COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SPEECH
The Rt. Hon. HAROLD HOLT, M. P.
ON
GOVERNMENT POLICY
Ministerial Statement
[ From the Parliamentary Debates," 24th March 1966]
Mr. HAROLD HOLT ( Higgins-Prime
Minister Speaker, the Leader
of the Opposition ( Mr. Caiwell) has proposed
an amendment to the motion that the
paper -that I presented to the House on 8th
March be printed, that motion providing
an opportunity for honorable members to
debate my statement. It is one of the major
ironies of Australian politics that the
amendment, which is claimed to be virtually
a motion of no confidence, has been submitted
by a leader who is unsure of his
leadership of his party and, indeed, unsure
of the deputy leadership of his party, to
say nothing of his party's policies. He is
* certain of only one thing-that each member
of his party must toe the line of dictation
from its. outside organisation or face
expulsion from the party. This, Sir, is the
alternative government that the Australian
Labour Party offers to the Australian
people. However, I do not intend tonight to
engage in a lengthy political argument with
honorable gentlemen opposite. I have more
important business to attend to in the
limited time available to me and there will
be other opportunities for these issues to
be thrashed out between us.
The amendment proporsed by the Leader
of the Opposition challenges a major aspect
of the Government's financial policy and
3 672/ 66 military strategy. He has attacked a vital
aspect of the measures designed to maintain
our military forces at the desired level
and at their highest degree of effectiveness.
The gulf that lies between the Government
and the Opposition in these matters has
been clearly revealed and the Parliament
has very properly been concentrating its
attention on this division over what becomes
for governments and parliaments the most
important subject that they have to discuss
-the security of the nation. There is a
clear choice between what the Government
has decided and what the Opposition proposes.
These matters have been vigorously
debated. The Government and its supporters
hold firmly to their view of the necessities
of the situation. Indeed, as recently as
yesterday Government supporters in both
Government parties and in both Houses of
the Parliament requested me to say publicly
on their behalf that they unanimously support
the Government in its policies in relation
to both South Vietnam and the use of
national servicemen. The Opposition persists
with its resistance to the point at which
it describes these issues as being appropriate
for determination at a general election. Sir,
the Government accepts full and final responsibility
for its decisions and will be
answerable for them. It is confident that as
the public becomes fully informed about
what is involved in these issues the people
will give strong backing to it.
One thing that should be noted is that
the Government, while it has final responsibility,
has acted after seeking the best
advice available to it from its own defence
advisers and on information that it has obtained
from allied and other friendly governments.
This Government takes its decisions
on defence against the background
of advice from competent and experienced
officers, both Service and civil. I should
like to make it clear that the Government
does -not act in a vacuum or on impulse
or for some political purpose. The first concern
of any Australian government must be
the security of this country, and procedures
have been established to assist the
Government in arriving at sound decisions
in this vital area of policy. The Government
works on the basis of long range
strategic appreciations submitted to it by
its professional advisers in the fields of external
affairs and strategic, military and economic
matters. This advice is channelled
to the Government through two principal
bodies. There is the Defence Committee
under the chairmanship of the Secretary of
the Department of Defence. It is composed
of the Chiefs of Staff and the Permanent
Heads of the Departments of Defence and
External Affairs, -the Prime Minister's Department
and the Treasury. This Committee
deals with questions involving the widest
issues of defence policy. For professional
military advice, the Government looks to
the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which is
composed of the Chairman of the Chiefs
of Staff and the heads of the three Services.
The strateg'ic appreciations placed before
the Government take into account future
trends in the international situa-tion, the
assessment of possible threats to our security,
and contingency plans developed in
consultation with our allies. A great range of
information is available to the Government
from our own and allied sources, though
naturally this cannot all be made public.
There is an analysis of this as it bears on
the problems of Australia's security, and
conclusions are placed before the Government
by men of experience and judgment.
This is something which proceeds on a continuing
basis, for we do not get our advice from a Federal executive outside this
Parliament. We get ours from the Government's
official advisers. By a systematic
process of discerning the fundamental issues
that determine our security, we project our
thinking forward as far as is reasonably
possible. The decisions on defence, I repeat,
are decisions of the Government. But in
arriving at those decisions, the Government
takes into account the* considered conclusions
of its professional advisers in all
the relevant fields.
The fundamental difference between the
attitude of the Government and its supporters
and the attitude of Opposition members
is that we see the events in South Vietnam
against the historical background of postwar
Communist aggression. It seems to us
utterly lacking in realism to ignore the part
that Russian and Chinese Communism has
played in the encouragement of aggression
in South Vietnam and the material assistance
given by the Russian and Chinese Governments
to the Communist Government of
North Vietnam. The members of the Vietcoyng
have taken their direction from Hanoi.
