cotimon
to make up for the oovious aisag; reement over the importance of
Vietnam md all that means?
P. M. Yes, and I do know that the countries of Africa in
particular, and some of the newer Commonwealth countries attacA great
importance to their membership of it.
MOOpRE. ood Sir. Iow I'd like to move on to Asia if I could
briefly again first You've sugested t-hat in talking about asia, and
you visited ten countries there, thit it's a mistake to see Asia as a
unity. That in a sense, it's merely a geographical expression. That
/ 6
there are as, in fact, s many Asias is there are countries and as
many Asian opinions as there ire countries. This would su_ est
tha in turn we should have not so much an Asian policy bui a
number of Asian policies directed towards specific countries.
Now your critics su est, though that on the whole we have only
one and that is tht our Asian policy is our Vietnam policy.
. ihat's your comment on that?
P. M. :: ell, first of all, we do have a number of policies in
relation to individual countries. I didn't mean we have different
policies for the same country. But our policy with Cambodia,
which is neutral and tends to the Socialist camp; with Laos,
which is neutral but tends to the . estern camn that is a very
different line of policy, say, to what we have in Taiwan, what
we have in Korea, certainly to what we have in Vietnam. but
all of these countries have marked dissimilarities, even of
physical appearance certainly of rolicy attitudes. This is
Why I've stressed that we've got to get ourselves into the frame
of mind thit there are greater differences of policy, of physical
apnearance, of general mental and social attitude to be found
there than there are in Europe, for example. just don't think
of the Europeans as the same sort of people.
MOOE. Could I put this argument another way then? I think
what is often suggested by your critics is that our policies are
much oetter defined towards the smaller, perhaps more vulnerable
and dependent countries in the area than bur policies are defined
towards the oigger boys Japan and Indonesia and so on. The
argument goes on to say ': ell, the ra:: son why we take so specific
an interest in the smalier dependent countries is because it suits
our Vietnam policy, and the argument then roes on to say that it's
about time that we took a more detailed policy towa rds Japan and
Indonesia.
P. M. ', ell, of course, we do have tery detailed policies with
Japan out these are princioally on the trade side because Japan
hasn't been involved in defence or military ore-oaration over recent
years. but Vietnam looms so large for us, not merely because we re
helping to safeuard a small country which is under agressive attack
or errorism, subversion and matters of that sort. This is important,
but it's not the fundamental thing aoout the Vietnam conflict. '. hat
is fundamental there is the shape of Asia, indeed the shar. e of the
free world for the future. If you were to have a Communist domain,
nbt necessarily a Chinese Communist domain but a Communist domain
as we very well might have had if we hadn't intervened in Korea and
then followed that up by the intervention in Vietnam. If you'd
h-d that right down through South-East Asia from China southlwards,
and Derhais even penetrating as I'm sure it would have if the checks
hadn't been apnlied, into Indonesia, then it would have been a very
different kind of world with which we'd oe dealing in the years to
come. . hat we are doing here by these policies is allo. independent
countries to develoo their resources, to ;. in economic growth, to
co-operite. I mentioned ASPC, there was a shining example. -C. FS,,
the Asian Development oink. In a variety of ways the countries of
Asia are co-operating in a manner they've never done through the
centuries.
MOOiE. This week, Sir, Mr. C: uot Lodge was reported as saying
that United States troons could ue in Vietnam for ahot er 25 years.
Do you think Australian trooos should be?
P. M. ', ell, a lot of people speculate. Some say it's all
going to oe over in 2 years, some say another thing. I don't think
anyoody can say with firmness because it's not merely a military
result which will determine this. I've maintained all along that / 7
a military result will not Je sufficient of itself. It would leave
the way cpen for continuing 6uerilla campaign of the sort we had
to face in IEalaysia.
MOORE. But is the figure of 20 or 25 more ye-rs i ridiculous
one, do you think?
P. M. I would certainly hope it w-; s quite unrealistic. But I
do remember that it took us 15 years to clean up the situation in
Malaysia and tha-t w: s far less extensive, much less complex. On
the other hand, the forces involved were very much smaller than is the
case in Vietnam. No I think the Iorth Vietnamese will find the cost
too heavy much earlier than that, and quite apa-rt from the military
results obtained, there will oe a r-alisation at some point of time
and who can say when, when they decide the game is not worth the candle.
MOOIL. NIow, Sir, I'd like to come at last home to domestic
affairs. It seems to me that this ear, more than any other year
there is a crisis in at least the thinking about CommonwealthState
relttions in Australia. That the federation is under more critical
andlysis than evsr before, nd there are some su gestions that in
fact federation his broken down, in fact, in astralia. That the
St tes are simply the financial i -ents ind none too efficient at
thit, of the Commonelth. Now, how stands the federation.
