PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Holt, Harold

Period of Service: 26/01/1966 - 19/12/1967
Release Date:
29/05/1967
Release Type:
Press Conference
Transcript ID:
1589
Document:
00001589.pdf 4 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Holt, Harold Edward
VISIT TO US, CANADA AND UK - LOS ANGELES, USA - PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR HAROLD HOLT AT LOS AGNELES AIRPORT - 29TH MAY 1967

ca* 5 JUN 1967
VISIT TO US, CANADA AND UK L 18R Alt
LOS ANGELES, USA
PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER,
MR. HAROLD HOLT AT LOS ANGELES AIRPORT. 29TH MAY, 1967
PRIME MINISTER: I am on a journey this time to have talks with President Johnson
and with Prime Minister Lester Pearson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson,
and senior members of the administrations of those three countries.
It is always a valuable thing for an Australian Prime Minister to have
discussions with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom. As for the Prime Minister of Canada, we usually catch
up with each other at Prime Ministers' Conferences.
But the timing of this particular conference is linked up with EXPO 67.
June 6 has been marked as Australian Day at that Exposition and the President,
learning that I am coming for the Exposition, very kindly invited me for talIs
with him. They will be very timely talks as there are several matters of major
consequence we will have to discuss together. We have a very substantial
concern with matters concerning Vietnam, British intentions East of Suez,
the British entry it it is achieved into the European Economic Community,
and there are always, with two countries that trade so freely together, trade
and economic issues which call for some discussion between Heads of
Government and Cabinet Ministers of our two countries. These are a few of
the principal items which I refer to as looming large in our talks together. I
I hope not only to have the opportunity of the talks in Washington but th9
President has very kindly invited me to stay with him for a time and I expect
to do this on my homeward journey. It would not be practicable for me to
do this on my way over to the United Kingdom as I have a series of commitments,
some here in your own city, but in Canada apart from EXPO and Australia's
events there I am looking forward to meeting Prime Minister Pearson. I
think that our two countries, both growing in economic strength and, projecting
your minds forward some years to the time when they will have a considerably
larger population, growing in economic strength and numbers together. And
having in mind our special relationship with the United States and United Kingdom
we'll together be able to play a useful role.
In these days with less emphasis placed on Commonwealth meetings, I
think a closer contact between Canada and Australia is certainly desirable.
The projected entry of the United Kingdom into the European Economic
Community poses some curious trade problems to Australia. The United
Kingdom has a preferential entry into Australia and for our part we have a
preferred entry for much of our primary production and inevitably it seems to
us that some arrangements can be made and that there will be some adverse
effect upon Australia's primary industries and I suspect a weakening of the
United Kingdom's preferred position in our own country.
So we have this to talk about, but overshadowing that in a sense is the
future that Britain has to maintain East of Suez. There is, as is well known,
the British intention to reduce its military establishments East of Suez. How
far this will go and at what pace is a matter that concerns your own country
and certainly concerns ours. I have been assured by Prime Minister Wilson
that no final decisions will be taken on these matters until we have the
opportunity of a talk together. So altogether my journey will involve me in
some of the most important discussions I think that any Australian Prime
Minister could expect to hold.

While in this country I have a significant number of speaking
engagements and at these I hope to outline in more details Australia's
attitudes in relation to its participation in South-East Asian and Pacific
affairs, and the trade matters which concern this country and the other
countries I have mentioned.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, you have been to Vietnam on two occasions and
you have had a first hand look at the battle. What is your assessment of
the situation?
P. M. Well, I made the comment when I first returned that I was entirely
confident that we could not lose the war in Vietnam. I felt at the same time
it could be a long and protracted struggle there, unless the North Vietnamese
could be persuaded to negotiate. We had, as you will know, experience with
other Communist forces in Malaya as it was then known. It was a much less
complex matter, far fewer people were involved, but it dragged on for very
many years. But I have seen what has happened to Malaysia as it now is,
now that Communism has been brought under check and I would certainly
hope that, if we can bring Communism under check and restraint in South
Vietnam, there will be the same economic and political progress there that
we have seen so favourably marked in Malaysia.
Q. There was a growing indication here that people were against the war
and of course there was when President Johnson was down in your country.
What is the general concensus of the Australian people now?
P. M. On the first proposition, I think all sensible people are against war.
It doesn't suit any free democratic or liberty-loving country to be invoilved
in military operations. They are costly in terms o-flife even happiness
they are costly in a material sense and I can assure you that we are just as
fullhearted as any other people in seeing a just and enduring settlement
come out of the Vietnam conflict.
But at the same time, while the stress is there we believe that it must
be resisted. This is not our first contact as I have just instanced of Communist
aggression in South-East Asia. It can manifest itself in other places as well
as in South Vietnam. I have only to mention Thailand as one of the
possibilities and in Laos where I was quite recently I was told of the tens of
thousands of North Vietnamese forces already infiltrated into that country.
So that we feel that the struggle must be continued until there is a satisfactory
outcome a just and enduring settlement. So far as my own people are
concerned I think that I can illustrate it best to you this way. The last general
election was foi, ght on Australia's participation in Vietnam and the involvement
there for the fir'st time in Australia's history of men brou, ht in on a draft
basis. The fact that we secured an all time majority in that election aigainst
the strong opposition of the Australian Labor Party indicates the Australian
attitude of mind. It is interesting to note that since th. en the spokesmen for
the Labor Party have modified their outlook quite considerably. The Deputy
Leader of the Party, Mr. Barnard, who has been touring South-East Asia
and has been on a visit to Vietnam in recent days was quoted before I left
Australia as having said that they would have to have a fresh look at their
policy, that he was not convinced that it was not a civil war or merely a
guerilla war, but there was evidence of the infiltration of Communist forces
from the north. This modification, in fact this drastic alteration of attitude
on the part of the Deputy Leader of the Labor Party following views expressed
by Mr. Whitlam, Leader of the Party, the watering down of the attitude
disclosed at the election time, I think will bring a greater unity amongst the
Australian people on this issue. Certainly the determination of my own
Party and of the Country Party which forms the coalition which I lead is quite
firm. We have had only one dissenter from the policy, one Senator who has