It is only by ignoring the role of Communism
in the postwar ideological contest
that the Leader of the Opposition and his
supporters can have come to the hopelessly
unrealistic conclusion that this is merely a
civil war and that we should let the Vietnamese,
North and South, sort out the
situation for themselves. It should be noted
that of the four political parties represented
in, the National Parliament, three-the
Liberal Party of Australia, the Australian
Country Party and the Australian Democratic
Labour Party-L-take the same view
of events in South-' Vietnam and of their
significance. The view of the Commonwealth
Government is in accord with that
held by three successive Presidents of the
United States of America-first, President
Eisenhower and President Kennedy and
now President Johnson. On the benches
opposite we have representatives of the one
party that challenges the judgment of the
country's expert advisers and of these three
friendly Presidents of our great ally, the
United States.
South Korea, which was itself so recently
threatened by Chinese Communist aggression,
is supplying in South Vietnam forces
which, proportionate to its population, represent
the same scale of assistance as is
being given by those of the United States.
Australia is helping the free Government
and people of the Republic of South Vietnam
to defend their freedom and independence
against an attack directed and in
large part supplied from North Vietnam.
We are helping to prevent the success of
Communist aggression. If honorable members
opposite want any further proof that
this aggre ' ssion is Communist directed, Sir,
let them examine the findings of the Legal
Committee of the International Commission
for Supervision and Control which was
established to supervise the observance of
the Vietnam ceasefire of 1954. The Commission
is composed of Indian, Polish and
Canadian members. The Legal Committee,
with Pnland objecting, reported in 1962-
There is evidence to show that arms, munitions
and other supplies have been sent from the zone
in the north to the zone in the south with the
objective of supporting, organising and carrying
out hostile activities, including armed attacks,
against the armed forces and administration of
the zone in the south.
One could quote at length the findings
of this Committee firmly establishing intervention
from the North. In the three year
period from 1959 to 1961, the North Vietnam
regime infiltrated 10,000 men into the
South. In 1962, 13,000 additional personnel
were infiltrated and by the end of 1964,
North Vietnam may well have moved over
40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into
South Vietnam. Most recently, Hanoi has
begun to infiltrate elements of the North
Vietnamese Army in increasingly large
numbers. Up to the end of January 1966,
t there was evidence that nine regiments of
regular North Vietnamese forces were fighting
in organised -units in the South. This is
the civil war that -honorable gentlemen opposite
persist in proclaiming it to be.
In the long run, the threat to South Vietnam
is a direct threat to Australia. That is
the view of this Government. We are much
more dangerously placed than is the United
States of America. The previous Prime
Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, announcing
in Parliament on 29th April 1965 the decision
to send the 1st Battalion to Vietnam
said-The takeover of South Vietnam would be a
direct military threat to Australia and to the
countries of South and South East Asia. It must
be seen as a part of a thrust by Communist China
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Yet honorable gentlemen opposite continue
to deny that this is the situation in
that part of the world.
Mr. Calwell.-We do.
Mr. SPEAKER.-Order! A number of
honorable members persist in loudly interjecting.
I remind the House that the Prime
Minister is limited to 20 minutes. The
challenger was unlimited. I ask honorable
members to observe the Standing Orders. If
they do not do so, I shall have to deal with
them. Mr. HAROLD HOLT.-We cannot leave
the containment of aggressive Communism
in Asia to our allies and their national
servicemen. The United States has made a
sustained, firm and large commitment to
the South Vietnamese Government and
people. As leaders of our own Government
have said previously our stake in preserving
the security of South East Asia is at least as
great as that of the United States. It would
be outside the character of the Australian
people to leave the fighting to the Americans
in what we know are also our interests and
our causes.
It is within our capacity to make the
enlarged contribution which we have
offered. The Army forces to be deployed to
South Vietnam will constitute approximately
10 per cent., in terms of personnel
numbers, of the strength of 40,000, to which
it has been approved the Army is to rise
by 1967. The Government's enlarged
contribution to South Vietnam has been
measured against all our other commitments
including those to Malaysia and Singapore.
It has been of great value and reassurance
to us to know of the United Kingdom's
declared intention to maintain a strong
military presence in this area. The deployments
to South Vietnam are also, of course,
fully consistent with our obligations and
requirements to retain adequate forces for
the defence of Australia and its Territories,
including Papua and New Guinea.