P. M. : ell, you're speaking a week after a Premiers' nference,
: nd the Loan council meetings, and that's never really the uest time
to . e calmly anailysing the st lte of Commonqealth/. 3tate rel. tions,
because as you know w. e go through these motions each time a-nd certain
results occur. I've found some papers now which sa-id we were too
tight-fisted to begin with and, when they've anal sed what hanpened
last week saying that the ommonwealth h's provide too much mney for
the States. 3o that's a matter of judgment. 3ut could I come really
to the crux of ohat you're saying? I believe in a federal system.
I believe thit in a country as vast n-ird sparsely settled as hustralia
ou must have some decentralised activity of government and rather
han have this come through a jottleneck in Canoerra, it's better that
each State should h: ve its ol.' n governmental odministr.; tion. But there
should ee then close co-operation with the central administration, and
far from the federation breakin. down this is growing as I could point
out in a number of specific insTarnces.
MOORE. * ut isn't one of thie chtr'es made that in fact there is
now a bottle-neck in Canberra, that it's just a matter of bad nujlic
administra: tion to h: ave one overnment collectin taxes and another
government spending it? . ho's responsible for what?
I don't think that creates the cottle-neck. 2ottle-necks
develo out of policy not out of rroviding the funds for neople.
Each St te can make 1 s own -olicies. But there is this much point
in what you're putting, that the electorate is demanding a muc
greater Commonwealth particination in matters which were formally
urely matters within'the constitutional province of the states.
alth, educ . tion, and matters of that sort, 1which were primarily
St. te matters are now regarded as ceing directly of interest for
the Commonealth. Ard, indeed, we're nrnviding vTst sums -s you know
in both these directions. i
S 3But isn't nart of the trouile too that the electorate
or some elements of it, are wanting to know which government do they
blame for either as they reird, inadequrate services or, on the other
hand, increased taxes?
. ell, in my exnaerience they know which government to ./ 8
-8-
blame. It's al: avs the Commonwealth Government, because they say
the Commonwealth Government's got the money and the State Governments
aren't slow to point out to tiose who importune them that they can't
provide the money because the Commonwealth won't give it to them.
But I think thoughtful people appreciate that a Federal system is
necessary in this continent. And it's up to us to make it work, and I
would assure you that we do that in very many directions. There are
conferences at the Ministerial level on a scale which never existed before
in different departments of Government.
MOORE. Sir, now I wonder if we could turn to a orief -ccount of
your Parliamentary record since you've been Prime Minister? The
first thing about it, of course, is the undoubted triumph at the
last Federal election, your first election as Prime iMinister when
you came back with a record majority and that's an undouDt-d
riumph in anyone's terms. On the other hand, since then some
peole are detecting some black clouds on the horizon and I'd like
to go very quickly through the three which normally stand out, and
ask for your comments on them. First of all the fact that you
at present have a reuellious, to put it mildly, Senate. People are
suggesting that this shows a less of control by the Government over
the Government's business. Your comment on that.
P. M. Jell, first we have a minority in the Senate. e lost
by death two Senators which we couldn't replace on the rresent electoral
system. So we are in a minority in any event. Secondly, the Labor
Party regiments it vote in th-e enate. Our Senators try to behave
as they think Senators should and occasionally depart from the
policies of rovernment. out taking in view the fact.....
MOORE. But you do have some rebellious Senators of your own?
P. M. W ell, I don't know what your definition of rebellious is.
There are one or two I think wvho interoret their indenendent role
rather toe lioerally for themselves. But enerall sneaking
the Senators support the Government, but leave to themselves the right
to dissent where they think this is justified. If the Labor Senators
would behave in the same spirit the Senite would work much more along
the lines that it was intended to work. Jut of course theirs is a
regimented vote. but while you have the pro'ortional basis of voting
for the Sen-te there will always be a trouble for governments from
an almost evenly divided Senate.
MO RE. You don't feel that it would have been po sible for the
Government to have negotiated a w:: ay through its problem in the Senate?
I mean, is it the mere fact that you are in a minority or could you
have with some more diplomacy, or finesse, or whatever the word is,
achieved your end?
P. M. ; ell, there are not many matters of major moment that the
Senate has prevented us from putting through. You've had the recent
instance of the postal charges, out that raises other issues and I'm
not surprised th:. t Mr. Calwell got very angry at ; what he regarded as
a breach of L'oor practice and principle on this matter.
