COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
, SPEECHES BY
The Rt Hon. HAROLD HOLT, M. P.,
ON
CONSTITUTION ALTERATION PARLIAMENT)
BILL 1967
AND)
CONSTITUTION ALTERATION ( ABORIGINALS)
BILL 1967
Second Reading
[ From the ' Parliamentary Debates', 1 March .1967]
CONSTIUTION ALTERATION
( PARLIAMENT) BILL 1967
Mr HAROLD HOLT ( Higgins-Prime
Minister) [ 8.42]-1 move:
. That the Bill be now read . a second time.
As I informed honourable members in my
statement in this House last week, the Government
has -decided to proceed with the
referendum proposals that were embodied
in . the two Bills passed by both Houses
towards the end of 1965 and to add * a
further proposal with respect to section
51 ( xxvi). Because of the requirements of
section 128 of the Constitution relating to
alteration of the Constitution, the Bills that
were passed in 1965 with a view to their
submission to a referendum have lapsed and
fresh Bills must be passed before the alterations
they propose to the Constitution can
be submitted to the electors. The Bill now
before the House is, in its substantive provisions,
identical with the Bill on the same
subject passed by both Houses in 1965,
except -in one significant respect. That is
3211/ 67 the substitution of ' 85,000' for ' 80,000' in
sub-section of proposed new section 24.
1 will come back to this alteration later.
This Bill, as honourable members will be
aware, is the Bill to break the present link
between the size of this House and the
size of the ' Senate. This link or nexus is
provided for by. section 24 of the Constitution,
the first paragraph of which reads:
The House of Repiesentatives shall be composed
of members directly chosen by the people
of the Commonwealth, and the number of such
members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice
the number of the senators.
Unless the requirement -that the number of
members shall be, as nearly as practicable,
twice the number of the senators, is
deleted from section 24, any increase in the
House of Representatives must . be accompanied
by an increase of half that number
in the Senate. While this provision is not
to be interpreted with exact mathematical
precision-indeed the present House
consists of slightly more members than the
120 -that results from a strict doubling of
the number of Senators-it is nevertheless
clear, and it has been the consistent view
of constitutional advisers over many years,
that it is not open to the Parliament to
increase the size of this House except by
a very small number without at the same
time increasing the number of senators.
Such a limitation is not imposed on other
parliaments, and it is, I believe, the view
of a large majority of this Parliament that,
whilst the substantial growth in population
will make some expansion of this House
necessary and desirable, it should not
follow that the number of senators be
increased proportionately.
Unless some measures are taken soon to
increase the size of the House of Representatives,
it will bccame impracticable for
members -adequately to perform the
functions on behalf of their electors that
are expected of them. As Sir Robert
Menzies said when introducing the corresponding
Bill in November 1965:
*'' The problems being looked at by
honourable members today are three or four times
more weighty and more complex than they were
when I first came into this House. I know this
at first hand. I am not an idler; I have worked
all this time and I know what it means
We have the supreme duty to represent o ur
people and to represent them effectively. To
represent them effectively, there must be a
proper proportion between the number of members
of this Hotuse and the number of the electors
in the nation as a whole.
I shall illustrate the point a -little further.
If the Constitution remains unamended,
by 1969 the existing number of members,
or very close to -the existing number, will
have held for twenty years. The last change
of significance was made in 1949. ' It is
estimated that the population of. Australia
will have risen from just on eight . milli on
in 1949 to twelve million, or thereabouts,
by the end of 1969. There will be this
increase in population of approximately
since the last change was made. Anybody
who has been in this place for any
number of years will appreciate the force
of what Sir Robert said as to the range
of matters which have to be dealt with
compared with the more limited jurisdicdiction*
which -the Parliament took to itself.
in those earlier years.