Now, Sir, I turn to the question of the
introduction of national service. The
Menzies Government conducted a review of
Australia's defence position in 1964 against
a background of an accelerated deterioration
in the strategic situation in South East Asia.
China had committed open aggression
against India. North Vietnam, with the
encouragement of China, had increased its
terrorist and insurgency campaign against
South Vietnam. Communist armed activity
continued in Laos. There was a resurgence
of Communist terrorism in northern Malaya,
and Indonesia had stepped up its armed
confrontation of Malaysia.
In his report to the Parliament on 10th
November 1964, the then Prime Minister,
Sir Robert Menzies, pointed out that Indonesian
attacks against Malaysia could create
a real risk of war, and that Australia must
prepare for all eventualities including the
control and, if necessary, defence of the
frontier between West New Guinea and the
Territory of Papua and New Guinea. Our
defence review showed clearly that the
likely military situations Australia must be
prepared to face had increased in number
and complexity. Does anybody opposite
deny that? It was apparent that the tasks
already entered upon must be maintained
and that ' a rapid buildup of ground forces
would be required to enable this to be done
and to prepare against further possible
contingencies including an increase in cold
war commitments; meeting agreed commitments
under collective security agreements
if called upon; providing bilateral assistance
to our allies if required at short notice;
increased provision for the defence of Australia
and her Territories; and the development
of forces against a further erosion of
the strategic situation in South East Asia
and as a basis for rapid expansion in the
event of war.
The Regular Army strength at the time
was 22,750. The assessment by the Chiefs
of Staff Committee of the actual, foreseeable
and contingency tasks showed that an
effective Army strength of 33,000 was required
by the end of 1966. All practicable
steps were taken -to attract an increase in
volunteers for the Regular Army. Pay was
increased, conditions of service were improved,
quarters were modernised, the number
of married quarters was increased,
amenities were improved, the retirement
benefits scheme was streamlined and an
intensive recruiting campaign was undertaken.
These measures produced some
additional recruits. It became evident, however,
that in a time of great prosperity with
over full employment and intense competition for young men, it was not possible
to obtain the necessary increase in effective
strength within the time required. A survey
of recruiting trends showed that some 3,000
volunteers would be recruited each year for
the Army. Allowing for wastage as members
completed their engagements and return
to civil life, the net increase in strength
would be only of the order of 750 a year.
To obtain an increase of some 10,000 in
strength in two years, there was no alternative
to the introduction of selective national
service. No party in this place has a monopoly
of concern for the young manhood of Australia
and it is an unwarranted presumption
on the part of any member of Parliament
to claim it. But this Government has concern
for the national security of Australia
and when our security, on the advice of expert
advisers, had to be supported in the
way we have been told as tor the numbers
required, we faced quite realistically and
firmly in the national interest the harsh
decision which then lay ahead of us. We
have an illustration of how the Opposition
would have met that kind of challenge. Our
national security produced the need for a
national service scheme and, accepting that
need, what fairer or more democratic
method of selection could be devised?
Mr. Calwell.-The lottery of death.
Mr. HAROLD HOLT.-That is the way
the Leader of the Opposition distorts the
sitbation. He is running true to form
because when his own former leader introduced
in a time of national peril a scheme
to call up young men in th-is country for
national service, he opposed it. The honorable
gentleman resisted it and he is running
true to form again. The honorable gentleman
cannot get his mind on economic
matters away from the depression years of
the 1930' s. On the defence matters, he cannot
get his mind outside the conscription
issues of 1916 and 1917. What Australia
needs is a government which faces * up to
the reality that here we have a country
which is expected to shoulder its own share
of obligations. With maturing nationhood, it
is proud to take its share of that responsibility.
I say -that, sure as I1a m that the young
manhood of Australia will accept its obl-igations
with pride and will serve Australia
with credit.
I am glad to be able to tell the House
that in the course of the next month, as I
indicated in my statement, I shall be visiting
our troops in a number of their stations
abroad. I am quite certain that when I
come back to this Parliament it will be
with a heartening recognition that this young
Australian battalion which has served us
with such distinction in Vietnam, and our
troops in Thailand, in Malaysia and in
Borneo, are helping to discharge the
national obligations of a country which can stand before the rest of the world proudly,
knowing that it has faced up to the need
to maintain the eternal vigilance that is
necessary for the preservation of freedom
throughout this troubled world.
We shall not be deterred from that course
by the threats of the Opposition. We are
confident that once the Australian people
know the realities of the situation they have
to face they will support this Government
and they will support Australia's young
manhood in the testing time that lies ahead.
BY AUTHORITY: A. J. ARTHUR, COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT PRINTER, CANBERRA.
3762/ 66.-2