PRIM. Eli ISTER'S TOUR OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA
Press Conference given by the Prime Kinister,. o
Mr. Harold Holt at Kuala Lumpur 27TH APRIL 1966
Well ladies and gentlemen I didn't propose to make any
extensive statement of a general kind because most of you will
have had the statement I made for my visit here, which outlined
where I've been, what the general purpose of the visit has been
and our plans for the remainder of the tour.
You will have gathered that my principal purpose when
I first planned this journey was tc make contact with Australian
troops wherever they rre stationed in South-East Asia.
Indeed, from the time I took office as Prime Minister,
this has been one of my most pressing priorities in my own view
and I have taken what turned out to be the first opportunity,
indeed made some rearrangements of plans to achieve this because
Parliament is still in session and part of the explanation, the
largest part, for the compression of this visit to so many
countries into so short a space of time is to enable me to return
to the Parliament for the remaining weeks of the session.
The visit, however, as we have gone along and as
became fairly evident when we were planning the details of it
with the Governments of the countries concerned, has developed
into quite a considerable diplomatic exercise, quite apart from
the purpose I've outlined to you and it has been a most valuable
experience to have had intimate political discussions in each cf
the countries I have visited with the senior political and
diplomatic personalities of that country wherever we have gone.
I have already been to Vietnam where most of the time
planned for the journey had been allotted.
We are, as you know, actively engaged in military
operations in Vietnam in support of' the forces kf South Vietnam
at the request of its Govrnment and in association with the
United States which has such massive iepresentation there.
Not only was I able to make observations and have
discussions on the spot, but it was an o. pportunity tc make a
fresh assessi-ient of the prospects in that area.
I f-und thec,, I say very frankly cnc.-, uraging as to the
future. There are some tough times ahead, perhaps for a long
time ahead, but I'm sure that the Viet Cong cannot finally
succeed in South Vietnam and with that knowledge, the South
Vietnamese people themselves m. ust be heartened continue a
struggle which has been for then a long drawn cut crisis of so
many years duration nearly 20 years duration for many of those
who have been actively in the fight throughout.
But with thu massive assistance now available to them,
with the encouragement and heartening effect of the knowledge
that there are friends arnd the world willing to co: n tc their
aid until this task is resolved, there has been a lift in the
morale of the S: cuth Victnamese themselves a. nd as to our c. wn
troops, I found then in splendid spirit and well meriting the
high commendaticn which had boen expresscd often by all with
whom we spoke. But apart from the Victnamese situation, the visit to
Thailand and tc this country, and then later in Singapore, will
enable me to have an up-to-date assessment on matters which are
of mutual interest and concern to us in this area of the world.
Xe, oi coarse, share your own concern with the
continuation of the Indonesian policy of confrontation and our
own assistance is continuing with your forces, the forces of the
United Kingdom and New Zealand, in resisting this confrontation
process. ihat will emerge from the changes which have been
taking place in Indonesia?
I think it wiser to defer judgment on that until there
is clearer evidence that there has been some change of heart, or
change of direction.
But, quite obviously, if judged merely on the number
of people of Communist sympathies who have been disposed of
violently in Indonesia, there is undoubtedly a strength of' anti-
Communist which, when the disorders can be finally suppressed,
do open up some prospect of collaboration with the countries of
the free world. However, I think it not fruitful at this point of time
to speculate at any length on what might emerge there.
Having said that, and with your knowledge that I will
be visiting the remaining centres Butterworth the Borneo
points of interest to us and various other centres around this
country, I think the most useful thing I can do for you at this
point is to ask if there are questions which occur to you on
which you would liike an answer.
I can't guarantee to answer them all, because, on
domestic matters I am, as you will appreciate, a guest of your
Government in this country and it's not usaal for those so
situated to coimmient on matters of domestic political concern.
QUESTION: ( By Straits Echo and Indian papers)
iIr. Prime œ 1; inister, you said you would make. a fresh
assessment in the area, that is Vietnam.
In the light of your assessment, is there any likelihood
that you will increase your military assistance and presence in
Vietnam?
iYM. HOLT: The Australian assistance has already been publicly
indicated. It was made in the light of considerable knowledge of
what the situation is there.
It represents a trebling of our existing forcc in that
area, something more than a frebling of that existing force, and
you must have in mind that Australia has commitments and
obligations, or even in the absencc of commitment or obligation,
is making a military assistance in other parts of South-Tast Asia,
I've already mentioned what we are doing in relation to
this country. fe have certain responsibilities in respect of Papua
and New Guinea which enjoys a common border with Indonesia, and
the arrangement, so far as our own troops in Vietnam are
concerned is that their tour of duty will be approxijratol, 12
months. So we will need to have replacement forces for the
troops in that area.-
In order to meet all these different tasks and
obligations, we have found it necessary to introduce a system of
national service, and so, at this stage, I would point to what we
have alreauy undertaken to do.
I have said in Parliament that the Government reviews
from time to time the contribution that it is making, either
overall or in a particular situation.
But the strength of force wnich I have indicated to
you is the only decision which the Government has taken on this
matter and relates to at least the foreseeable future.