As I mentioned in the House last week,
there is, I believe, agreement among all
members of both Houses that, because of the disproportion which has developed in
the numbers represented in certain electorates,
a redistribution should be made before
the next general elections. Some electorates
in the same State have less than 40,000
voters, while -others have in excess of
100,000, and the disparity will have
widened by the time of the next election,
whenever that may be. It would clearly
be imprudent to set in motion a redistribution
until we had ascertained the views of
the people on the question of breaking
the nexus. Further, not only has the number
of voters in some electorates now
become very large but, as suggested by
Sir Robert Menzies in the speech from
which I have just quoted, -the burdens of
members have increased considerably.
Government in Australia today is active in
many more fields, and the range of problems
which th-is has created has had a
significant impact on the duties of the
people's representatives.
Additionally, our population contains
growing proportions of young people and
of migrants. The future of our country lies
to a significant extent in these people, and
they have therefore been the subject of
special attention by the Government and
its agencies, through social services and
other means. The Commonwealth has increasingly
been drawn by the will of the
electorate into fields that were originally
the province of the States. We have seen
this occurring in health and education, to
give only two illustrations. Although the
young people and many of our migrants
hiave no vote, their welcome presence in
the community has the effect of adding
significantly to the burdens of those who
represent the electorates in which they live.
I know that this strikes a" responsive ch~ rd
in the LUader of the Opposition ( Mr
Whitlam),' who has told me on more than
one occasion not only that he has an electorate
with a yery'large number of voters
but also that a very considerable number
of migrants have settled in it.
Mr James-He told the right honourable
gentleman-that in confidence.
MrU HAROLD HOLT-I do not think so.
He has made no secret of the fact that he
represents a substantial part of the Australian
electorate, at least in his own constituency,
even though I cannot attribute
the same merit to him with respect to the
electorate at large. I am sure that my colleagues,
the honourable member for Lalor
( Mr Lee), the Minister for Immigration ( Mr
Snedden), who represents the electorate of
Bruce, and the honourable member for
Mitchell ( Mr Irwin), will confirm the point
that I have made. I have singled them out
because they come readily to mind.
The points that I have mentioned all
suggest the need not only for a redistribution
but also for power to make increases
deemed appropriate in the size of the
popular House. Unless the nexus is removed,
a significant increase in the size of the
House of Representatives cannot be made
unless the number of senators also is increased
proportionately. To enable the
Senate to continue to operate on a basis
similar to that on which it is operating at
present-that is, with an uneven number of
senators standing for election on every
occasion in each State-the minimum increase
is twenty-four. This would mean
increasing the size of the House of Representatives
by some forty-eight members.
No-one in this Parliament-nor any member
of the public-would want this result.
Nor do we as a government.
There have been suggestions-and no
doubt they will be made again-that the
object of the proposed changes in section 24
of the Constitution is to permit an excessive
increase in the number of members
in Parliament. Nothing could be further
from the truth. The purpose of the proposal
is to seek from ' the electors approval
to alter the Constitution so that, as the
growth of the Commonwealth's population
demands, this Parliament can legislate for
a modest increase in the size of the popular
House without -having at the same time to
increase the size of the Senate. If carried,
our proposals will permit the smallest increase
that we consider to be consistent with
effective representation. Indeed, as I shall
explain later, there will for the first time be
introduced into the Constitution a provision
which will have the effect of placing
an upper limit on the number of members
of the popular House.
The Government, I may say, has considered
other suggestions that have been
brought forward to effect an increase in
the size of the House of Representatives and at the same time enable an increase in the
size of the Senate, but without having the
considerable jump in numbers that would
follow if we maintained the present
system of voting. However, we have concluded-
as indeed Sir Robert Menzies
concluded-that none of them offers a
wholly satisfactory solution, under the system
of proportional representation-a system
which experience has shown to be the
best that has so far been devised. We have
looked in particular at a proposal that the
Senate be increased by a -total of six, with
one additional senator for each State, making
eleven senators for each State. This
would mean that at alternate elections there
would be six senators voted for on one
occasion and five on the other. It might
prove necessary to have six senators elected
in some States and five in others at the
same election. The possibility of a deadlocked
Senate could be increased, and there
are other factors which, in the view of the
Government, make this a less desirable
course -than the more simple and clear cut
proposal to increase the House of Representatives
to the required extent without
the requirement of a corresponding increase
in the Senate. I think I should observe that,
even if the proposal that the size of the
Senate be increased by six were adoptedand
this could be done without a constitutional
amendment at all-the result would
be that we would be faced with an increase
of some eighteen members and senators in
all. In other words, to provide for the addition'of
twelve or thirteen members of this
House-if that were the number considered
necessary-six senators would have to be
added to the National Parliament, even
though it might be generally agreed that at
the time there was no adequate reason for
increasing the size of the Senate.