since become an independent, but I think that we have only had one out of
a record number of Members of the House of Representatives and a large
body of Senators from both those Parties indicates the unanimity of the
feeling on the Government's side on this particular issue.
Q. Do you consider President Johnson has done everything postible to
negotiate with the North Vietnamese?
P. M. I am sure he is sincere in his desire to produce an early negotiation.
Indeed, I think he has gone a very long way in regard to the important
objective he mL~ st hope to secure out of any negotiation on behalf of the
proposals which have been put on behalf of the United States administration.
I have seen a good deal of him as you are aware during the past twelve
months, possibly more in point of fact than the head of any other government.
The circumstances which brought me here twice last year, his visit to
Australia, our participation together in the Manila Conference, gave me
many opportunities of seeing him and talking closely to him, and we keep
in close touch by correspondence. I believe he is genuinely concerned to
bring about a peaceful settlement as soon as that can be arranged with
decency and honor and justice.
Q. Your country has a considerable military combat force in Vietnam. As
a military participant in that conflict do you, Sir, see any hopeful sign for
a settlement?
P. M. You can't claim to see a hopeful sign from anything that emerges from
Hanoi, but I am quite certain on the evidence and I had a briefing yesterday
which ran over the best part of two hours with Admiral Sharp of the US Navy
and officers in Honolulu on the situation there that it is evident that the
Hanoi administration and the people are taking terrific punishment. Now what
are they hoping to achieve? They can't win this war and they delude themselves
if they think they can. Surely there is enough realism for them to accept
that they can't win this war and that they face a continuing destruction of
their industrial assets, means of transportation and other things that go to
make a vibrant economy. They can't look at the present troubled state of
China with any confidence of a continuance of the present strength of
support from that source. I have had enough dealings myself internationally
and domestically with the Communist mentality to sustain a hope that even
when you . seem to be up against a brick wall in negotiations with them, once
they have decided that the game isn't worth the candle they can, without
regard to consistency, logic or anything that they have said before, stand
around and decide that the time has come to make a deal.
Q. What is your present commitment in. South Vietnam and is your
Government considering increasing that commitment?
P. M. I am not proposin-; to comment, but the size of the commitment is known.
The commitment in a national sense, of course, is clear. In the military
sense it is affected by our obligations in other directions and at the moment
it is not clear to us just what the British intention is East of Suez. But
Australia does not really need prodding by the United States or for that
matter by any other country to what it should contribute, having regard to
its resources. It is perhaps useful to remind an earlier generation of
Americans that my country lost more men killed in the first world war than
the United States did and we didn't require any prompting about that. ' We have
as I mentioned undertaken a major political issue in bringing in for the first
time a selective draft of Australian young men to fight away from our own
shores. WAe fought an election on it and put our political existence at stake.

4.
Now at the present time not only do we have our political situation there
to consider, we have certain obligations in relation to the Malaysian-Singapore
area. We have recently been involved in meeting Indonesian confrontation,
we have defence obligations as we see them to Papua and New Guinea. Vie have
more than doubled our defence expenditure over the last four years. It may
interest some of you to know that as a percentage of our gross national product
Australia contributes more to defence than any Western country other than the
United States and the United Kingdom. And remember that although we are
geographically the size of the metropolitan United States, we are a small
country of 11-t million people against your 190 odd million people.
Q. Do I take it you are not contemplating any increase in your commidtment?
P. M. We have no present intention of increasing the Vietnam commitment, but
may I just add this. It is not perhaps generally known that Australia is the
only country assisting the United States which has representation from the
three armed services, the Army, Navy and the Air Force. We are also
contributing in civil aid and that we do this entirely at our own expense. The
Koreans have a much larger numerical strength, but as I understand the
position they are largely financed by the United States of America. We don't
receive a dollar of aid for the defence contribution we make.
Q. What will be the effect on Australia's defence if the British pull out of
East of Suez?
P. m. I am not going to deal with that hypothetical question. I am goi1' Ig to see
Prime M'Vinister Wilson and see if I can get a clearer view of his intentions
there. He has assured me that there will be no final decisions until we have
had some talks.
Q. How does the present crisis in the Middle E~ ast affect Australia's security?
There is a speculation that the Russians are using this crisis as a lever to
get the Uni-ted States out of Vietnam.
P. M. Well, on the first point; Australia, as its record in two world wars has
demonstrated, and as our participation in Vietnam dem~ onstrates remember
Australia was the first country to join you in Korea, and one of the few
countries to join you in Vietnam finds itself concerned wherever the peace
of the world is threatened, and we are naturally concerned with anything
which is likely to threaten the peace of the world such as the events occurring
in the Middle E~ ast. But Australia is not a significant factor in that situation
in the sense that we believe ourselves to be not without some significance in
respect of South Vietnam.
As to the Russians using this as a lever to reduce the American effort in
South Vietnam, well I can only express a personal view on that. I think that
is a rather far-fetched view. I don't even think the Russiars want trouble in
the Middle East any more than the United States or Great Britain want trouble
in the Middle East. I see this as a product of Middle East politics and in
particular the aspirations, the ambitions, the objective of Nasser and the
chronic ill-feeling that exists between Egypt and other Arabic countries and
Israel. Thank you gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister.

1589