Q. ( Local Rep. AAP Reuters)
Can you tell us what were the topics of your discussion
with Tun ñ. azak today?
HOLT: ie had a talk which has ranged over quite a wide area,
but as Tun Razak commented to me, we don't have problems between
each other, we have matters of interest.
. e have one or two matters of mutual concern, but the
relations between Australia an alaysia are very friendly
relations. co-operate in a number of fields.
: c have bucn glad to give some assistance in directions
which he was good enough to say were of help and much appreciated
by him and his Government.
But naturally, we had some discussion on the Indonesian
situation. I dia give him an account of my own impressions of the
situation in Vietnam.
I was particularly interested in what your Government
is doing in the fiela of rural development, because w firmly
believe, and this . Ls true of the Government of South Vietnam, of
the American authorities there, or our own advisers, that
considerable contribution to military success, and a continued
stablilty in South Vietnam will be the amount of energy and
purpose put behind the programes of civil action or
revolutionary development as they call them.
This would supplement the military effort in much the
same way as in the days of your own guerrilla activity where it
was found necessary to support with economic and social welfare
programmes.
2.
Q. ( Straits Times)
Sir, in view of your commitment in Vietnam, what are the
chances of il1alaysia gettin,. extra troops in case she asks for them?
Extra Australian troops.
14R. HOLT: Well, I think this would have to be viewed against the
total range of our comiuiitments, but I believe that the forces
currently available are adequate to meet the military requirements
of' the current situation.
I don't think it's likely to worsen.
hatever view one takes of the situation in Indonesia,
I frankly don't think the military situation is likely to worsen.
There may be some prospect even of improvement, but I
don't dwiell on that.
Q. How does Australia view the friction ,-which exists
between L'i,, alaysia and Singapore?
Has this been part of your general discussions here?
MR. HOLT: Naturally vie, as friends of both *,. alaysia and Singapore,
are interested in the continuation or establishment of' good
relations on a firm basis between these tw.-o areas.
Quite obviously it has an importance in our own eyes
for military co-operation, and the successful progress of trade
between our countries.
The economic well being of' Singapore has a bearing on
the economic well being of '.! alaysia and vice versa.
For our part the economic well being of two friendly
countries has some concern for us, certainly a very real interest
for us. But these are problems which, quite obviously, have to
be worked out between the two Governments of the areas concerned.
It's not for us to try to meddle in what are the
domestic affairs of those two Governments.
Q. ( Far EL-astern Economic -Review)
Sir, looking for a change of heart or change of
direction in Indonesia, would you regard Indonesia's offer of
recognition of ], ingapore as a change in direction?
12. HOLT: I think it could be.
I know it was accompanied. by some reference to an
increase of' confrontation against ialaysia, but the situation
there is capable of thc interpretation that the generals are
proceeding gradually.
I don't think it is helpful to the situation generally
for us to try to pursue the possibilities in public debate.
I would prefer to see how these things work out.
Q. ( Far Eastern Economic Review)
Sir, you spoke of the Viet Cong: they cannot finally
succeed, I think were the words you chose.
WJere you referring to the situation inilitarily or
politically or both?
MR. HOLT: I would say both.
I'm certainly confident that they will not succeed
militarily. I don't mean by that that they won't do damage here or
there, or be a serious m~ ilitary problem perhaps for some long
time., but I do believe the military strength which has been built
up is so massive and is being so well applied, is being supplemented
by well thought out schemes of civic action and rural development,
that the Viet Cong are not going to achieve the objectives that
they have set for themselves.
It may very well be that, as they find the military
situation becoming more difficult for them, they will either revert
to more off the guerrilla type activity w,, hich marked their earlier
phases of operation, or they may it's not a question of or, in
an exclusive sense, " and" they may, " or they may, whichever
way things work out, turn their attention increasingly to the
political situation an-j with so many different groups and
different sects, different interestsY, there's a fertile field
for trouble making.
The other possibility too, which I think has to be
thought about quite seriously, is that the Communists may shift
front to other areas of South-East Asia and there are some signs
that they have been iioving: in other directions, particularly
Thailand, Laos. This could be intensified.
Q. ( Straits Times)
There have been reports that because Singapore and
11alaysiQ have-been unable to draw up fornal riachiftery for
defence arrnnngements, Australia havs found it difficult to put
forward. some kind of defence plan for Singapore.
Are those reports true, or have you anything to say on
that?
MR. HOLT: So far as I am aware, our Dlans have been going ahead.
It may well be that because of the lack of an agreed
defence arrangement between the two countries, that there has
been some delay in completion of' the plan, but I would~ n't be
speaking in any critical tone of that.
Indeed, I would find this matter mnore closely in the
province of my colleague, the Minister for External Affairs, or
possibly the Minister for Defence.
But quite obviously the closer the teamwork, and the
relationship, the collaboration, the friendship between Ialaysia
and Singapore, the more advantageously we believe this operates
for all of us who have common interests in this area.
We certainly don't wish to complicate the problem of
either negotiation or mutual discussion by including views which
may not necessarily be welcome views.
We watch with a sympathetic interest the efforts which
both countries are making to establish a cordial and co-operative
relationship.