There . are ' two things that I want to say
about the position of the Senate. The proposed
amendments of section 24 of the-
Constitution will not, in the view of the
Government, in any way erode the role of
the Senate. Nor will they preclude a future
increase in the size of the Senate, should
that at any time be considered desirable.
As to the first matter, we believe that the
Senate, as ' at present constituted, is well
able to discharge-and to discharge effectively-
the role designed for it by the Constitution.
We are well aware that some fears
are held that the prestige and authority of
the Senate . may in some manner be diminished
as a consequence of. this proposal, and
that the role it . can perform as a house of
review and custodian of the rights of the
smaller States may be-weakened. We do not
accept these views -as having practical force.
The good sense of the electorate and of the
Parliament will, I believe, provide effective
safeguards against any such weakening of
the position of the Senate.
Moreover, two protections of the . position
of the Senate will be afforded by the present
proposals. Firstly, State representation will
be protected by guaranteeing to original
States-that is, all the existing States-a
minimum of ten senators, in lieu of six
senators guaranteed under the Constitution
in its present form. Secondly, as a guarantee
against excessive increases in the size of
the House of Representatives, the Bill provides
that the number of members of this
House shall be ascertained by dividing the
number of people of the States by a number
determined by the Parliament, but not being
less than 85,000. The 1965 Bill provided
that the number of people was to be divided
by a number not less than 80,000.
On reflection, the Government has decided
that the minimum figure is to be
preferred. Adoption of 85,000 as the population
quota would permit a total increase
of thirteen or fourteen members by about
1969. This, I stress, is. a maximum increase,
not minimum increase. I recall that, at the
time of the First Parliament in 1901, the
average population per electorate was about
50,000. By 1947 it had risen to over
100,000, and the size . of this House was
then increased from 74 members to 121
members. By the .1949 elections the average
population per electorate . was some 67,000;
by 1969, we expect, the average would rise to
a figure in excess of 94,000. I point out that,
if : the Government's proposals embodied
in this Bill become -law, it will be the first
occasion on which the Constitution has
imposed an upper limit on the total number
in the popular House.
I commend the Bill to the House. I
believe . that the proposals contained . in it
should be approved by the people, and
that, if they are, this will constitute a
significant advance in the efficient working
of . our parliamentary system.
Debate ( on motion by Mr Whitlam) adjourned. ( CONSTITUTION ALTERATION
i( ABORIGINALS) BILL 1967
Mr ' HAROLD HOLT .( Higgins-Prime
Minister) move:
That the Bill be now read a second time.
The purpose of this Bill is to make alterations
to the two provisions of the Constitution
which make explicit reference to people
of the Aboriginal race. One alteration-that
proposed by clause 3 of the Bill-is designed
to repeal section 127. An identical proposal
was passed unanimously by both Houses
of the Parliament in November 1965. Section
127 provides that, in reckoning the
numbers of the people of the Commonwealth,
or of . a State or other part of the
Commonwealth, Aboriginal natives shall not
be counted. The Government continues to
believe that this section should be repealed.
The principal reason for including section
127 in the Constitution was the practical
difficulty of enumerating the Aboriginal
population at that time. No doubt in 1900
this was a very substantial problem. It is,
however, no longer a serious difficulty, and
the basis for the existence of the section
consequently does not now exist. I should
emphasise that section 127 does not affect
the qualifications of Aboriginals to vote at
Commonwealth elections. Section 41 has
always guaranteed an Aboriginal the right
to vote at elections if he has a right to vote
at elections for the more. numerous House
of the Parliament of the State in which he
is a voter, and this Parliament itself has
removed all disabilities in respect of voting
at Commonwealth elections so far as
Aboriginals . are concerned. They are now
entitled to enrol and to vote ' and should,
in the view of the Government, ' be counted
as part of the population of the ' Commonwealth,
or : their State . or Territory, for any
purpose. The simple truth is that section 127
is completely . out of harmony with our
national . attitudes . and modern thinking. It
h'as , no place in our Constitution in this age.