MOORE. Sir, could I now turn to the Vozyaer debate, where it's
sometimes been suggested that this showed that the Party had lost some
of its control over its members, and you were reported saying,
admittedly only reported as saying, that you were led to say, tat you
would rather lead a solid Party of 20 than a rajule of 00. Now did
you say anything like that?
P. M. This was not in relttion to the Voyager matter. Jut I would
say it iwas over that general . eriod but not in relation to that, oh no.
/ 9
It T5s on the occasion though, wasn't it?
No I didn't object at all to the line tken by
our own mnembers on the Voyager matter, and I think I can say quite
fairly that on the morning on which I armounced the Government's
decisions to the House, Ye h-d a snecial Party meeting and I've
never known the party more united than it was at tha-t point of time.
I ias very haprpy with the atmosphere in the Party.
MOORE. That wasn't on the morning on which you were
reported to have said.....
P. M. No. No.
MOORE. ! lell, now the Nexus iReferendum and its defeat.
Did you take this is a Personal affront to your position as
Prime Minister? 1o more so than I took the nine to one vote for
the ARori ines proposals as an overwhelming endorsement of the
Government. No, peoole voted, I think the vote on the Nexus was
not based on very solid information and revealed a prejudice
against more politicians. That was the cry that was put up, although
in substance it was likely to have just the reverse effect.
MOORE. You don't sea it then : s in any . ay a defict for a
Prime inister th-it he can't carry a referendum in wihich he h s the
support of the Leader of the Opposition?
P. M. ell, a lot of Prime inisters would feel. themselves
rebuffed if they took that attitude. There have -en very few
refe-endum nroposals adopted throunh the histo of the Federation
but ,7e felt we hd to give the pu ic the onnor unity of deciding this
before we tackled the task of redistrioution. The vital t-ask because
the electorates are so ill . ala; nced even in the same State and in the
same city areas.
MOORE. Now, Sir could we turn very briefly to relations
between the Coailition Farties. Low a lot of peodle lot of thins
have ceen said recently nd headlines made about an alle., ed rift
within the Party and it's often su,, gested that the Liberal Party is
out to et rid of the Country Party and rule in its own right. Now,
what's in this? ell, nothing as far as I'm concerned, because it's
my own pelief that as far thead zs I can see there should oe in the
interests of good government in Australia a coalition oetween the
Liberal Party and The Country Party. I've made this quite cleair to
my colleagues and to Mr. cwen. Mr. McEwen and I are old colleaues
we've been together in Parliament for more than thirty years. ve
been in governments together for just on twenty years as fellow
Ministers, and we can usually sort our way through our problems. 3ut
we're competitors for votes let's face it, we're separite Parties,
we're out to get the best of what we can for the electorate and they
are, and they have a difficult problem in a neried in ' which the urban
growth is tending to outstrip the rural : rowth of maintaining cn
identity and I can understand some of te thin. s that go on inside
the Coun ry Party.
WMORL. And inside the Liberal Party? Are there no tensions
there? P. M. ell ag'ain vie are competitors and some Liberals
of course, tend to take more extreme views of where we should stand
in relation to thle Country Party than others, but over the whole field,
MO * RE
-1
rjlations are as good and -hen you trace it back over the period of
the coalition, I think remarkabl good and may I just conclude
on that by sayin I find in nrac ice I have fewer problems arise in
relations with te Country "> rty than I do with some of my colleagues
in what is non a very large Libera. l Party.
MOORE. Sir at the beginning of this discussion I sugjested
that one mi-ht descrioe you as a " Foreign Aff irs" Prime Minister. If
it was put To you, how would you de3cri e government Holt-style?
P. M. I don't think there should be a smecial emphasis placed
on neople's view as to foreign affairs or home a-ffairs. I've said
at the outset what hlipens on the home front is vital and overwhelmingly
important but placedias Australia is, of course, so do our foreign
policies become of great importnce to us. but if you ask me what
is my general approach.
MOORE. .; hat is your style of government? How would you
surmarise it?
P. M. ell, I put it to President Johnson that I tried to
be firm fair forthrifhtfand friendly if you like a fair deal
Government. Ae told me that his objectives were rogress reace and
prosperity I said 11, let's marry them together, and we've ot
it made", and I would descrioe m own approach in those terms an
I think you avoid a , reat deal o the complexity of government when
people accept you as bein fair and understand that you'll be firm
and forthright, but also now tAt you'll be trying to be friendly.
MOORE. rime Minister, thank you for giving us your time.
P. H. Thank you.