The second alteration, ' which -is contained
in clause 2 of the Bill, is the deletion of the
words ' other than the Aboriginal race in any
State' ' from paragraph ( xxvi) of section 51.
Section 51,'( xxvi) of the Constitution reads:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution,
have power to make laws for the peace, order and
good government of the Commonwealth with
respect to:-
( xxvi) The people of any race, other than the
aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is
deemed necessary to make special laws.
Since the Government's earlier proposals
for constitutional alterations were put
before the Parliament, a great deal of
thought has been given, both inside and
outside the Parliament, to the constitutional
provisions relating to the Aboriginal people
and there has been much activity by
Government private members and organisations
concerned with the welfare of the
Aboriginals. In the light of this activity and
the many representations made, the Government
has reviewed the position and has
decided that an amendment of section
51 ( Xxvi), as provided for in the Bill, should
be put to the people, in addition to the
proposal for the repeal of section 127. In
coming to this conclusion, the Government
has been influenced by the popular impression
that the words now proposed to be
omitted from section 51 ( xxvi) are discriminatory-
a view which the Government
believes to be erroneous but which, nevertheless,
seems to be deep rooted.
An effect of omitting these words will be
the removal of the existing restriction on
-the power of the Commonwealth to make
special laws for the people of the Aboriginal
race in any State if the Parliament
considers it necessary. As the Constitution
stands at present, the Commonwealth ' has
no power, except in the Territories, to
legislate with respect to people of the
Aboriginal race as such. If the words
' other than the Aboriginal race in any
State' were deleted from section 51 ( xxvi),
the result would be that the Commonwealth
Parliament would have vested in it
a concurrent legislative power with -respect
to Aboriginals as such, they being the
people of a race, provided the Parliament
deemed it necessary to make special laws
for them. It is the view of the Government
that the National Parliament should have
this power. If the proposals relating to
Aboriginals are approved by the people,
the Government would regard it as desirable
to hold discussions with the States to secure the widest * measure of agreement
with respect to Aboriginal advancement.
1 think 1 should say a few words about
the suggestion . that has been made that we
should include a constitutional guarantee
against discrimination on the ground of
race. Such a proposal was put forward,
in particular, by the honourable member
for Mackellar ( Mr Wentworth) in a private
member's Bill. The recommendation to
include such a guarantee in our Constitution
has the obvious attraction of providing
evidence of the Australian people's desire
to outlaw discriminatory practices of every
kind, but the disadvantages of the inclusion
of such a guarantee are so substantial that
the Government does * not believe that it
should be pursued. Such a guarantee could
provide a fertile source of attack on the
Constitutional validity of legislation which
we, at this point of time, would not consider
discriminatory. The extent of litigation
that has arisen from section 92 provides
a serious warning of the ramifications
of an apparently straightforward constitutional
guarantee. Moreover, such a
guarantee would operate only to limit
government action. It would not affect
actions by individuals. Racial discrimination,
if it exists in a community, is the
outward * manifestation of beliefs rooted in
the hearts and minds of some men and
women. I do not believe -that such beliefs
are to be found on any significant scale
in this country; but even if it were otherwise,
I do not think the position could be
remqedied in practice by a constitutional
guarantee. Accordingly, the Government believes
that the best course, the most effective
course, for the Commonwealth to adopt
is to seek the amendments proposed in
the Bill. It proposes to submit -them at the
same time as the referendum on the nexus
provision-section 24 of the Constitution.
I commend the Bill to the House.
Debate ( on motion by Mr Whitiam)
adjourned.
BY AUTHORITY: A. ARTHUR, COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT PRINTER, CANBERRA, A. C. T.
3211/ 67-2